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SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE
Picture Macbeth alone on stage, staring intently into empty 
space. ‘Is this a dagger which I see before me?’ he asks, grasp-
ing decisively at the air. On one hand, this is a quintessentially 
theatrical question. At once an object and a vector, the dagger 
describes the possibility of knowledge (‘Is this a dagger’) in 
specifi cally visual and spatial terms (‘which I see before me’). 
At the same time, Macbeth is posing a quintessentially philo-
sophical question, one that assumes knowledge to be both 
conditional and experiential, and that probes the relationship 
between certainty and perception as well as intention and 
action. It is from this shared ground of art and inquiry, of 
theatre and theory, that this series advances its basic premise: 
Shakespeare is philosophical.
It seems like a simple enough claim. But what does it 
mean exactly, beyond the parameters of this specifi c moment 
in Macbeth? Does it mean that Shakespeare had something 
we could think of as his own philosophy? Does it mean that 
he was infl uenced by particular philosophical schools, texts 
and thinkers? Does it mean, conversely, that modern phi-
losophers have been infl uenced by him, that Shakespeare’s 
plays and poems have been, and continue to be, resources for 
philosophical thought and speculation? 
The answer is yes all around. These are all useful ways 
of conceiving a philosophical Shakespeare and all point to 
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lines of enquiry that this series welcomes. But Shakespeare 
is philosophical in a much more fundamental way as well. 
Shakespeare is philosophical because the plays and poems 
actively create new worlds of knowledge and new scenes of 
ethical encounter. They ask big questions, make bold argu-
ments and develop new vocabularies in order to think what 
might otherwise be unthinkable. Through both their scenar-
ios and their imagery, the plays and poems engage the quali-
ties of consciousness, the consequences of human action, 
the phenomenology of motive and attention, the conditions 
of personhood and the relationship among different orders 
of reality and experience. This is writing and dramaturgy, 
moreover, that consistently experiments with a broad range 
of conceptual crossings, between love and subjectivity, nature 
and politics, and temporality and form. 
Edinburgh Critical Studies in Shakespeare and Philosophy 
takes seriously these speculative and world-making dimen-
sions of Shakespeare’s work. The series proceeds from a core 
conviction that art’s capacity to think – to formulate, not 
just refl ect, ideas – is what makes it urgent and valuable. 
Art matters because, unlike other human activities, it estab-
lishes its own frame of reference, reminding us that all acts of 
creation – biological, political, intellectual and amorous – are 
grounded in imagination. This is a far cry from business-as-
usual in Shakespeare studies. Because historicism remains the 
methodological gold standard of the fi eld, far more energy 
has been invested in exploring what Shakespeare once meant 
than in thinking rigorously about what Shakespeare contin-
ues to make possible. In response, Edinburgh Critical Studies 
in Shakespeare and Philosophy pushes back against the criti-
cal orthodoxies of historicism and cultural studies to clear 
a space for scholarship that confronts aspects of literature 
that can be neither reduced to nor adequately explained by 
particular historical contexts. 
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Shakespeare’s creations are not just inheritances of a past 
culture, frozen artefacts whose original settings must be expertly 
reconstructed in order to be understood. The plays and poems 
are also living art, vital thought-worlds that struggle, across 
time, with foundational questions of metaphysics, ethics, poli-
tics and aesthetics. With this orientation in mind, Edinburgh 
Critical Studies in Shakespeare and Philosophy offers a series 
of scholarly monographs that will reinvigorate Shakespeare 
studies by opening new interdisciplinary conversations among 
scholars, artists and students.
Kevin Curran
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Part I
Confl icting Moral Visions
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Shakespeare’s Moral Compass is an attempt to uncover and 
defi ne the moral framework that binds and blinds the char-
acters of the most famous body of plays in world literature. 
I write at a time when some feel that Western civilisation is 
at a moment of crisis. It is a moment in which many of us 
are taking stock and looking for meaning. It is a moment in 
which it somehow feels apposite to look, as so many previous 
generations have looked, to the great literature of the past for 
some insight, and perhaps even for some guidance. Certain 
commentators worry that many people in Europe and North 
America appear to have lost ‘the “tragic sense of life”. They 
have forgotten what the World War II generation so pain-
fully learnt: that everything you love, even the greatest and 
most cultured civilizations in history, can be swept away by 
people who are unworthy of them.’1 Indeed, in drawing on 
modern psychological studies, as I do throughout this book, 
in some sense I prove the idea that ‘it has taken modern sci-
ence to remind us what our grandparents knew’.2 What did 
they know about human morality? What did Shakespeare 
know about it? 
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In recent years, studies of Shakespeare’s plays have con-
cerned themselves with everyday objects and ‘matter’ rather 
than with questions of philosophy or moral value. As ideol-
ogy critique has fallen out of fashion, scholars and critics 
have turned their attentions from thinking to living: it mat-
ters less what Shakespeare and his contemporaries thought 
and believed, and rather more how they prepared and ate 
their meals. How did they sleep? How did they arrange their 
furniture? What did their typical wardrobe contain? These 
and other such fascinating topics have dominated the past 
ten years of Shakespeare scholarship. At its best, this work 
has made us seriously rethink some of our ideas about lit-
erature in the early modern period,3 but at its worst it has 
been a lapse into workaday positivism – an unwitting wind-
ing back of the clock, as if the new historicists had never 
heard of Hayden White and the cultural materialists had 
decided that Raymond Williams and Louis Althusser were 
not worth worrying about after all.4 In their introduction to 
Shakespeare and Renaissance Ethics (2014), a recent book 
that has bucked this dominant trend, Patrick Gray and John 
D. Cox draw attention to the increasingly unrefl ective literal-
mindedness of much of this work:
Studying Shakespeare and ethics has been discouraged . . . 
by the recent appearance of a new positivism. This inter-
est seems to have been born of the desire to avoid high-
fl ying theoretical controversy, but it is also indebted to the 
taking up of materialistic premises into a new set of com-
mon assumptions. . . . In contrast to ‘Theory’, the local 
history of specifi c objects seems reassuring, because it is 
‘scientistic’. It eschews risky ‘big ideas’ in favour of tan-
gible, quantifi able, and easily identifi ed evidence. . . . In 
short, the pendulum of critical momentum, having swung 
too far in the direction of abstract theorizing, may now be 
at risk of swinging too far in the opposite direction, that 
of materialist detail. . . . A diet of minutiae is too ascetic; 
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literary criticism lives and breathes, properly speaking, in 
the intersection, the connection, between the abstract and 
the concrete, the universal and the particular.5 
William James separated issues into ‘living or dead . . . 
momentous or trivial’.6 In focusing so squarely on early 
modern living, these positivist studies have ended up con-
centrating on issues that are actually dead and trivial. Did 
Shakespeare use a knife and fork to eat? Probably, yes.7 It’s a 
dead, trivial question with a single answer. I remain entirely 
unconvinced that it is the job of literary criticism to answer 
such questions; they are best left to the museum curator and 
antiquarian historian. By contrast, this book can be seen as 
part of a slowly building move to bring literature to bear 
on philosophical questions, what Stanley Stewart has called, 
provocatively, ‘the Litrifi cation of Philosophy’.8 I want to ask 
the sorts of probing questions that brought us to read litera-
ture in the fi rst place. How can we characterise the moral 
vision of Shakespeare’s plays? This is a living, momentous 
question – much more suited to the task of literary criti-
cism than the recent museum work – and it will take me the 
remainder of this book to attempt an answer. 
I started writing this book during the summer of 2016 
in the aftermath of the historic ‘Brexit’ vote (the UK’s with-
drawal from the European Union), a few weeks after Michael 
Gove was widely seen has having stabbed his long-time friend 
and associate Boris Johnson in the back by putting himself 
in the running to be prime minister while denouncing his 
ally. The move drew instant comparisons with Shakespeare’s 
more Machiavellian characters as well as his plays – most 
obviously Julius Caesar.9 In the event, Gove would pay the 
price, as he was sacked from the cabinet by the new Prime 
Minister, Theresa May, while Johnson was elevated to For-
eign Secretary. The episode illustrates two things: fi rst, ethics 
is still a ‘living’ issue of real concern to real people; second, 
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Shakespeare’s plays are seen by the general public as being 
directly relevant and comparable to real-life happenings. 
The fact that Gove’s betrayal might be compared to that of 
Marcus Brutus at all also suggests an underlying similarity in 
the moral values at stake in both the play and our own time. 
We might be living in a very different moment from Ancient 
Rome or Shakespeare’s London, but we can still recognise 
treachery when we see it. 
Where do these moral values come from? Peter Kreeft 
observes:
Looking at history, we can see that pre-modern societies 
saw these values as objective, and as universal, absolute, 
and unchanging, and it wasn’t until the advent of the mod-
ern Western society that philosophers began to claim them 
to be subjective, meaning that they are culturally relative, 
changing and man-made. These two viewpoints continue 
today and are highly critical of one another.10 
Until fairly recently, it was generally the case that responses 
to Kreeft’s questions would split down the political lines of 
left and right: those on the conservative right incline to the 
pre-modern view that morality is absolute and unchanging, 
while those on the liberal left – and especially those in the 
humanities – have strongly inclined to the view that it is rela-
tive, changing and man-made. However, as Clancy Martin 
points out, this dichotomy has recently been disturbed by 
developments in the sciences:
Scientifi c research and evolutionary theory is increasingly 
showing that we may actually be naturally inclined toward 
a universal set of moral intuitions that we might collec-
tively call the good. It turns out that the latest scientifi c 
research shows that we have a kind of baseline sense for 
morality that transcends the relativity of cultural, social, or 
historical position.11 
I will elaborate on some of these developments shortly. 
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This living, momentous and ultimate question of the 
origins of moral values generates three smaller and more 
specifi c (though no less living or momentous) ones: fi rst, 
in their moral philosophy, were the early moderns closer 
to the ancients or to modern Western society? That is, did 
they think morality was objective or subjective? Second, 
through his depictions of characters and their relationships 
in situ, does Shakespeare tend towards one of these views 
more than the other? Third, what moral values in particular 
did Shakespeare foreground through representation in his 
plays? It is the aim of this book to answer all three of these 
questions. 
This book is divided into two parts. In Part I, I seek to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of morality in Shake-
speare’s time. In Chapter 2, I will situate Moral Foundations 
Theory in its broader frameworks of philosophy, politics 
and evolutionary ethics. The long Chapter 3 will provide the 
historical and philosophical frameworks in which we can 
seriously consider my questions in an informed way. It maps 
the moral landscape of England during the time in which 
Shakespeare was writing by tracing the infl uence of four 
Hellenistic approaches to moral philosophy (virtue ethics 
in the Aristotelian–Thomist tradition, Stoicism, scepticism, 
Epicureanism). Chapter 4 complicates the picture further by 
considering the impact of the Protestant Reformation and the 
challenge posed by John Calvin to the synthesised humanist 
moral systems that had been developing during the Renais-
sance. It also considers the impact of the rise of capitalism, 
which is broadly coincident with that of Protestantism. 
Building on this historical and philosophical understand-
ing, Part II focuses on moral foundations in Shakespeare’s 
plays. Chapter 5 focuses on what previous generations of 
critics have had to say about Shakespeare and morality. 
Chapters 6 to 11 each centre on one of six moral foundations 
(authority, loyalty, fairness, sanctity, care and liberty), which 
I will explain further in the following section.
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The remainder of the present chapter divides into two 
sections. In the fi rst, I will outline some recent developments 
in thinking about morality derived from evolutionary psy-
chology, which have broadly been given the name ‘Moral 
Foundations Theory’ (MFT). In the second, I will refi ne my 
thoughts on literary character and cognition, before expand-
ing on how I intend to use them to approach the question of 
morality in Shakespeare’s plays. For the purposes of clarity, 




‘Jesus died for somebody’s sins but not mine’: so begins Patti 
Smith’s ‘Gloria’ from her seminal album Horses (1975),12 at 
once an audacious rejection of faith and a statement of cul-
tural and moral relativism. The speaker rejects Christian sal-
vation, while at the same time acknowledging its possibility 
for believers. The verse ends with an assertion of property 
rights: ‘My sins my own / They belong to me, me.’ Insomuch 
as one would expect an urbane and educated Westerner 
from the late twentieth century to believe that there is nei-
ther an absolute, universal morality nor an original, collec-
tive sin, Smith’s speaker is undeniably a product of her time 
and place. The repetition of ‘me’ is marked and suggests an 
individualistic and subjective moral system defi ned mainly by 
the self: my sin, therefore my values and my ethical code. It is 
a modern, self-centred view of ethics that has come to typify 
the so-called ‘Me’ Generation to which Smith belongs (and 
indeed its children). In such a moral system, the primacy of 
self-determination outstrips any sense of social responsibility. 
As another of its popular voices sang a decade earlier, ‘I’m 
free to do what I want any old time.’13 A modern, Western 
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individual is far more likely to bridle at the feeling of their 
own value system being judged than to feel a sense of shame 
for their ‘sins’ (as externally defi ned by, for example, tradi-
tional Christian ethics), which – as in Smith’s song – can be 
worn almost as badges of pride. There is a general distaste for 
the ‘old’ values, such as respect for and trust in authority or 
the idea that we should avoid sensual pleasures because they 
are ‘sinful’, and a corresponding valorising of individual lib-
erty and expression, and, indeed, pleasure-seeking, without 
apparent guilt or consequence. 
In his infl uential book, The Righteous Mind (2012) – which 
will inform the present study, Jonathan Haidt calls individuals 
such as Patti Smith’s speaker ‘WEIRD’: that is, ‘Western, edu-
cated, industrial, rich, and democratic’. According to Haidt:
[WEIRD] societies are statistical outliers on many psycho-
logical measures, including measures of moral psychol-
ogy. . . . The WEIRDer you are, the more you perceive a 
world full of separate objects, rather than relationships. . . . 
The moral domain is unusually narrow in WEIRD cultures, 
where it is largely limited to the ethic of autonomy (i.e., 
moral concerns about individuals harming, oppressing, or 
cheating other individuals). It is broader – including the 
ethics of community and divinity – in most other societies, 
and within religious and conservative moral matrices within 
WEIRD societies.14 
Modern Western liberal morality is distinguished from the 
moral systems of almost all other known cultures by its 
intense focus on the self: the basic unit of analysis is not the 
group, family or community, but rather the individual. This is 
even true of utilitarianism, which ostensibly makes its calcu-
lations for the greater good of the group, because in those cal-
culations individuals become discrete data points – ‘separate 
objects’ – which are taken to be autonomous and self-serving 
rather than bound by social or familial relations. 
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This is a key realisation when considering the issue of 
Shakespeare and morality: English society of the 1590s and 
early 1600s was pre-industrial, non-democratic and mostly 
uneducated, and religion played a much more signifi cant 
role in daily life – it can scarcely qualify as ‘WEIRD’. One 
would expect, therefore, to fi nd the broader moral domain 
that Haidt describes. This domain consists of the six moral 
foundations around which I have structured Part II of this 
book. These are described as follows:
1. Authority / subversion: This foundation was shaped by our long 
primate history of hierarchical social interactions. It underlies 
virtues of leadership and followership, including deference to 
legitimate authority and respect for traditions.
2. Loyalty / betrayal: This foundation is related to our long his-
tory as tribal creatures able to form shifting coalitions. Loyalty 
underlies virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifi ce for the group. It 
is active any time people feel that it’s ‘one for all, and all for one’. 
3. Fairness / cheating: This foundation is related to the evolution-
ary process of reciprocal altruism. It generates ideas of justice, 
rights, and autonomy.
4. Sanctity / degradation: This foundation was shaped by the psy-
chology of disgust and contamination. It underlies religious 
notions of striving to live in an elevated, less carnal, more noble 
way. It underlies the widespread idea that the body is a temple 
that can be desecrated by immoral activities and contaminants 
(an idea not unique to religious traditions).
5. Care / harm: This foundation is related to our long evolution 
as mammals with attachment systems and an ability to feel 
(and dislike) the pain of others. It underlies virtues of kindness, 
gentleness and nurturance.
6. Liberty / oppression: This foundation is about the feelings of 
reactance and resentment people feel toward those who domi-
nate them and restrict their liberty. Its intuitions are often in 
tension with those of the authority foundation. The hatred of 
bullies and dominators motivates people to come together, in 
solidarity, to oppose or take down the oppressor.15
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According to Haidt and others, these six foundations are 
innate in human moral thinking, and therefore universal. 
This is not to say that everyone responds equally to all 
six foundations – indeed, Western liberals tend to respond 
only to care, fairness and liberty and are somewhat blind 
to the other three (more on this in the next chapter) – but 
rather that we each have the capacity to respond to them. 
Haidt makes an analogy to taste receptors on the tongue: 
we all have the capacity to taste sweet, salty or sour foods, 
but that does not mean that we all must necessarily like the 
taste of those foods. Gary Marcus makes another analogy – 
that the brain is like a book, which at birth already has a 
rough draft written in outline, even though no chapters are 
complete: ‘Nature provides a fi rst draft, which experience 
then revises. . . . “Built-in” does not mean unmalleable; it 
means “organized in advance of experience”.’16 As Scott 
M. James elaborates, ‘We do not come into the world as 
blank slates, as many commonly assume . . . our heads are 
full of psychological adaptations.’17
Culture can mediate, mould and shape our natural ten-
dencies, but there is a limit to the extent to which this is 
possible:
[O]ne of the deathblows to behaviorism was the demon-
stration that animals have constraints on learning: some 
pairings of stimuli and responses are so heavily prepared 
that the animal can learn them on a single training trial, 
while other associations go against the animal’s nature 
and cannot be learned in thousands of trials. Virtue theo-
ries would thus be improved if they took account of the 
kinds of virtues that ‘fi t’ with the human mind and of the 
kinds that do not. Virtues are indeed cultural achieve-
ments, but they are cultural achievements built on and 
partly constrained by deeply rooted preparednesses to 
construe and respond to the social world in particular 
ways.18 
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Incidentally, this echoes a passage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics:
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, 
intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its 
growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience 
and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of 
habit, whence also its name (ēthikē) is one that is formed 
by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From 
this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in 
us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a 
habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which 
by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move 
upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it 
up ten thousand times; nor can fi re be habituated to move 
downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves 
in one way be trained to behave in another.19 
Virtues can be socially constructed and learned, but they 
must still work by activating the innate moral ‘modules’ or 
taste receptors. We cannot go against our natures; our sense 
of virtue in part derives from this. Historically, in moral 
philosophy, this has been called ‘natural law’. 
However, it is important that we do not commit the natu-
ralistic fallacy and mistake is for ought. Just because nature 
pushes us in a certain direction, it does not follow that it is 
therefore morally justifi ed.20 Nor does it follow that culture 
must follow the dictates of nature, even if it is constrained by 
it. As Daniel Dennett puts it, 
no matter how potent cultural forces are, they always have 
to act on the materials genetic forces have shaped for them, 
and will go on shaping, but they can just as readily redirect 
or exploit or subvert those genetically endorsed designs as 
attenuate or combat them.21 
In Richard Dawkins’s famous line ‘We, alone on earth, can 
rebel against the tyranny of the selfi sh replicators.’22 The 
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relationship between nature and culture thus may take the 
form of being mutually assured, in mutual tension, a com-
plex set of checks and balances, or some other confi guration. 
As I will explore in this book, it is quite possible that the 
moral signals an individual receives from their natural intu-
itions might diverge sharply and even contradict the signals 
received from culture. Indeed, often in Shakespeare’s plays, 
ethical decision-making takes place in the ambiguities and 
uncertainties of this space between moral intuition and cul-
tural script.
When it comes to morality, the area in which human nature 
has been most keenly felt in recent scientifi c studies is in ques-
tions of altruism. This is a subject tackled in Richard Dawkins’s 
The Selfi sh Gene (1976), which argues that animals, including 
humans, are capable of selfl essness in the service of their ‘self-
ish genes’ – that is, to ensure the survival of a particular set of 
genes. Dawkins does not see scope for altruism outside of this 
except in cases of quid pro quo arrangements of mutual ben-
efi t, also known as reciprocal altruism.23 Following Charles 
Darwin’s idea of group selection, and utilising concepts from 
Émile Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
(1915),24 Haidt argues (contra Dawkins) that while humans 
are naturally selfi sh, they are also naturally groupish: ‘I mean 
that our minds contain a variety of mental mechanisms that 
make us adept at promoting our group’s interests, in competi-
tion with other groups. We are not saints, but we are some-
times good team players.’25 According to Haidt, individuals 
can temporarily look beyond their own self-interests in a sort 
of momentary transcendence to become part of an organism 
larger than themselves. This effect is somewhat tribal in nature 
and cannot extend to ‘all of humanity’; its effectiveness and 
possibilities for existence necessarily depend on competition 
between different groups. There is no small degree of disagree-
ment over this among evolutionists; I will return to this in 
Chapter 2, but for now the crucial point for us is that, no mat-
ter its exact constitution, evolutionists are agreed that there 
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is an underlying human nature (that is mostly selfi sh), which 
both constrains and shapes moral decision-making.
In addition, Haidt and other advocates of MFT argue 
that moral thinking is primarily intuitive and instinctual, 
rather than deliberative: the intuition comes fi rst and stra-
tegic reasoning follows. Moral reasoning is most often post 
hoc: a justifi cation for a snap judgement made on the spur of 
the moment. His favourite metaphor is that of the elephant 
(intuition) and the rider (reasoning):
When human beings evolved the capacity for language and 
reasoning at some point in the last million years, the brain 
did not rewire itself to hand over the reins to a new and 
inexperienced charioteer. Rather, the rider (language-based 
reasoning) evolved because it did something useful for the 
elephant. . . . The rider is skilled at fabricating post-hoc 
explanations for what the elephant has just done, and it 
is good at fi nding reasons for whatever the elephant wants 
to do next. . . . Reason is the servant of the intuitions. The 
rider was put there in the fi rst place to serve the elephant.26 
It is clear that the elephant is the one in control, with the rider 
acting more like a little defence lawyer. The rider seldom ques-
tions the elephant because of the heuristic of confi rmation 
bias: ‘We make our judgements rapidly, and we are dreadful at 
seeking out evidence that might disconfi rm those initial judge-
ments.’27 Here it is important to make two points clear: fi rst, 
following the work of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio 
and the dual-process theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky,28 MFT views emotions and intuitions as cognitive 
processes – that is, a part of thinking rather than a distinct 
category in opposition to it. The two cognitive systems – 
the elephant and the rider, or intuitions and reasoning – are 
complementary and mostly work together rather than being at 
odds. Second, we must not confl ate intuitions into emotions. 
Emotions are a kind of information processing; as Richard 
Lazarus and Craig A. Smith put it, they ‘are the product of 
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transactions or relationships between the person and the envi-
ronment’.29 Emotions represent one type of intuition, perhaps 
the strongest, but they are seen to be at a heightened level to 
which most intuitions do not reach. Intuitions are rapid and 
automatic, we make them constantly, and most of the time 
they do not fl are up into ‘full-blown emotions’.30 
This set of positions puts MFT at odds with at least 
two different traditions of thought: fi rst, any moral system 
based on rationalist philosophies that give primacy to reason 
alone, which would include thinkers as diverse as Plato, the 
Stoics, Immanuel Kant (deontology) and Jeremey Bentham 
(utilitarianism), as well as the moral psychologist Lawrence 
Kohlberg, whose work MFT challenges;31 and second, any 
socially deterministic mode of thinking that denies human 
nature and gives exclusivity to the structuring forces of cul-
ture, which would include various varieties of Marxism, 
Michel Foucault and the anthropology of Clifford Geertz, 
as well as their inheritors, including the ‘new materialism’. I 
will elaborate on this when discussing the ‘confl ict of visions’ 
between constrained (tragic) and unconstrained (utopian) 
views of humanity in Chapter 2.
MFT’s chief antecedent in the philosophical tradition 
would be David Hume, who argued, of course, that ‘Reason 
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.’32 Thus, in 
the late eighteenth century, its insights came naturally to those 
infl uenced by Hume, such as the New England Federalists. 
For example, here is Fisher Ames, a US Congressman and 
Founding Father, recognising that politics is driven primarily 
by emotion rather than reason:
Politicians have supposed, that man really is what he should 
be; that his reason will do all it can, and his passions and 
prejudice no more than they ought; whereas his reason is a 
mere looker-on; it is moderation, when it should be zeal; it 
is often corrupted to vindicate, where it should condemn; 
and is a coward or a trimmer, that will take hush-money.33 
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This is a near-perfect description of Haidt’s elephant and 
rider written over two centuries before The Righteous Mind.
There is also something of Aristotle’s virtue ethics in 
MFT, which its advocates view as ‘the most psychologically 
sound approach to morality’, because ‘such theories fi t more 
neatly with what we know about moral development, judg-
ment, and behavior than do theories that focus on moral 
reasoning or on the acceptance of high-level moral princi-
ples such as justice’.34 Here ‘virtues’ (such as loyalty, honesty 
and so on) are learned social skills that become so ingrained 
and habitual that they become almost second nature – that 
is, they can start to function on the level of intuitions. I will 
note in passing that in this view, moral virtues are behav-
iours (or habits of action) rather than fi xed character traits 
(I will expand on this in Chapters 2 and 3). 
In this book, I am using MFT primarily as a framing mech-
anism and starting point. I am supposing, at the most general 
level, that Shakespeare and the other members of his culture 
were pre-wired to respond to the six different moral founda-
tions it outlines in whatever way, although the specifi cs of 
those responses are subject to and in tension with their cul-
tural upbringing, which includes a diverse and complex mix of 
different ideas (see Chapters 3 and 4). My concern is primarily 
with how Shakespeare’s plays and the characters that populate 
them respond to each of these moral foundations. We do not 
typically think of Shakespeare as a moralistic writer; his plays 
– distinguished as they are by their polyvocality – can scarcely 
be thought of as being morally didactic or instructive. William 
Hazlitt’s remarks on this are still broadly convincing:
Shakespeare was in one sense the least moral of all writers; 
for morality (commonly so called) is made up of antipathies; 
and his talent consisted in sympathy with human nature, in 
all its shapes, degrees, depressions, and elevations. The object 
of the pedantic moralist is to fi nd out the bad in everything: 
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his was to show that ‘there is some soul of goodness in things 
evil’. . . . In one sense, Shakespeare was no moralist at all: in 
another, he was the greatest of all moralists. He was a moral-
ist in the same sense in which nature is one. He taught what 
he had learnt from her. He showed the greatest knowledge of 
humanity with the greatest fellow-feeling for it.35 
I am not sure that Hazlitt is right that Shakespeare always sees 
‘some soul of goodness’ in his characters; that makes his plays 
perhaps more optimistic than they often are, and I suspect the 
optimism is Hazlitt’s rather than Shakespeare’s. For now it is 
enough to note that, in my scepticism here, I am not suggest-
ing that Shakespeare has a dim view of humanity or that he is 
necessarily pessimistic, but rather that Hazlitt pushes the anal-
ysis too far. It certainly does not hold true for every character. 
Where is the ‘soul of goodness’ in a character like Oswald 
from King Lear? This is not to mention his great villains such 
as Iago, Richard III, or Goneril and Regan. In emphasising the 
obviously humane side of Shakespeare, Hazlitt seems to ignore 
him at his blackest and bleakest – let us say Titus Andronicus 
or Timon of Athens – which one might argue are visions of 
nihilism and misanthropy, respectively. However, this remains 
to be seen and the issue as to whether or not Hazlitt is right 
is one of the recurring themes of this book. I will return to 
this basic theme at numerous junctures, especially in Part II 
(Chapters 5–11). But, whatever the case, Hazlitt is right to say 
that Shakespeare has an extraordinary capacity for empathy 
in his characterisation – he will not write anyone off entirely, 
not even the villains – and this renders futile any attempt to 
locate a single moralistic voice in his plays. Despite that, how-
ever, one expects to fi nd patterns of moral response across his 
works, and the sharp focus on each moral foundation should 
make these patterns easier to fi nd. By this study’s conclusion, 
I hope to have defi ned a six-point ‘moral compass’ derived by 
the responses we fi nd in Shakespeare’s plays.
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In summary
• Moral Foundations Theory claims that human beings are 
‘pre-wired’ to respond to six moral foundations: authority / 
subversion, loyalty / betrayal, fairness / cheating, sanctity / 
degradation, care / harm and liberty / oppression.
• It argues that we experience these responses as near-automatic 
moral intuitions, and that most moral reasoning is post hoc 
justifi cation.
• Culture mediates our moral responses, but is limited in its 
scope by the raw materials of nature.
• Most cultures in history have been rooted in all six moral foun-
dations, but modern Western cultures are statistical outliers in 
that they lean very strongly on the foundations of care / harm 
and liberty / oppression.
• Part II of this book is structured around Shakespeare’s treat-
ment of the six moral foundations outlined above.
II
Literary Character, Morality and the Cognitive 
Reading of Shakespeare’s Plays
As well as being at odds with cultural historicism in vari-
ous forms, MFT also somewhat complicates the assump-
tions of recent studies of Shakespeare that have focused 
on the history of emotion. Following the so-called ‘affec-
tive turn’, these studies tend to view emotions as the post-
linguistic playing out of a learned ‘cultural script’.36 As I 
have made clear, MFT sees language as coming after and 
being in the service of intuitions and emotions. MFT does 
not deny that culture strongly mediates moral responses, but 
it does insist that moral intuitions are at base instinctual; in 
Jonathan Haidt’s phrase, ‘morality is universal, yet cultur-
ally variable’.37 James A. Knapp – to my knowledge the only 
Shakespeare scholar to devote any serious attention to MFT 
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before the present study – gives a concrete example of what 
this might mean in practice:
[T]hough the moral categories invoked to judge a particular 
action are different in different cultural settings, the concept 
of a universal moral sense remains intact: an honor killing 
is a moral act for the brother who is moved by the category 
of purity [‘sanctity / degradation’ in the defi nitions outlined 
above], while it is immoral for the outside observer moved 
by an appeal to [protect from] harm.38 
One culture might lean more heavily on the moral founda-
tion of sanctity / degradation and another more heavily on 
that of care / harm, but the point is that the raw materials of 
these categories are fundamental and felt intuitively rather 
than learned. Knapp continues: ‘Haidt is clear that we have 
the ability to override the initial intuition, and that one way 
to do so is to use moral reasoning to consider the situation.’39 
Implicitly, therefore, I would suggest that the more one 
applies reasoning to a situation, the more one starts to chal-
lenge the natural intuition through cultural learning. We can 
see this in action in Hamlet: clearly, Hamlet has an intuition 
about what he must do, but he insists on reasoning through 
every decision and so dramatises in situ the tension between 
fi rst-level moral instincts and culturally learned ethical rea-
soning (we must not forget he was training to be a lawyer).40 
Haidt’s point, however, is that most of the time, we do not go 
down the same agonising path as Hamlet; we simply make a 
judgement and act on it, and then make our justifi cations or 
excuses after the fact. Hamlet’s case of painstakingly weigh-
ing up all options in a rational manner is the exception rather 
than the rule. It requires a greater mental effort to overturn 
initial moral intuitions than it does to follow them, and most 
of the time we follow them.
There is in this, therefore, an implied tension between 
what an individual should do, as dictated by the cultural 
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scripts of their social conditioning (which, by their very 
nature, have been derived post hoc and rationally), and what 
an individual actually feels in any given moment in which 
ethical decision-making is required. Knapp has suggested 
that we can see this play out in Shakespeare:
Literary characters are notorious for their moral reasoning 
prior to action, and Shakespeare’s characters would seem 
to be no exceptions, a fact that would seem to suggest that 
Shakespeare’s interest was with his characters’ facility with 
moral reasoning rather than their innate moral sense. But 
I want to suggest the opposite – that Shakespeare’s repre-
sentation of moral agency focuses on the way moral con-
viction wells up in his characters against established moral 
principles and in tension with the calm domain of moral 
reasoning. [His concern] is less with adjudicating human 
action according to a set moral code and more with exam-
ining the lived experience of moral agents.41 
He is surely right that Shakespeare’s literary purpose is seldom, 
if ever, to push a particular moral doctrine; he is an exception-
ally undidactic writer. I would suggest that this idea of ‘lived 
experience’, of analysing characters in situations that we can 
imagine as real (or at least alluding to reality), provides us with 
a situated way of thinking about ethics that exceeds what is 
possible in the abstract and rational world of pure philosophy 
and, indeed, most psychology. 
I want to pause briefl y on the signifi cance of Knapp’s idea 
of moral conviction ‘welling up’ in Shakespeare’s characters, 
because it presents a challenge to the way modern psycholo-
gists of character and morality (as distinct from those who 
advocate MFT) have been thinking about both categories. 
It seems to me that Shakespeare’s characters are often more 
fl uid and more dynamic than the personality trait-mapping 
models on which that strand of psychology rests.42 Through 
this ‘welling up’ of feeling, Shakespeare often brings us up 
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against the limits of scientifi c attempts to codify human behav-
iour. The unpredictability and changeability of Shakespeare’s 
characters, therefore, pose a rebuttal to the idea of fi xed per-
sonality traits. Even the most nuanced models available, such 
as Christian B. Miller’s ‘Mixed Trait Framework’, provide an 
essentially static view of character. Shakespeare’s characters 
seem to exceed the stability that such models would assume, 
and one reason for this is because the plays are what psychol-
ogists would call inherently ‘situationist’: that is to say, the 
complex simulations that Shakespeare imagines in the pres-
sured situations of his plays contain too many moving parts, 
too many variables, for psychologists to be able to map or 
reproduce in their experiments. The situatedness of Shake-
speare’s plays shows us in action how people react in chang-
ing circumstances; sometimes those circumstances are even 
transformational. Shakespeare’s understanding of character 
is truly experiential – supposed traits are put to the test even 
as they are introduced. As an immediate example, we might 
think of Angelo in Measure for Measure: it is not long after 
Duke Vincentio describes him as ‘a man of stricture and fi rm 
abstinence’ (I, iii, 12) that he sets about stunningly disprov-
ing that assessment at nearly every turn. Perhaps Angelo was 
never the man that the Duke thought he was, or perhaps his 
supposed traits had never been tested by experience. Angelo 
fi nds himself in changed circumstances and reacts in a way 
that few, probably not even himself, could have predicted. 
Even if some psychologists, such as Miller, accept that ‘most 
people do not have any of the virtues to any degree, although 
a few might possess one or more of them’ and, by the same 
token, that ‘Most people do not have any of the vices to any 
degree, although a few might possess one or more of them,’ 
they still assume at a basic level that people conform to their 
personality traits.43 To my mind, if we accept the insights of 
MFT, this seems a fundamentally wrong-headed and unreal-
istic way to approach moral thinking. The ‘welling up’ that 
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Knapp fi nds in Shakespeare is much closer to how we actu-
ally make moral decisions than any idea of personality traits. 
Character traits, it seems to me, are a post hoc description of 
a response. Macbeth is not a cruel man but he undoubtedly 
becomes cruel; we describe his behaviour as cruel only after 
he does cruel things – this is quite distinct from the logic of 
the personality trait, which says ‘this person is cruel, there-
fore they do cruel things’. Shakespeare’s characterisation, 
at its most engaging and dynamic, does not function on 
the level of fi xed traits; rather, he gives us the process of 
becoming – the spontaneous welling up of feelings that char-
acters almost need to invent new language to describe. 
In 2015, I published a short book called Shakespeare and 
Cognition: Thinking Fast and Slow through Character, in 
which I argued for the central importance of character as a 
unit for literary analysis.44 In this line of thought, I have been 
infl uenced by Michael D. Bristol’s recent work on moral 
agency,45 as well as by Harry Berger, Jr, and A. D. Nuttall.46 
In that book, to use Berger’s phrase, I proposed ‘a modifi ed 
character and action approach’,47 in which the modifi cation 
comes from an understanding of human thought processes 
updated by modern cognitive psychology. In this present 
book, I want to build on that approach by taking advantage 
of the unique opportunity for moral thinking that literature 
– and Shakespeare in particular – afford. Of course, that 
literature provides us with opportunities to consider moral 
quandaries in situ is not a new idea – as Patrick Gray and 
John D. Cox put it succinctly, ‘not new, but . . . also not 
current’48 – but it is one that is being considered again with 
increasingly renewed vigour across the discipline, including 
beyond Shakespeare studies. One recent volume, Fictional 
Characters, Real Problems: The Search for Ethical Content 
in Literature (2016), edited by Garry L. Hagberg, ranges 
across genres and periods, and collects a number of sugges-
tive essays about the fruitful intersections between literature 
and ethics, several of which stress the central importance of 
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character. In one such essay, Eileen John does well to remind 
us that although characters are not real people, we still feel 
as if we have a stake in their fi ctive lives:
[F]ictional characters are in a way representationally exces-
sive and fantastic. They serve as occasions for more, and 
more intense, representational activity than do most real 
people. But they are also manifestations of ordinary activity, 
of putting into words how people and their lives are found 
to be, and we have strong interests at stake in this activity.49 
I think this is an important recognition: literary characters are 
not real people but they allow us to consider aspects of real-
ity. We must, however, expect not verisimilitude – perhaps the 
pipe-dream of a perfected naturalism – but rather an exagger-
ated, heightened, even extreme and distorted version of reality. 
It is also important to recognise that most leading characters 
are hardly going about their everyday lives: we usually glimpse 
them at a moment of crisis, in abnormal conditions. 
Shakespeare specialises in crisis. The imagined worlds 
of his plays place their characters in highly pressured and 
extreme situations and then demand that they react to those 
situations. Shakespeare has a habit of taking a situation 
and then adjusting the variables to see what might happen 
if just one or two details are altered. Think, for example, 
of the pressure he exerts on the friendship of Helena and 
Hermia in Midsummer Night’s Dream through the simple 
device of Puck applying the love potion to Lysander and 
then Demetrius. Was the friendship between Helena and 
Hermia actually contingent on Hermia being the one who 
had the attention of the men? We might think of many 
other examples: Macbeth’s encounter with the weird sisters; 
Lear’s outburst at and subsequent banishment of Cordelia; 
Duke Frederick’s sudden banishment of Rosalind in As 
You Like It; Duke Vincentio’s apparently arbitrary decision 
to delegate his power temporarily to Angelo in Measure 
for Measure; Shylock’s outrageous condition for the loan 
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to Bassanio (namely, a pound of Antonio’s fl esh) in The 
Merchant of Venice; Richard II’s double banishment of 
Bolingbroke and Mowbray; and so on and so forth. These 
are all classic ‘set-ups’ for the necessary dramatic action to 
occur – in most cases, without them there would be no play 
and the plot would collapse – but I would like to take them 
out of their literary context for a moment and imagine them 
as game-like scenarios. The characters are players in a game 
with established rules; Shakespeare intervenes and changes 
the rules and then looks on as his characters scramble to 
react to those changes. Of course, Shakespeare also has con-
trol over how they react but I am imagining him as a writer 
who in some sense lets the characters take on a ‘life of their 
own’. He was able to use his considerable creative powers 
as a conduit for the imagined consciousness of another. In 
fact, as Lynn Enterline has shown brilliantly, this is exactly 
the sort of mental exercise he would have learned from an 
early age through training in classical imitatio.50
Terence Cave’s enormously provocative Thinking with 
Literature: Towards a Cognitive Criticism (2016) calls for 
critics to ‘give priority to the kinds of question that literature 
itself poses, since those questions might well challenge some 
of the positions and perspectives put forward by other disci-
plines’ while recognising ‘that literature does what the human 
mind (cognition) does best – it specialises in cognitive fl uid-
ity, the tangled connectivity and capacity for improvisation 
that enable it to engage with a world in “decoupled” mode’.51 
‘Decoupling’ is a term borrowed from Jean-Marie Schaeffer, 
which describes a complex process by which we are able to 
respond to and become immersed in fi ction (we might say ‘sus-
pension of disbelief’), without invoking our natural defence 
mechanisms against deception.52 We do not mistake fi ction for 
reality but we also do not process it as lies. In Cave’s phrase, 
‘pretence is a weapon; shared pretence is a game.’53 I want to 
suggest that to watch or read a Shakespeare play is to share in 
a pretence, and therefore to participate in a game. 
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So, there are, in fact, two games going on: one played 
between the characters and the other by the audience. The 
fi rst game is being played between the characters struggling to 
adapt to new rules that have placed them in extremis. But since 
the audience cannot possibly participate in that, what sort of 
game are they playing? When I teach the Henry IV plays, I 
ask my students to perform a mock trial for Falstaff. There 
is a prosecution and a defence. One student plays Falstaff, 
who must prepare for the trial in consultation with his defence 
team. Each team is also allowed to call a single witness (played 
by one of themselves) who – after swearing on The Complete 
Works (‘I swear to tell the truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help the Bard’) – will face cross-examination. In my experi-
ence of putting on this mock trial over several years, successive 
classes have, without fail, taken the exercise extremely seri-
ously, perhaps partly owing to the increased stakes of compe-
tition. I want to suggest that it is precisely in this sort of little 
game that every attentive audience or reader of a Shakespeare 
play is participating. We watch how the characters perform 
in their game and simultaneously evaluate their performance 
as judge and jury, as if they were in a mock trial. As the play-
ers engage in their game, we almost automatically assess how 
they are playing it; we make a judgement. In the history plays, 
for example, Shakespeare gives us many different players of 
the political game: ideologues, Machiavellian schemers, naïfs, 
populists, elitists, brutal tyrants, selfi sh self-preservationists, 
and selfl ess servants to the commonwealth. We see who wins, 
who loses, and why: we can see who played the game well and 
who did not.54 But the political is subsumed by the ethical: we 
judge these characters not simply by how well they perform 
in the political arena but also in moral terms. The question is 
not only ‘was he a good king?’ but also ‘was he a good man?’ 
This being Shakespeare, regardless of the king in question, 
the answer is likely to be complex and debatable rather than 
simple and binary. We do not judge only on the character as a 
whole but on their actions as well. Whenever a character acts 
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on a decision, we ask automatically ‘was that the right thing to 
do?’ Sometimes ostensibly good characters make catastrophic 
decisions. Henry VI, in general, is perhaps the most obvious 
example: a terrible king in terms of his political decisions, who 
was none the less quite a good man. 
Our near-automatic judgements on these questions are 
what Michael D. Bristol has called ‘vernacular intuitions’.55 
Assuming competence enough to understand Shakespeare’s 
language, they do not require special scholarly training. Bristol 
mentions his sister’s vernacular intuitions at one point; 
I am reminded of a time when I watched a production of 
Measure for Measure with my mother. She was utterly dis-
gusted at Claudio’s behaviour in III, i, when he begs his sister, 
Isabella, to save his life by sleeping with Angelo and violating 
her vows as a novice nun. It was a genuine, visceral reaction: 
perhaps my mother was responding to the moral foundation 
of sanctity / degradation. Many other modern viewers of the 
play, perhaps moved instead by the foundation of care / harm, 
actually have the opposite reaction: they cannot believe that 
Isabella could be so callous as to let her brother die for the 
sake of a religious principle. In either case, the scenario is pro-
voking a moral intuition. This works so effectively because, 
in most cases, Shakespeare does not appear to judge himself: 
he provides the raw materials for judgements to be made but 
asks the audience to make them. In Shakespeare’s Philosophy: 
Discovering the Meaning Behind the Plays (2006) – a work 
that is stunningly out-of-step with workaday Shakespeare 
scholarship – Colin McGinn recognises this:
The sense in which [Shakespeare] is a great moralist is 
that he is an expert recorder of nature in its moral aspect. 
And not merely a disinterested recorder: for Shakespeare 
is a moral being, like the rest of us. As he records, he also 
evaluates; or better, he provides us with the materials with 
which to evaluate. All he needs to do is accurately describe; 
it is left to the audience’s moral sense to supply the moral 
assessment. . . . His task is essentially cognitive: he must 
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share his knowledge of moral psychology with the audi-
ence, leaving the evaluative part to them.56 
This, I think, is the difference between morality in Shake-
speare’s plays and in philosophy. An average philosopher 
may defi ne their ethics and tell you what to think, a great phi-
losopher may outline a moral framework and tell you how 
to think, but Shakespeare does neither; instead, he throws 
complex, game-like moral situations at the members of the 
audience and asks them to fi gure it all out for themselves. As 
Bristol says, he ‘delineates the question of how to live a good 
life in all its messy uncertainty’.57
The process of moral judgement McGinn and I have been 
describing is what happens near-automatically when, in Bris-
tol’s words, ‘smart, well-educated people who are interested 
in Shakespeare’ (but who are not academics who specialise in 
Shakespeare or literature) engage with the plays.58 It is impor-
tant to be aware of this process because for the remainder of 
this book I wish to attempt to suspend it entirely while being 
alert to it in other critical responses to date: that is to say, this is 
not a reader-response study about my own ‘vernacular’ moral 
intuitions about various scenarios in Shakespeare’s plays. 
I want to gain an understanding of how Shakespeare repre-
sents (or, in McGinn’s terms, ‘describes’) morality in his plays 
by tracing the extent to which characters react to or invoke 
particular moral foundations. To do this properly, it is neces-
sary to put my own moral judgements on hold – not only for 
fear of anachronism, but also because I do not want my own 
moral compass ‘contaminating’ the one that will derive from 
Shakespeare’s plays. It is almost a cliché to point out that:
Whoever writes about Shakespeare, writes to some extent 
about himself or herself. Lawyers, Marxists, Freudians, 
Feminists and others often give in to the temptation to 
put their special interest above all else, and end up sifting 
through Shakespeare’s plays in search of echoes of their 
own preoccupation.59 
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My special interest is in discovering how Shakespeare frames 
and thinks about moral issues. To be clear, this is not a book 
that is concerned with putting characters on trial and asking 
if what they did at a given moment was ethically right or 
wrong. The ‘moral compass’ in its title is not mine or yours 
but Shakespeare’s, as expressed by his characters and their 
relationships in situ. My concern is with how Shakespeare 
represents and develops his own nuanced understandings of 
the six moral foundations: authority, loyalty, sanctity, fair-
ness, liberty and care. In order to do this, it is important to 
develop a deepened historical and cultural understanding of 
moral philosophy in Shakespeare’s time and place, which I 
will provide in Chapters 3 and 4.
In summary
• Lived moral intuitions are often in tension with the offi cial, 
fully rationalised moral doctrines or ‘cultural scripts’.
• Shakespeare’s characters are dynamic and in the process of 
becoming rather than conforming to a set of fi xed personality 
traits, and in this way they exceed trait-based accounts of human 
character provided by one branch of modern psychology.
• An approach to morality in literature must be centred on 
characters and their actions.
• Shakespeare often throws characters into crisis by tweaking 
some aspect of their circumstances and forcing them to ‘react’ 
under pressure; in this way, they are like game scenarios in 
which the rules have been altered. His ethics, therefore, are 
always situated and experiential.
• Audiences and readers of Shakespeare’s plays are invited to 
make moral judgements of characters’ actions and do so near 
automatically.
• This study will not engage in making its own moral judge-
ments of characters and their actions, but rather will focus on 
how Shakespeare depicts the six moral foundations (authority, 
loyalty, sanctity, fairness, liberty and care) and develops his 
own nuanced versions of them.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONSTRAINED VISION OF 
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS
I
A Confl ict of Visions
‘Before Kingdoms change, men must change’1
‘To know the state, fi rst we must know the ethical man’2
In The Cave and the Light (2013), Arthur Herman argues 
that ‘the struggle for the soul of western civilization’ has been 
primarily a philosophical one between Aristotelian empiri-
cism, which lends itself to realism, and Platonist rationalism, 
which lends itself to idealism and ‘the utopian impulse’.3 The 
supreme articulation of this idea is found in Thomas Sowell’s 
A Confl ict of Visions (1987), a book of rare clarity, which 
argues that modern political struggles boil down to two very 
different visions of humanity: the constrained vision and 
the unconstrained vision.4 Later, in The Blank Slate (2002), 
Steven Pinker recast these in perhaps more poetic terms: the 
tragic vision and the utopian vision.5 The political scientist 
Larry Arnhart prefers to call them the ‘realist’ and ‘utopian’ 
visions.6 The constrained (or empiricist, or tragic, or realist) 
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vision sees the limit of human potential in its very nature. 
Humans have essentially unchanging characteristics that con-
strain what can and cannot be expected of them. They are 
primarily selfi sh, greedy and driven by self-interest, although 
they retain some capacity for cooperation. In this view ‘man 
is an individual, an individual born with a natural sociability 
. . . but also a desire to protect his own natural rights and 
his own self-interest’.7 In this tradition, we fi nd an extensive 
line of thinkers; Sowell names Thomas Hobbes, Thomas 
Malthus, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Edmund Burke, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman. 
Scholars of the early modern period would also surely add 
Niccolò Machiavelli to that list. In fact, it seems to me that the 
constrained vision was broadly dominant in Western thought 
until at least John Locke. As we shall see in Chapters 2 
and 3, we can see variants of the constrained vision in 
Aristotle, Epicurus, Cicero, Seneca, Augustine of Hippo and 
John Calvin. These thinkers all, to a certain extent, recognise 
that we have baser instincts that cannot be helped, and so, in 
this vision, moral codes and laws emerge naturally from the 
ancient wisdom of experience. In this view, cultural rituals, 
governments and institutions are necessary checks and bal-
ances to help curb the baser instincts and save humans from 
themselves. This line of thought is encapsulated by Russell 
Kirk, discussing Edmund Burke:
Pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, 
ungoverned zeal, disorderly appetites – these vices are the 
actual causes of the storms that trouble life. ‘Religion, mor-
als, laws, prerogatives, privileges, liberties, rights of men, are 
the pretexts’ for revolution by sentimental humanitarians 
and mischievous agitators who think that established insti-
tutions must be the source of our affl ictions. But the human 
heart, in reality, is the fountain of evil.8
There are no solutions, only trade-offs. There is no hope, for 
example, of somehow stopping people from being selfi sh or 
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greedy, so organisations must devise incentives to lure them 
into more positive behaviours. By the same token, the govern-
ment must ensure that the disincentives for committing crime 
are strong enough to make the costs outweigh the benefi ts. 
In this vision, social processes are so irreducibly complex 
that their mechanisms are beyond the understanding of any 
single individual, and develop over centuries. Because of this, 
those who hold the constrained vision make no real distinc-
tion between intellectuals and the general populace. They 
do not greatly elevate the wisdom of the elites over the wis-
dom of the people, which is inherent in the social processes 
we have developed over the centuries. As Kirk puts it, ‘the 
individual is foolish, but the species is wise; prejudices and 
prescriptions and presumptions are the instruments which 
the wisdom of the species employs to safeguard man against 
his own passions and appetites’.9 No one can engineer solu-
tions to provide better outcomes for the whole because no 
one’s understanding of these processes can possibly be good 
enough to predict their possible consequences. It is for this 
reason that they focus instead on incentives. 
Against all of this, we can contrast the unconstrained 
(or rationalist, or utopian) vision. In this vision, there are vir-
tually no natural limits on what human beings can achieve 
because human behaviour is contingent on its social and envi-
ronmental conditions, which can be transcended through our 
powers of reason. This means humans are ‘perfectible’ in a 
way that is seen to be impossible by those who hold the con-
strained vision. Indeed, Edmund Burke was ‘contemptuous of 
the notion of human perfectibility’.10 This is what Pinker calls 
‘The Blank Slate’. This view of the world is encompassed in 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s phrase ‘man is born free, and every-
where he is in chains’.11 According to this vision, the main 
thing holding humanity back from achieving its full potential 
is not its nature, but rather its bad old institutions and other 
such social contrivances. If only we could get those institu-
tions right, if only we could somehow reconfi gure society in 
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such and such a way, then the problems that have dogged 
human history till now would go away, and the rest would 
follow. The unconstrained vision ‘insists that inherited insti-
tutions are diseased and oppressive, traditional values dis-
sembling and dishonest; and it therefore proposes to supplant 
them with an infi nitely more just and benign way of life’.12 
As Roger Scruton puts it, 
the most important point to notice is that it is [a vision] 
that allows nothing to stand in its way. No existing cus-
tom, institution, law, or hierarchy; no tradition, distinc-
tion, rule or piety can trump [the vision] . . . . Everything 
that does not conform to . . . [its] goal must be pulled down 
and built again, and the mere fact some custom or institu-
tion has been handed down and accepted is no argument 
in its favour.13 
In a memorable passage, speaking of the differences between 
the constrained and unconstrained visions, Sowell writes, 
The issue is not as to whether changes have occurred in 
human history, but whether these are, in effect, changes of 
costumes and scenery or changes of the play itself. In the 
constrained vision, it is mostly the costumes and scenery 
that have changed; in the unconstrained vision, the play 
itself has changed, the characters are fundamentally differ-
ent, and equally sweeping changes are both likely and nec-
essary in the future.14 
In the tradition of the unconstrained vision, Sowell names 
William Godwin, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, 
Thorstein Veblen, George Bernard Shaw, Laurence Tribe and 
John Kenneth Galbraith. As I suggested, scholars of the early 
modern period would surely take it back to John Locke. Of 
course, we can trace back the idea of the tabula rasa much 
further to Aristotle and then the Ancient Stoics such as Zeno 
of Citium, and later some residue of this fi nds its way into 
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Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas. Remarkably, Aristotle can be 
found near the start of both lists – although, as per Herman, 
the tradition of rationalist, utopian thinking surely owes 
more to Plato than it does to his student, even if Plato’s own 
vision was pessimistic.15 It is this broadly unconstrained, uto-
pian view of the world that has today come to dominate both 
the political left and the academy – especially in Shakespeare 
studies and the discipline of English literature more broadly. 
‘The mind, in this view, is basically passive – it is a basin 
into which, as a person matures, the local culture is gradu-
ally poured; if the mind sets any limits at all on the content 
of culture, they are exceedingly broad.’16 This belief in the 
unrestrained malleability of humans wedded to a faith rea-
son alone begets a remarkable faith in the philosopher kings 
of Plato’s Republic and their prescriptions for a rationally 
planned society. The central logic of utopian thinking almost 
always has as its solution to the problems of the world a 
belief that we should follow the teachings of a great sage, 
be it Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin or 
any number of more recent theorists; the solution invariably 
emanates from the font of their special insights and a priori 
authority. 
But when Sowell speaks of these ‘visions’, it is not in the 
sense of ‘a dream, a hope, a prophecy, or moral imperative, 
though each of these things may ultimately derive from some 
particular vision’, but rather as an intuitively felt root cause.
Here a vision is a sense of causation. It is more like a hunch 
or a ‘gut feeling’ than it is like an exercise in logic or factual 
verifi cation. These things come later, and feed on the raw 
material provided by the vision.17 
In other words, logic and the seeking of verifi cation are often 
post hoc rationalisations. As in MFT, intuition comes fi rst 
and strategic reasoning follows. Because of the greatly con-
trasting fi rst principles of the two visions, they differ on some 
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very fundamental issues. In the cases of equality, power and 
justice, for example, their very defi nitions are completely 
different. In the constrained vision, equality means equal-
ity of rights or opportunity, power is diffuse and held by 
the people, and justice is understood as fairness of process. 
These are largely the principles that underpin the ‘unwritten’ 
British constitution and the many checks and balances that 
Alexander Hamilton ensured were written into the United 
States constitution. In the unconstrained vision, meanwhile, 
equality means equality of outcome, power is held and exer-
cised by specifi c groups with specifi c interests, and justice is 
understood – as with equality – as fairness of outcome. It is 
not diffi cult to see these ideas underpinning, for example, 
socialism or modern notions of social justice, what Sowell 
would later dub ‘the quest for cosmic justice’.18
In drawing from MFT, and from evolutionary psychol-
ogy more broadly, this book aligns itself with the constrained 
vision. Studies in evolutionary psychology have widely cor-
roborated the constrained vision and repudiated the uncon-
strained vision, for which there is little concrete evidence 
beyond wishful thinking. To admit that human beings have 
discernible natural characteristics that limit their range of 
possible behaviours is to subscribe to the constrained vision. 
Sowell notes that:
Virtually no one believes that man is 100 percent uncon-
strained and virtually no one believes that man is 100 percent 
constrained. What puts a given thinker in the tradition of one 
vision rather than the other is not simply whether he refers 
more to man’s constraints or to his untapped potential, but 
whether, or to what extent, constraints are built into the very 
structure and operation of a theory.19 
The six moral foundations serve to constrain the range of pos-
sible moral intuitions, even if (ironically) a certain set of moral 
responses (see ‘WEIRD’ in Chapter 1) lead many people to 
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believe in the unconstrained vision. Like Pinker in The Blank 
Slate, Jonathan Haidt references Sowell’s A Confl ict of Visions 
in The Righteous Mind.20 In an interview with The Wall Street 
Journal, he made his position explicit: ‘as a moral psycholo-
gist, I had to say the constrained vision is correct’.21 In a paper 
on the ethics of the emerging political paradigm of globalisa-
tion versus nationalism, Haidt provided a useful summary of 
Sowell’s argument in the form of a table:22
Unconstrained Vision Constrained Vision
Human nature is malleable 
and can be improved – 
perhaps even perfected – 
if social conditions are 
improved. Anything is 
possible, if the artifi cial 
constraints placed on human 
beings can be removed. 
We must therefore free 
people from the petty tribal 
loyalties that cause mistrust 
and war.
Human beings need external 
structures or constraints 
in order to behave well, 
cooperate, and thrive. These 
external constraints include 
laws, institutions, customs, 
traditions, nations, and 
religions. These constraints are 
built up slowly and organically 
in local communities, but they 
can be destroyed quickly by 
radical reformers who don’t 
understand their value.
It is important to note that the distinction between the con-
strained and the unconstrained vision should neither be seen 
as a simple shorthand for political right versus left, nor be 
mistaken for the old binary between nature and nurture. In 
the case of political persuasions, even though the logic of 
much thinking on the left follows the unconstrained vision, 
it is possible for someone who broadly holds the constrained 
vision to fi nd themselves, by various circumstances, aligned 
to the left, and the same is true for those on the right who 
hold the unconstrained vision. The role of culture – and, 
more fundamentally, one’s structures of beliefs and values 
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(that is, ‘cultural scripts’) – is central in both visions. The 
crucial difference is that, in the unconstrained vision, culture 
itself is put at such a premium that in many cases it shapes 
not only beliefs but also the very possibility of what can be 
thought; culture itself becomes the ultimate constraint. In the 
constrained vision, however, culture serves primarily to pro-
mote desirable behaviours by providing incentives and, by 
the same token, discourages undesirable behaviours through 
disincentives. This is to say that, although human beings 
must be taught how to speak, read and write, and to follow 
certain cultural rules, certain instinctual moral intuitions are 
prior to cultural laws. 
One can see this latent assumption in modern economics, 
in the tradition of Adam Smith. Consider, for example, Milton 
Friedman, who fi nds human beings acting according to their 
desires and their own moral instincts, regardless of whatever 
laws might be in place:
There’s a fundamental economic law which has never been 
contradicted: if you pay more for something, there will 
tend to be more of that something available. If the amount 
you’re willing to pay for anything goes up, somehow or 
other somebody will supply more of that thing. We have 
made immoral behaviour far more profi table. We have 
in the course of changes in our society been establishing 
greater and greater incentives on people to behave in ways 
that most of us regard as immoral. . . . When the only laws 
are those laws which everybody regards as right and valid 
they have great moral force. When you make laws which 
people separately do not regard as right and valid, they 
lose their moral force. Is there anybody in here who has a 
moral compunction to speeding? I’m not saying you may 
not have a prudential compunction to speeding, you may 
be afraid to get caught, but does it seem to you immoral to 
speed? Maybe, if so, you’re in a small minority. I’ve never 
yet found anybody who regarded it immoral to violate the 
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exchange rate regulations of a foreign country. Here are 
people who would never dream for a second of stealing 
a nickel from their neighbour, who have no hesitancy in 
manipulating their income tax returns so as to reduce their 
income tax returns by thousands. Why? Because one set of 
laws have a moral value that people recognise independent 
of the government having passed these laws, the other set 
do not appeal to people’s moral instincts.23 
He provides a concrete example from US history: 
Prohibition of liquor, which was attempted as you know, 
had disastrous effects on the climates of law obedience and 
morality. Something which had been legal – to buy and drink 
alcoholic beverages – became illegal. And you converted law 
abiding citizens into bootleggers overnight.24 
We can see in this sentiment the same logic as that used by Sir 
Toby in Twelfth Night when confronted by Malvolio: ‘Dost 
thou think because thou art virtuous there shall be no more 
cakes and ale?’ (II, iii, 107–8). And again in Measure for 
Measure when Pompey protests to Escalus about Angelo’s 
punitive new anti-prostitution laws: ‘If you head and hang 
all that offend that way but for ten year together, you’ll be 
glad to give out a commission for more heads’ (II, i, 234–6). 
In the real world, attempts to curb our instincts by the blunt 
imperative of legal dictates usually fail in such a way as to 
make them seem farcical. 
Hence in modern-day Iran, where the fundamentalist 
Islamic government attempts to enforce laws not too dis-
similar to those enacted by Angelo, rates of porn distribu-
tion and prostitution have ironically sky-rocketed.25 Even if 
you make every attempt to stop them by force or coercion, 
individuals still show a very strong pattern of following their 
own interests, based on the incentives for doing so. The uto-
pian vision that society or culture ‘produces’ individuals is 
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therefore shown to be demonstrably untrue. In every case, 
the dictate triggers the psychological phenomenon of ‘reac-
tance’, known to the layperson as ‘reverse psychology’ – that 
is, a natural urge to do directly the opposite of what has 
been forbidden.26 While these dictates were both examples 
from the political right, one might easily fi nd examples from 
the left. Let us not forget either that the likes of Michel 
Foucault, like many on the radical left at the time, supported 
the Iranian Revolution.27 It is a testament to the strength of 
the unconstrained vision, insulated from evidence, that this 
has neither been a source of embarrassment for them, nor 
made any dent in their reputations.
In the constrained vision, individuals pursuing their own 
separate interests none the less end up benefi ting the ‘whole’ 
of society through the product of their labour. So Adam 
Smith writes in The Wealth of Nations (1776):
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote public 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . 
he intends only his own security; and by directing that 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, he intends only his own gain; and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part his intention. Nor is it 
always the worse for society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interests he frequently promotes that of 
the society more effectually than when he really intends 
to promote it.28 
Here, unplanned social benefi ts are the by-product of indi-
vidual self-interest. A factory owner may be thinking only of 
pennies and pounds, but in the process ends up employing 
a lot of other people, and his factory is making a product 
that people presumably want enough to pay for it. Here, the 
owner, the worker and the consumer are all driven by their 
own interests and yet they are all benefi ting in some way: 
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the factory owner turns a profi t, the worker is paid for their 
time and labour, and the consumer has a product they want. 
This is in sharp contrast to the Marxist view of the economy, 
which, rather than seeing individual agency and mutually 
benefi cial relationships of exchange, sees instead only power 
and exploitation. 
The utopian aspect of the Marxist vision (Sowell lists 
it as a ‘hybrid’) assumes that if one removes individual 
property rights, then ‘self-interest’ – which capitalists fol-
lowing Smith assume is natural – will fall away and be 
replaced by a concern with the common good. The fact 
that, to date, there have been more than fi ve dozen failed 
socialist states,29 and the fact that this utopian vision failed 
to materialise in any of them, should be all the evidence 
required to see that, whatever the rights and wrongs of 
capitalism, Smith’s vision of human nature was none the 
less closer to the truth than that of Marx. Of course, those 
holding a utopian vision above empirical reality will fi nd 
ever more ingenious ways to explain away failed predic-
tions. As Sowell says, 
One of the more remarkable feats of those with the 
[unconstrained] vision . . . has been the maintenance of 
their reputations in the face of repeated predictions that 
have been wrong by miles. . . . In each case, the utter 
certainty of their predictions has been matched by the 
utter failure of the real world to cooperate – and by the 
utter invulnerability of their reputations.30 
Sowell discusses the predictions of John Kenneth Galbraith 
and Paul Ehrlich, but fast-forward to the present-day and 
he might just as well be talking about any of the numberless 
pundits who spoke with certainty that the United Kingdom 
would vote to remain in the European Union and that Hillary 
Clinton would defeat Donald Trump to become president of 
the United States. How many of them saw any serious dent 
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to their reputations? To advocates of MFT, such as Jona-
than Haidt, there is nothing remotely surprising about this: 
whatever the facts of a given matter, the rider – strategic 
reasoning – will work overtime to justify the proclamations 
of the intuitive elephant. In the confl ict of visions, systemic 
and routine confi rmation bias prevails.31 If we know this, 
is there any wonder that we live in a post-truth moment 
characterised by blind partisanship and ‘fake news’ on both 
sides of the political divide? The right, as well as the left, can 
be prone to utopian visions: I have touched already on pro-
hibition laws and the Iranian Islamic revolution, but think 
also of Donald Rumsfeld’s neo-conservative dream of drop-
ping American-style democracy on to Iraq and expecting it 
to take root.
Likewise, despite evidence of a growing consensus regard-
ing evolutionary ideas across twenty-two disciplines,32 we 
can also see a hostility to science, perhaps our last bastion 
of empiricism, on both sides of the political divide. In the 
United States, both evangelical Christians and radical femi-
nists have been notable for their fi erce opposition to evolu-
tionary ideas.33 Leftist thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard 
and Michel Foucault told us for decades to distrust science, 
while Marxists such as Louis Althusser declared their own 
form of ideology critique ‘scientifi c knowledge’.34 Whenever 
a political group holds its utopian vision above empirical 
reality, you can expect that group to fi nd ways of claiming 
that the scientifi c method is in some way ideological. Thus, 
in the Soviet Union, when accepted scientifi c consensus failed 
to cooperate with socialism, Josef Stalin supplanted it with 
Lysenkoism, named after the thoroughly debunked pseudo-
science of Trofi m Lysenko.35 My view is that the denial or 
bastardisation of science for political ends is almost always 
dangerous, and this is something of which we must be acutely 
aware when navigating the fi ercely contested waters of 
evolutionary psychology. 
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In 1978, when Edward O. Wilson wrote his double 
Pulitzer Prize-winning masterpiece, On Human Nature, 
Marxists moved swiftly to denounce it as ‘unscientifi c’, as 
they had done with his previous book, Sociobiology: The 
New Synthesis (1975). Writing in 2004, Wilson refl ected, 
the fashionable mood in academia was revolutionary left. 
Elite universities invented political correctness, enforced by 
peer pressures and the threat of student protest. Marxism 
and socialism in this ambience were all right. Communist 
revolutions were all right. The regimes of China and the 
Soviet Union were, at least in ideology, all right. Centrism 
was scorned outside the dean’s offi ce. Political conserva-
tives, stewing inwardly, for the most part dared not speak 
up. Radical professors, the heroes on campus, repeated 
this litany: The Establishment failed us, the Establishment 
blocks progress, the Establishment is the enemy. Power to 
the people it was, but with an American twist. Because ordi-
nary working people remained dismayingly conservative 
throughout this sandbox revolution, the new proletariat in 
the class struggle had to be the students.36 
If any of this sounds familiar, it is because similar ‘revolution-
ary’ forces have strengthened their death-grip in some areas 
of the humanities in the past three decades. The Berkeley 
campus at the University of California has become a symbol 
of their authoritarianism. Should it be any news to us that 
the far left is prone to tyranny? At the time of writing, the 
endemic of ‘no-platforming’ speakers with whom certain stu-
dents disagree has reached the point where even the Democrat 
fi rebrand Bernie Sanders was moved to defend the outspoken 
conservative Ann Coulter’s right to speak.37 Haidt has been a 
vocal critic of this anti-intellectual and authoritarian streak in 
the radical left: 
Aristotle often evaluated a thing with respect to its ‘telos’ – 
its purpose, end, or goal. The telos of a knife is to cut. 
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The telos of a physician is health or healing. What is the 
telos of university? The most obvious answer is ‘truth’ – the 
word appears on so many university crests. But increas-
ingly, many of America’s top universities are embracing 
social justice as their telos, or as a second and equal telos. 
But can any institution or profession have two teloses 
(or teloi)? What happens if they confl ict? . . . I believe that 
the confl ict between truth and social justice is likely to 
become unmanageable. Universities will have to choose, 
and be explicit about their choice, so that potential stu-
dents and faculty recruits can make an informed choice. 
Universities that try to honor both will face increasing 
incoherence and internal confl ict.38 
The academy will increasingly struggle to serve two masters. 
It is very much ‘a confl ict of visions’ between an empiricism 
concerned with describing reality and a utopian rationalism 
concerned only with a righteous quest for a cosmic justice that 
can never be achieved. Where the truth is inconvenient to their 
ends, radical political groups, like religious groups, will almost 
always seek to silence or defame them, as they did through-
out the twentieth century. Although Haidt describes the left as 
primarily responding to the moral foundations of care, fair-
ness and liberty (for example, WEIRD), it seems to me that 
when groups cluster around a utopian vision, they develop 
new forms of sanctity, authority and loyalty. It is not diffi -
cult to see, for example, how for some – of which the Antifa 
group offer the most extreme and violent example – ‘diversity’ 
has become an almost quasi-religious sacred creed. It is a kind 
of purity test. If this test is failed (sanctity), the sinner will 
be ‘de-platformed’ and punished (authority), and cast out for 
their betrayal as an unrepentant heathen (loyalty). As we will 
see in Chapter 4, when I consider the European Reformation 
and the rise of puritanism, it is a pattern characteristic of resis-
tance groups driven by an ideological vision.
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Both Sowell and Haidt note that there is a signifi cant 
difference between how those with the constrained and 
unconstrained visions deal with disagreements. Those with 
the constrained vision are much more likely to see their 
unconstrained opponents as well-meaning but dangerously 
misguided and perhaps naïve or idealistic people, who often 
end up doing more harm than good. For those holding the 
unconstrained vision, however, it is often insuffi cient to see 
those who disagree as being simply wrong; in many cases 
they must also morally condemn them. This is because it 
is ‘not simply a vision of the world and its functioning in 
a causal sense, but is also a vision of themselves as and of 
their moral role in that world. It is a vision of differential 
rectitude.’39 Perhaps because of this ‘the localization of evil 
is one of the hallmarks of the unconstrained vision’.40 Once 
it is clear who the bad people are, then the moral crusader 
has a focal point on which to fi xate their righteous indigna-
tion. Once this compulsion in some people towards moral 
condemnation is understood, our current ‘outrage culture’ 
looks almost like an inevitability. Anthony Walsh puts it 
bluntly: 
Unconstrained visionaries seem to believe that if appar-
ently intelligent and well-educated individuals research 
race and sex differences, or oppose programs they believe 
could improve the lives of the less fortunate, they must be 
evil racists or sexists, or some other hissing epithet.41 
One of the aims of this book is to show how a writer like 
Shakespeare, with his extraordinary capacity for empathy 
and his singular unwillingness to write anyone off, can teach 
us all how to be a little more understanding of where another 
person with a different point of view – perhaps a different 
vision of the world, a different moral compass – might be 
coming from.
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In summary
• Political and ideological struggles across the centuries can be 
characterised as ‘a confl ict of vision’ following the scheme 
described in Thomas Sowell’s (1987) book of the same name.
• The constrained vision sees human nature as fundamentally 
unchanging and hence an ultimate ‘constraint’ on what can 
realistically be expected from human beings. Accordingly, 
there are no solutions, only trade-offs; individuals need incen-
tives to encourage naturally good behaviour and disincentives 
to discourage naturally bad behaviour. Society must erect 
institutions to help curb humanity’s ‘baser instincts’.
• The unconstrained vision sees human nature as having no fi xed 
characteristics, and hence as free from natural constraints, as 
being ‘perfectible’. Accordingly, there are permanent solutions; 
individuals need only change society and the rest will follow. 
• Moral Foundations Theory holds the constrained vision, and 
in following it, so does this book.
• The unconstrained vision has no truck with empirical real-
ity; it is insulated from evidence. Through confi rmation bias, 
those who hold it will look only for evidence that confi rms 
their existing beliefs and systematically ignore facts inconve-
nient to its narrative. Although the constrained vision derives 
from empirical knowledge, those who hold it can also be 
guilty of confi rmation bias.
• Those who hold the unconstrained vision see themselves as 
being morally superior to others, and accordingly seek to 
condemn and, in the worst cases, silence others.
• One of this book’s aims is to show how we might learn to be 
more understanding of one another’s differences of opinion 
from Shakespeare’s remarkable capacity for empathy.
II
Evolutionary Ethics
While there can be little doubt that the constrained vision is 
closer to empirical reality than the unconstrained vision, evo-
lutionary studies none the less vary in how they characterise 
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human nature, and as such have reproduced their own version 
of the ‘confl ict of visions’. The effort to understand morality 
from a biological perspective started with Charles Darwin him-
self in The Descent of Man (1871). Unfortunately, it was not 
long after this that Darwin’s ideas were hijacked by ‘survival-
of-the-fi ttest’ Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer and 
William Graham Sumner. While enormously popular in their 
day, Spencer and Sumner had fallen out of fashion by the 1930s. 
The fi rst years of the twentieth century would also see Darwin 
pressed into service for a utopian vision, where the uncon-
strained idea of human perfectibility reached its most terrifying 
conclusion in eugenics. In Britain, Francis Galton believed that 
aspects that make up human character, such as moral virtues or 
dispositions, were hereditary traits. In Germany, such thinking 
resulted in atrocity. Perhaps understandably, research into the 
relationship between ethics and biology was considered taboo 
until the mid-1970s and the pioneering work of Edward O. 
Wilson, especially his books Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 
(1975) and On Human Nature (1978), which built on earlier 
studies by W. D. Hamilton and Robert Trivers.42 Wilson argued 
that to fi nd ‘a new morality based on a more truthful defi nition 
of man, it is necessary to look inward, to dissect the machinery 
of the mind and to retrace its evolutionary history’.43
The central moral dilemma for biologists and evolutionists 
is perhaps summed up best by Adam Smith in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759):
How selfi sh soever man may be supposed, there are evi-
dently some principles in his nature, which interest him in 
the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary 
to him, though he derives nothing from it except the plea-
sure of seeing it.44 
If human beings are naturally selfi sh, why should they take 
pleasure in the fortune of others? If we are self-interested, why 
are people sometimes moved to help each other when there 
is no obvious gain in doing so? Darwin himself was puzzled 
by this. He noted that human beings are unique among all 
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animals in caring for weaker members of a society, even at the 
apparent detriment to survival:
With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon elimi-
nated; and those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous 
state of health. We civilised men, on the other hand, do our 
utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asy-
lums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute 
poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to 
save the life of every one to the last moment. There is rea-
son to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, 
who from a weak constitution would formerly have suc-
cumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilised 
societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to 
the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must 
be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how 
soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the 
degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case 
of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow 
his worst animals to breed.45 
For Darwin this impulse to help the less fortunate and 
‘helpless is mainly an incidental result of the instinct of sym-
pathy, which was originally acquired as part of the social 
instincts, but subsequently rendered . . . more tender and more 
widely diffused’. He sees this instinct ‘extending to men of all 
races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other useless members of 
society, and fi nally to the lower animals’. He argues that the 
more mankind nurtures this natural sympathy, the more the 
standard of morality will ‘rise higher and higher’. Indeed, he 
thinks that ‘the standard of morality has risen since an early 
period in the history of man’. Thus, for Darwin, it is in us to 
be nicer to each other, which he views as a mark of ‘civilized 
man’. 46 This is, of course, the morality of care and harm.
Although Darwin’s consideration of morality in The 
Descent of Man is couched in the racially and culturally 
insensitive language typical of his period, when considering 
various indigenous peoples from Africa, the Americas and 
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Australia he none the less recognises their moral capacities, 
even if these often seem constrained by groupishness: 
As barbarians do not regard the opinion of their women, 
wives are commonly treated like slaves. Most savages are 
utterly indifferent to the sufferings of strangers, or even 
delight in witnessing them. It is well known that the women 
and children of the North-American Indians aided in tortur-
ing their enemies. Some savages take pleasure in cruelty to 
animals, and humanity is an unknown virtue. Nevertheless, 
besides family affections, kindness is common, especially in 
sickness, between members of the same tribe, and is some-
times extended beyond those limits. Mungo Park’s touching 
account of the kindness of the negro of the interior to him 
is well known. Many instances could be given of the noble 
fi delity of savages towards each other, but not to strang-
ers; common experience justifi es the maxim of the Spaniard, 
‘Never, never trust an Indian.’47
One might imagine that the natives had similar expressions 
about the Spaniards, but it is clear from Darwin’s account 
that the so-called savages do possess the ‘natural sympathy’ 
he ascribes to ‘civilized man’, under the right conditions. What 
is interesting here is that Darwin starts to spot other types of 
morality beyond that of care and harm. For example, he spots 
the moral foundation of authority in Native American stoicism: 
As soon as a tribe has a recognised leader, disobedience 
becomes a crime, and even abject submission is looked on 
as a sacred virtue. . . . The American savage voluntarily 
submits to the most horrid tortures without a groan, to 
prove and strengthen his fortitude and courage; and we 
cannot help admiring him [. . .].48
And that of sanctity:
As soon, however, as marriage, whether polygamous, or 
monogamous, becomes common, jealousy will lead to the 
inculcation of female virtue; and this, being honoured, will 
spread to the unmarried females. How slowly it spreads to 
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the male sex, we see at the present day. Chastity eminently 
requires self-command, therefore it has been honoured 
from a very early period in the history of civilized man. As 
a consequence of this, the senseless practice of celibacy has 
been ranked from a remote period as a virtue.49 
He goes on to reveal that his own understanding of morality is, 
in Haidt’s term, ‘WEIRD’ – that is, primarily concerned with 
the individual, rather than with the community or in-group. 
Like most Western liberals, he downplayed the moral foun-
dations of authority, sanctity and loyalty. Thus, according to 
Darwin, ‘savages’ regard actions as ‘good or bad, solely as they 
obviously affect the welfare of the tribe – not that of the spe-
cies, nor that of an individual member of the tribe’.50 In this 
sentence, Darwin drew the key battle-lines of contemporary 
evolutionary ethics. Did morality develop primarily to serve 
the survival of the tribe (or group), the whole species or the 
individual? Plainly, Darwin saw tribal morality as being at a 
more primitive stage of development to moralities that fore-
ground the whole species or the individual – it is something 
that he has in common with the globalists of today who are 
so quick to condemn the deplorable nationalists. But is it true 
that there is such a hierarchy of progress between the moral 
foundations? It seems unlikely.
Before continuing, it is important to note that Darwin’s 
assumption that the differences between people around the 
world stem from genetic difference is not simply something 
we cannot countenance because it is politically distaste-
ful to modern sensibilities; it is also fl atly untrue. On this 
score, biology does not provide us with an adequate answer 
because there are no meaningful or signifi cant evolutionary 
differences between European, Native American, African or 
Asian peoples. Cultural differences between historic peoples 
around the world are much more readily understood in 
terms of geographical differences. Many indigenous cultural 
practices lead directly from the relationship between people 
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and the land. Excellent and meticulous studies by Fernand 
Braudel, Jared Diamond, David S. Landes, Thomas Sowell, 
Ian Morris and Francis Fukuyama demonstrate, almost 
beyond doubt, that at both a local and a continental level, 
geography accounts for technological and military develop-
ment,51 the structure of political order,52 and the types of 
characteristics valued by the culture.53 Hence, we fi nd strik-
ing similarities between disparate sets of mountain peoples 
from around the globe, as distinct from coastal peoples, or 
jungle-dwelling peoples in the tropics.54 As Braudel argues, 
‘In understanding Black Africa, geography is more impor-
tant than history . . . [because] climate accounts for the 
alternation of vast areas of grass and trees which inevitably 
involve different ways of life.’55 Diamond argues that, given 
the lopsided nature of historical conquests, ‘it seems logical 
to suppose that history’s pattern refl ects innate differences 
in people themselves’, but in actuality ‘there is no hint of 
any intellectual disadvantage’ in the tribes and civilisations 
that for one reason or another were colonised by others.56 
The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that, despite typical 
variations in physical and mental abilities within groups, 
biologically speaking, people everywhere are essentially the 
same in their natural capacities, even if not wholly identi-
cal. People vary much more within groups than between 
groups.57 Perhaps Thomas Hobbes put it best: 
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the 
body and mind; as that though there be found one man 
sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind 
than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the differ-
ence between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that 
one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefi t, to 
which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the 
strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill 
the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confeder-
acy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.58 
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Even in the realm of natural advantages between individuals, 
there are built-in checks and balances. Indeed, the moral foun-
dations that bind – authority, loyalty, fairness and sanctity – 
evolved partly as a natural counterweight to individual egoists.
The task of evolutionary psychology, then, is not to 
account for the differences between cultural groups, which 
is explained in large part by geography, but rather, as Wilson 
suggested, to gain a more accurate picture of the underlying 
common humanity. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the key 
dispute in evolutionary ethics since the 1970s has centred on 
questions of altruism versus selfi shness, and group selection 
versus kin selection. In The Righteous Mind, Haidt’s short-
hand metaphor is that ‘we are selfi sh and we are groupish 
. . . 90 percent chimp and 10 percent bee’,59 by which he 
means that, in the clear majority of cases, human beings, 
like chimpanzees, are self-interested, but nevertheless retain 
a certain capacity for cooperation and altruism to protect 
the ‘hive’ or in-group. For some, this allows for rather too 
much altruism, and for others too little. At the polar ends 
of this dispute we fi nd in the corner of altruism and group 
selection (or ‘multi-level selection’), among others, Edward 
O. Wilson, David Sloan Wilson, Elliott Sober and Leo Buss, 
and, in the corner of selfi shness and kin selection, among 
undoubtedly a greater number of others (because it is the 
orthodox position), Richard Dawkins, Steven Pinker, Daniel 
Dennett, David M. Buss, Robert Wright, and John Tooby 
and Leda Cosmides.60 To make matters more complicated, 
both groups found common enemies in Stephen Jay Gould, 
Niles Eldredge and Richard Lewontin, who stood against the 
entire enterprise of sociobiology and its successor, evolution-
ary psychology, arguing that their conception of humanity is 
too limited. As per the unconstrained vision, Gould, Eldredge 
and Lewontin emphasised cultural and ideological causes 
through their conception of ‘species selection’ and the related 
idea of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Just as Sowell lost patience 
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with those holding the ‘vision of the anointed’, so Gould’s 
opponents came to see him as an ideologue more concerned 
with an anti-capitalist progressive political agenda than with 
the truth: ‘his essays become revealed as mini-theatricals 
carefully staged for purposes of self-aggrandizement rather 
than for the careful and charitable pursuit of the truth’.61 As 
Daniel Dennett puts it, ‘Gould has gone from revolution to 
revolution. So far his declarations of revolution have all been 
false alarms, but he has kept on trying, defying the moral of 
Aesop’s fable about the boy who cried wolf.’62 
These are vast disagreements, which, across the decades, 
have raged suffi ciently to be dubbed ‘The Darwin Wars’.63 
As such, I cannot hope to do their complexity justice here 
beyond offering the briefest of sketches. At the heart of the 
dispute is a disagreement over levels of causation. When suc-
cessful evolutionary adaptations occur in animal species, do 
they take place at the level of the entire species, or at the level 
of the in-group, or, rather, at the level of the individual animal 
and its offspring? I have put the three options in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1
Species Selection (macro-level)
Group Selection (in-group-level, ‘multi-level’)
Kin Selection (gene-level)
We need not concern ourselves with species selection, which 
has been largely debunked; the key debate is currently between 
kin selection and group selection, which, in lay terms, is a con-
trast between ‘the “dog-eat-dog” view of nature and a new 
emphasis on “the bright side of biology”’.64 To take examples 
from the extreme ends, for Dawkins evolution is like sur-
vival in the tough world of Chicago gangsters, in which the 
‘predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is 
ruthless selfi shness’. In this view, evolution is an explanation 
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rather than a moral justifi cation: ‘I am saying how things have 
evolved. I am not saying how we humans morally ought to 
behave.’ While this ruthlessly selfi sh view of nature may seem 
unpalatable, ‘unfortunately, however much we may deplore 
something, it does not stop it being true’. Because of this, 
in Dawkins’s view, ‘we must teach our children altruism, for 
we cannot expect it to be part of their biological nature’.65 
In sharp contrast, the primatologist Frans de Waal, who has 
built his career on providing evidence for empathy and a 
sense of fairness among the primates and even among other 
animals, argues that humans ‘are group animals: highly com-
petitive, sensitive to injustice, sometimes warmongering, but 
mostly peace loving’.66 It is interesting that, despite ostensible 
appearances, it is de Waal who attributes more of our behav-
iour to nature, and Dawkins who gives the greater scope for 
a cultural perspective. Indeed, in The Selfi sh Gene, he grants 
quite extraordinary powers to cultural ‘memes’ that start to 
approach the unconstrained vision.67
Although David Sloan Wilson has advocated passionately 
for group selection, through the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s it 
was largely dismissed as a heterodox, fringe position among 
biologists, except where their arguments helped them fend 
off Gould and the claims made by species selection. This is 
the case, for example, in Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea 
(1995).68 Elsewhere, such as in The Moral Animal (1994) by 
Robert Wright, the idea was given short shrift.69 The heart 
of the dispute is that advocates of kin selection claim that 
they can explain away virtually any evolutionary trait as 
having developed for the benefi t of the gene rather than for 
the benefi t of the group. Thus, Steven Pinker argues:
The recent surge of interest in group selection has been moti-
vated by two empirical phenomena. One is eusociality in 
insect taxa such as bees, ants, and termites, whose worker or 
soldier castes forgo their own reproduction and may sacrifi ce 
their lives to benefi t their fellows, as when a bee dies when 
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stinging an invader. E. O. Wilson notes that a self-sacrifi cing 
insect benefi ts the colony, and concludes that eusociality must 
be explained by selection among colonies. But most other 
biologists point out that the sacrifi cer benefi ts the queen 
(her sister or mother), who founds a new colony when she 
reproduces, so the simplest explanation of eusociality is that 
the genes promoting self-sacrifi ce were selected because they 
benefi ted copies of themselves inside the queen.70 
In virtually all cases, they argue that apparently selfl ess and 
altruistic behaviour can be put down to either nepotism or 
reciprocity. 
Individuals give alarm calls not to protect their group but to 
protect their genes. . . . Females control the number of eggs 
laid or babies born not to aid the population regulation and 
save the group from extinction, but rather to optimize the 
number of offspring that survive and reproduce.71 
Jonathan Haidt has followed David Sloan Wilson and others 
in rejecting – or at the very least complicating – this claim, 
based on new empirical evidence from studies conducted since 
the 1970s. Their charge, which has gathered momentum since 
the turn of the twenty-fi rst century, is that while kin selection 
is undoubtedly true in some cases, it cannot explain away 
instances where stronger individuals, bullies or egoists, are 
subdued to confer long-term group advantages afforded by 
cooperation. For example, William Muir has found that when 
breeding chickens for egg production, if you select only the 
most productive hens – who tend to be more aggressive and 
dominant – the total number of eggs goes down because of 
the increased levels of aggression, which result in killings and 
cannibalisation. By using group selection – that is, breeding all 
the hens in the cage, not simply the most productive ones – the 
death rate fell from 67 per cent to just 8 per cent, and the total 
number of eggs produced jumped from 91 to 237 in just three 
generations.72 Haidt suggests that similarly rapid development 
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can occur in human societies, and this might be one reason 
why religions have persistently developed in cultures around 
the world. Religion helps to promote in-group social cohe-
sion, curbs the most aggressive and dominant characters, and 
greatly increases the capacity for cooperation and hence the 
social productivity of a society. In outlining the positive func-
tions of religion in this way, Haidt offends Richard Dawkins, 
and his allies Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and the late Christo-
pher Hitchens – together the ‘four horsemen of new atheism’, 
on two counts. He not only returns to group selection, a con-
cept Dawkins strongly opposes, but also gives an evolution-
ary rationale for religion. This is an argument fi rst outlined 
in David Sloan Wilson’s Darwin’s Cathedral (2002), in which 
he compares religious organisations to ‘a social insect colony’ 
and outlines the many group advantages that they have con-
ferred on human groups over the centuries.73 
Accordingly, in The Moral Landscape (2010), Sam Harris 
criticised Haidt on two grounds: fi rst, that the six moral foun-
dations might all be collapsed into different manifestations of 
care / harm, since the others are all ultimately about reducing 
harm in the long run,74 and second, that his defence of reli-
gion is wrong-headed because it can be shown to cause more 
harm than good, and also by the fact that it simply is not true. 
For Harris, morality must have a basis in scientifi c truth.75 
We need not concern ourselves with the lengthy exchanges 
between Harris and Haidt on this matter. The underlying 
difference between them comes down to the central dichot-
omy in Arthur Herman’s The Cave and the Light: Harris is a 
rationalist trying to derive truth through pure reason, while 
Haidt is an empiricist simply describing things as they can be 
observed. In other words, Harris is subscribing to the uncon-
strained, utopian vision: implicitly he imagines a world where 
human beings are no longer groupish or tribal, where the 
social functions traditionally provided for by religious insti-
tutions are no longer needed. Even though he is an atheist 
himself, Haidt sees no such possibility, and it seems to me that 
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the weight of evidence is entirely on his side. One need only 
think of the recent history of confl icts around the world to 
see that the groupish and tribal element of humanity remains 
constant, whether we have religion or not.
Joshua Greene has been another prominent critic of Haidt. 
In Moral Tribes (2014), while he agrees with many of the core 
arguments of The Righteous Mind, like Harris, he ultimately 
has a problem with the emphasis Haidt places on intuitionism. 
My fi rst important disagreement with Haidt concerns the 
role of reason, of manual mode, in moral psychology. 
I believe that manual-mode thinking has played an enor-
mously important role in moral life, that it is, once again, 
our second moral compass. Haidt disagrees. He thinks that 
moral reasoning plays a minor role in moral life, a conclu-
sion neatly expressed by the title of his famous paper ‘The 
Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail’.76
Greene’s basic problem is that Haidt’s prescription – to try 
to negate self-righteous indignation by understanding where 
your political adversary might be coming from (that is, by 
understanding the underlying moral foundations to which 
they are responding) – does not tell us what to do next. As 
Greene puts it, ‘it’s one thing to acknowledge that one’s 
opponents are not evil. It’s another thing to concede that 
they’re right, or even half-right.’77 Ultimately, though, this 
comes down to a political disagreement. As I have discussed, 
Haidt (a self-described liberal) argues that liberals (‘WEIRD’ 
people) are blind to three out of the six moral foundations, 
and so effectively are morally colour-blind. All Greene can 
offer here is ‘One might say, as Haidt does, that liberals have 
narrow moral tastes. But when it comes to moral founda-
tions, less may be more. Liberals’ moral tastes, rather than 
being narrow, may instead by more refi ned.’78 To take this 
stance, he invokes rationalist Enlightenment values. Note 
that this is the same argument that Darwin made when 
comparing various Native American and African tribes to 
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Victorian England. Some readers may very well agree with 
that argument instinctively; after all, this is how moral intu-
itions work, and if you are a liberal, you might prefer to see 
your moral tastes as ‘refi ned’ rather than ‘blind’. However, 
it seems to me that Greene seeks to make this argument 
almost exclusively because Haidt’s evidence does not fi t with, 
as Thomas Sowell would put it, the vision of the anointed. 
We need to check whatever our own moral impulses might 
be and study the evidence without partisanship. To this end, 
I think it is perfectly transparent that Harris takes issue with 
Haidt because his work seems to defend religion, which he 
does not like, and that Greene takes issue with it because it 
seems to defend conservatives, who he does not like. Both 
are examples of partisanship: Harris and Greene each defend 
their own team (atheists for Harris, liberals for Greene) from 
claims that feel as if they pose an existential threat. As Sowell 
predicted, even when faced with hard evidence, and even 
in the sciences, those who hold utopian visions will prefer 
to keep their ‘differential rectitude’ rather than accept the 
facts.79 They will invariably fi nd some issue with those who 
describe things as they are, and not how they should be.
The evolutionary critic, Joseph Carroll, provides a more sub-
stantial critique of Haidt on two grounds. First, the ‘open-ended’ 
suggestion that there might be more moral foundations discov-
ered beyond the six outlined in The Righteous Mind reveals a 
‘weak theoretical structure’ that would be ‘better grounded . . . 
within human life history theory’. Second, Carroll criticises the 
residue of the sociologist, Émile Durkheim, in Haidt’s concep-
tion of corporate social identity because it sits oddly next to the 
claim that moral foundations have an evolutionary root. For 
Carroll, this is ‘a split-level version of human identity’, which 
suggests ‘a basic failure to overcome an original belief in the 
primacy of individuals as a unit of selection’.80 
In reality, we are never an asocial species. We are always 
a species in which social identity is integral to individual 
identity. Haidt has not developed an integrated view of 
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human nature. He has simply shoved together two anoma-
lous pieces: the egoistic isolate that makes up, supposedly, 
90 percent of human motives and the superorganism that 
makes up the other 10 percent.81 
Carroll raises some valid concerns here, which push up against 
the limits of what is currently known at the cutting edge in 
this fi eld. The current study aims to provide a robust starting 
point for those wishing to foster fruitful dialogue between 
the latest research from evolutionary psychology and liter-
ary texts. If further moral foundations are found, it will be 
an exciting opportunity for further research. The ‘split-level’ 
view of humanity of which Carroll complains is mirrored 
in this book’s discussion of moral foundations on the one 
hand, and ‘cultural scripts’ on the other. As a literary critic 
(as opposed to a biologist or evolutionary psychologist), I do 
not fi nd the fact that these two aspects of humanity are in 
obvious tension to be especially troubling, particularly if one 
considers that the constrained vision posits that culture needs 
to protect humanity from its darkest impulses. Thus, I see no 
reason to believe that human identity should be ‘integrated’. 
Indeed, if group selection functions in the way Haidt, David 
Sloan Wilson and others describe, it makes perfect sense that 
the structures, institutions and rituals produced by the ‘super-
organism’ should be at odds with the individual egoist. In sit-
uations when a moral decision is required, the superorganism 
and the individual will invariably pull in different directions. 
If a loved one is murdered, the twenty-fi rst-century cultural 
script tells us to report it to the police, but many individu-
als will likely experience the welling up of emotions pushing 
them towards revenge and retaliation. As Carroll says, social 
identity is always important, and this might ultimately push 
the individual to perform the cultural script, but on other 
occasions the ‘egoistic isolate’ will win out. Both the cul-
tural scripts (group-level) and the individual emotional drive 
(kin-level) have an ultimate evolutionary root and, despite 
their apparent lack of integration and probable collision 
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course, they are both aspects of humanity. Accordingly, one 
of the key concerns in Part II of Shakespeare’s Moral Compass 
is whether the playwright’s moral thinking tends towards the 
superorganism or the individual. 
In summary
• In The Descent of Man (1871), Charles Darwin argued that 
human morality is found in our ‘natural sympathy’, and that 
the most civilised societies are those that show the greatest 
kindness to their weakest members.
• After Darwin, there has been a split in evolutionary psychol-
ogy between those, such as Richard Dawkins, who believe 
that evolution is primarily driven by the ruthlessly self-inter-
ested reproduction of genes, which can explain even appar-
ently selfl ess and altruistic behaviours, and those, such as 
Edward O. Wilson, who believe such behaviours develop 
because they confer group advantages.
• Following David Sloan Wilson, Jonathan Haidt argues that 
group selection helps explain the development of religious 
organisations, which promote social cohesion and coopera-
tion. Sam Harris has criticised this view because (in his view) 
religion has caused more harm than good and is based on 
false beliefs.
• Joshua Greene has also criticised Haidt because he believes 
that (‘WEIRD’) liberals are not morally lacking but rather 
‘morally refi ned’. 
• This book rejects the criticisms of both Harris and Greene 
because they are plainly born of a desire to protect rationalist 
utopian visions from empirical evidence.
• Joseph Carroll has criticised Haidt’s The Righteous Mind for 
failing to integrate moral foundations as experienced on an 
individual level and human groupishness. This book argues 
that there is no need for integration because the fundamental 
tension between these two aspects of humanity is central to 
understanding moral thinking.
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CHAPTER 3
MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLAND DURING 
THE TIME OF SHAKESPEARE
Introduction
In this chapter, I aim to provide a broad overview of the sorts 
of thinking about ethics that were swirling around during the 
period in which Shakespeare lived and wrote. I say ‘swirling 
around’ for two reasons: fi rst, because I do not think we can 
make any easy assumptions about the extent to which the 
philosophical and theological debates of the day carried into 
everyday life; second, because this is a particularly compli-
cated phase in the history of ethics to navigate. In the early 
modern period we are dealing with ‘a dizzying moment in 
the history of heterodoxy’, in which the ‘sudden presence’ 
of newly rediscovered and reinterpreted ideas from the 
Hellenistic schools competed for primacy at practically the 
same moment as the Church was facing its largest major 
schism since 1054.1 Perhaps as a symptom of this, 
many early modern philosophers were extremely (and some-
times overly) eclectic and their infl uences were not always 
straightforward: what looks to us as Stoic in an author could 
just as well be Epicurean . . . or a mixture of ancient sources, 
or a modern variant generally infl uenced by ancient schools 
without strong commitment to one school.’2 
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Shakespeare’s moment in particular – the 1580s to the 1610s – 
was a time when the intellectual world was still reeling from 
the twin effects of High Renaissance humanist philosophy 
and the Protestant Reformation, but had not yet formulated 
coherent responses to them as the next few decades would, in 
the form of thinkers such as Francis Bacon, René Descartes, 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Benedict de Spinoza. It is 
a moment that histories of moral philosophy have a habit of 
skipping over: for example, Henry Sidgwick’s classic Outlines 
of the History of Ethics for English Readers (1886) does not 
seem to know what to do with the late sixteenth century and 
so essentially jumps from Martin Luther to Hugo Grotius’s De 
jure belli ac pacis (‘On the Law of War and Peace’) (1625).3 
It is a move repeated by Bertrand Russell in his towering 
History of Western Philosophy (1946), in which he complains, 
‘Philosophically, the century following the Reformation is a 
barren one.’4 Likewise, in the most comprehensive history of 
ethics published to date, The Development of Ethics (2011), 
Terence Irwin gets as far as the Reformation, and from the sec-
ond half of the 1500s can fi nd room only for Francisco Suárez 
(1548–1617), a theistic natural law theorist in the Thomist 
tradition.5 In short, we can characterise Shakespeare’s time 
only as one that took on board a diverse mix of competing 
philosophical discourses around ethics but did not settle on 
any one of them and did not signifi cantly add anything new. 
If the period produced a great moral philosopher, our likeli-
est candidates are fi gures who were not philosophers in the 
conventional sense at all and who did not ‘write philosophy’: 
Michel de Montaigne and, in fact, Shakespeare himself. 
With this said, I think it is prudent to remember that 
Shakespeare was not a trained philosopher and therefore to 
assume that he did not read the vast majority of the philo-
sophical material that I will reference below. The question of 
what Shakespeare read is, of course, vexed. We must remem-
ber that he was, fi rst and foremost, a man of the theatre with 
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signifi cant commercial interests and time commitments; he 
was a living and working playwright and actor who, as we 
know, had not attended university. To draw on Ben Jonson’s 
endlessly quoted phrase yet another time: he had ‘small Latin, 
and less Greek’.6 In 1949, Gilbert Highet put it less charitably: 
‘He can only string a few schoolbook Latin words together.’ 
Highet believed, with some justifi cation, that Shakespeare 
loved the classics, but supplemented what he been taught at 
school ‘by reading translations’.7 He echoes Richard Farmer, 
who put this more memorably in 1767:
He remembered perhaps his school-boy learning to put 
the hig, hag, hog, into the mouth of Sir Hugh Evans; and 
might pick up in the course of his conversation a familiar 
word or two in French or Italian: but his Studies were most 
demonstrably confi ned to Nature and his own Language.8 
Leonard Barkan characterises Shakespeare’s reading as ‘more 
middle-brow than high-brow; heterodox; philosophically not 
of the avant-garde; anglo-centric in certain ways’.9 Therefore, 
I have generally thought it sensible to assume that if particu-
lar philosophical works written in Latin had not been trans-
lated into English, Shakespeare almost certainly had not read 
them. Furthermore, even if certain works had been translated 
into English, in the absence of direct textual evidence I have 
erred on the side of assuming that Shakespeare – being busy 
and probably not possessing the time or the inclination to 
seek out scholarly works of theology or philosophy – had 
not read them. But this does not mean, I must stress, that 
he did not feel the infl uence of ideas in the cultural ether. It 
is also, lest we forget, not paramount to have read the work 
of a particular thinker in order to get the gist of their general 
stance. If I might draw an analogy in the twenty-fi rst century, 
for example, how many people outside specialists in politi-
cal and economic theory have actually sat down and read 
Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1962)?10 I would 
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warrant relatively few; yet, such has been its infl uence and 
consequences that we broadly know its arguments and posi-
tions – they are ideas that have been ‘swirling around’ our 
historical moment.
Renaissance philosophers and theologians saw morality 
as consisting of three distinct branches following Aristotle: 
ethics, Oeconomics (which was a work then ascribed to 
Aristotle, which we now believe was written by his student, 
Theophrastus) and politics. Morality therefore had three 
domains: ‘the individual man was the subject of ethics; the 
home and its inhabitants were the subject of oeconomics; 
and the state was the subject of politics’.11 In this book, I am 
primarily concerned with the fi rst of these: ethics.
In her still-valuable study Shakespeare’s Tragic Heroes: 
Slaves of Passion (1930), Lily B. Campbell begins her 
account of the fundamental ideas found in ‘Moral Philoso-
phy in Shakespeare’s Day’ by signalling the early-modern 
indebtedness to previous ages:
That there was little new in these ideas no one can deny, 
for they represent something like a composite picture of the 
works of the most revered ancients and the most infl uential 
Schoolmen. Hippocrates, Galen, Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch, 
Cicero, Quintilian, Seneca, Hesiod, Thomas Aquinas, 
Augustine – these are the names which are mingled with 
others of less frequent recurrence in the list of authorities 
for philosophical ideas throughout the century.12 
In order to understand the intellectual milieu around ethics 
in England during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, it is necessary to trace the four philosophical tradi-
tions from antiquity that would strongly infl uence moral phi-
losophy across Europe in the Renaissance and early modern 
periods. The fi rst, and most prominent, is Aristotelian vir-
tue ethics. This was revived and reworked in the thirteenth 
century by the Christian scholastics, most notably Thomas 
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Aquinas, whose work itself was revived and reworked by 
Catholic theologians such as Jean Capréolus and Cardinal 
Cajetan during the fi fteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 
The second tradition that made itself felt during the years 
of the Renaissance is that of Stoicism, especially Seneca and 
earlier philosophers whose arguments are summarised in 
Cicero, such as Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus. The revival 
of Stoicism in 1580s and 1590s was known as ‘neostoicism’, 
a movement led by the Flemish scholar Justus Lipsius, and 
popularised by the charismatic French lawyer Guillaume du 
Vair, and which, in England, infl uenced Joseph Hall. A third 
tradition to consider is that of scepticism, for which, again, 
Cicero provides the key sources: particularly his Academica 
(‘On Academic Scepticism’), which summarises earlier think-
ers of the New Academy, such as Arcesilaus and Carneades. 
Another important infl uence on Renaissance scepticism was 
the work of Sextus Empiricus, which unarguably made a 
greater impact in the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries than it 
did in the second or third centuries when he lived and wrote. 
The early modern revival of interest in scepticism is seen most 
obviously in Francisco Sanches’s Quod nihil scitur (‘That 
Nothing Is Known’) and the essays of Michel de Montaigne. 
Finally, there is the perennially unpopular fi gure of Epicurus, 
caricatured and reviled by the other schools in Hellenistic 
Greece and generally frowned on in Renaissance Europe. 
Epicureanism was primarily transmitted through Diogenes 
Laërtius’s The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, 
after its translation into Latin in 1430, and Lucretius’s poem 
De rerum natura (‘On the Nature of Things’), after its redis-
covery in 1417, and there is an argument to be made that its 
natural successor was, in fact, Niccolò Machiavelli, a thinker 
who became reviled in his own right. Although Machiavelli 
is a political theorist rather than a moral philosopher, his 
radical assault on Christian ethics in The Prince warrants 
special attention. In the following four sections, I will give 
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some consideration to all four strains of moral thought – 
virtue ethics, Stoicism, scepticism and Epicureanism – while 
keeping the question of the possibility of Shakespeare’s expo-
sure to these ideas in focus. Each section will follow the same 
structure:
1. Outline of the basic ethical ideas at stake in the philosophical 
tradition.
2. Tracing of the impact of this thinking in the late 1500s in 
England.
3. Consideration of some evidence of this impact in Shakespeare’s 
plays.
After this, in the next chapter, I will consider the impact of 
both the Protestant Reformation and capitalism on moral 
thinking in Shakespeare’s time. 
I
Virtue and Vices: The Aristotelian–Thomist Tradition
As David N. Beauregard has gone to great lengths to show, 
the prevalent mode of morality in Shakespeare’s time was a 
Christian version of Aristotelian virtue ethics as mediated by 
Thomas Aquinas.13 Ethics was seen predominantly through 
the prism of virtues and vices: broadly speaking, cultivate the 
former by making them habitual, which will de facto help 
one resist temptation of the latter. The most infl uential ethical 
texts in the period after the Bible,14 therefore, were Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. 
I will return to the question of the infl uence of both writers 
in England during the late 1500s, and of Shakespeare’s pos-
sible familiarity with them, but fi rst let us consider the ideas 
at stake in the ethics of both Aristotle and Aquinas.
As was customary in classical ethics, both Aristotle and 
Aquinas defi ne the ultimate end as, in Cicero’s phrase, the 
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summum bonum, or ‘the highest good’. For Aristotle, this 
was eudaimonia, a word that has no direct English transla-
tion. It combines both happiness and a kind of fl ourishing, 
and is achieved through excellence of character (moral vir-
tues), which can be brought about by habit of action. Aris-
totle’s ethics are thus egocentric because the agent’s personal 
happiness, contentment and fulfi lment are seen as the highest 
ends: eudaimonia is an end in itself and is the highest good. 
In distinguishing between moral virtues and intellectual vir-
tues (wisdom, knowledge and reason), Aristotle departed 
from rational deontologists, such as Plato, who maintained 
that the highest good consisted in reason, pure contempla-
tion of the Idea, which brings us closer to the supreme good: 
namely, God. The Stoics, meanwhile, saw the essence of the 
highest good not in eudaimonia but in virtue itself, which 
can be achieved only through reasoned action. The question 
of what constitutes the summum bonum is thus a matter of 
emphasis: on eudaimonia (Aristotle), on reason (Plato) or on 
virtue (Stoicism). In his Christianisation of Aristotle, Aqui-
nas, in a sense, synthesised and harmonised these different 
approaches, by blending eudaimonia (or ‘happiness’), rea-
son and virtue into each other. The highest good in Aquinas 
is, of course, God, and it can be reached only in the after-
life: when we experience true happiness it is because we are 
closer to God, who is the rightful object of reason, and who 
is the author of our very capacity for virtue. For Aquinas, 
these three categories all presuppose one another as aspects 
of blissful possession: there can be no happiness that does 
not presuppose God because he is its ultimate source; there 
can be no rational argument that does not have God as its 
end because to deny God in Aquinas’s proof is irrational; and 
there can be no virtuous act that does not admit the nature 
of God because virtue is the highest achievement of which 
human beings are capable, and God created us. Therefore, 
because happiness, reason and virtue amount to aspects of 
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the same thing, Aquinas always maintains that virtues must 
be treated as ends in themselves, never as means to some ulti-
mate end. To put it crudely, an individual must not act virtu-
ously in the hope of some imagined reward (such as entry to 
Heaven), but rather do so for virtue’s own sake. 
I should note that MFT, from which I have drawn in this 
study, in many ways comes out of the virtue ethics tradition. 
Consider this passage from Aristotle:
Anger seems to listen to reason to some extent, but to mis-
hear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have 
heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the 
order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock at the door, 
before looking to see that it is a friend; so anger by reason 
of the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, 
does not hear an order, and so it springs to take revenge.15 
And how about this from St Thomas?
For the formal principle of virtue by which we speak now 
is value in accord with reason. This can be considered in 
two ways. First, as lying in a judgement of reason; in this 
way there is one principle virtue, called prudence. Secondly, 
according as reason puts its order into something else, 
either into what we do, and then we have justice, or into 
what we feel, and then we need two virtues. . . . For the 
need of putting the rule of reason into our emotions rises 
from their resistance to reason, and so need a curb, which 
we name temperance. Or they may make us shirk a course 
of action dictated by reason, through fear of dangers or 
hardships. Then a person needs to be steadfast and not run 
away from what is right; and for this courage is named.16 
Both Aristotle and Aquinas recognise that ethical decision-
making must always in some sense work with or against natu-
ral instincts and intuitions in the individual, which manifest 
themselves as emotions or ‘passions’. We can recognise in this 
the moral intuitions of MFT and correspondingly James A. 
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Knapp’s ‘welling up’ of moral conviction in Shakespearean 
characters. Both philosophers appear to be aware that reason 
is fi ghting an uphill struggle for primacy over gut-instinctual 
intuitions, which it sometimes cannot win. Tillyard argues that 
‘The battle between Reason and Passion, the commonplace of 
every age, was peculiarly vehement in the age of Elizabeth.’17 
His assumption that it has been ‘the commonplace of every age’ 
is one that we should not dismiss easily because the overwhelm-
ing evidence suggests that this recurring theme across different 
periods in history is a universal symptom of human experience, 
precisely because this is the way we process thought. ‘Every age’ 
has made the distinction between emotions and reasoning – 
what Cicero, drawing on Chrysippus, called ‘The Twofold 
Division of the Mind’18 – because they are two different cogni-
tive processes. Think of the way, for example, in modern ver-
nacular English or American English we might say ‘I lost it’ 
when getting angry. It is a momentary loss of the reasoning 
function: the rider has failed to keep the unruly elephant in 
check, which is now crashing about wildly. We can recognise 
– just as Aristotle, Aquinas and Shakespeare before us – that is 
a distinctive feature of human behaviour. I will return to this 
later in my discussion of Seneca’s Stoicism.
The recognition that we have such instinctual tendencies, 
for both Aristotle and Aquinas, is foundational to ethics: we 
must know what we are in order to know how to act: ‘before 
philosophers could even begin considering how to train 
man’s character, they fi rst had to understand his nature’.19 As 
the great historian of philosophy, F. C. Copleston, explains,
Aquinas emphasized the place and function of reason in 
moral conduct. He shared with Aristotle the view that it is 
the possession of reason which distinguishes man from the 
animals, to whom he is in many ways similar. It is reason 
which enables him to act deliberately in view of a con-
sciously apprehended end and raises him above the level 
of purely instinctual behaviour.20 
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I do not think the advocates of MFT would disagree on this 
point. Theirs is a psychological model that accounts for how 
we think when making day-to-day moral decisions, rather 
than an ethics trying to answer the eternal question of how 
to live the good life. I also do not think that either Aristotle 
or Aquinas believes that moderating the passions with reason 
is easy. Neither do they think that passions are always nec-
essarily bad; rather, they condemn, to return to Copleston, 
‘unhealthy upsurges of emotion, unregulated by reason and 
tending to lead man into acts contrary to right reason’.21 It is 
easy to see why G. K. Chesterton called this ‘the philosophy 
of common sense’.22
Before moving on, it is worth mapping Aquinas’s con-
ception of virtues and vices, which is surely the most robust 
account available in Christian theology. The Summa consis-
tently conforms to the structure of scholastic disputation: 
each question begins with several objections before a brief 
statement from a chosen authority that contradicts the objec-
tions (sed contra, ‘on the contrary’). Aquinas draws on a 
great many sources for these contrary statements but most 
often leans on the Bible, ‘the Philosopher’ (Aristotle), ‘The 
Theologian’ (Augustine) or ‘The Master’ (Peter Lombard). 
After this argument from authority, Aquinas then proceeds to 
reply to each objection one by one. Because of this adherence 
to the scholastic system of argument, Aquinas’s ethical sys-
tem is incredibly rigorous and fully realised. He follows both 
Ambrose and Augustine in expanding Plato’s four cardinal 
virtues (prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice) by add-
ing St Paul’s three theological virtues of faith, love and hope: 
the ‘former, as acquired virtues, lead to natural happiness, 
but the latter, the theological virtues, as being infused by God 
(virtues infusae), lead to supernatural happiness’.23 There are 
thus seven heavenly virtues, which each has various precepts, 
parts, gifts or associated acts, and corresponding vices. This is 
a complex and intricate system and any summary necessarily 
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risks reduction. I have listed the seven heavenly virtues below 
and attempted to note the various correspondences: 
1. Faith, which requires and bestows knowledge and understanding.
2. Hope, which bestows fear (which can be good or bad; in this 
case it is the fear of God and therefore good) and is opposed to 
despair and presumption. 
3. Charity, which bestows wisdom, requires love, joy, peace and 
mercy, and is opposed to hatred and the vices of sloth and envy.
4. Prudence, which bestows (good) counsel, and is opposed to 
imprudence, negligence and false resemblance.
5. Justice, which bestows piety, and is opposed to a great many 
things including crimes of all sorts, back-biting, derision, per-
jury, lying, dissimulation and hypocrisy, boastfulness, fl attery, 
disobedience and covetousness.
6. Fortitude, which bestows courage, magnanimity (opposed 
to presumption, ambition and vainglory) and pusillanimity 
(opposed to defi ciency). It is also opposed to (bad, ‘disordered’) 
fear, (foolish) fearlessness and daring.
7. Temperance, which bestows abstinence, sobriety and chastity, 
and is opposed to gluttony, drunkenness and lust.24
Aquinas’s writing around these seven virtues is not insignifi -
cant, comprising the entirety of the Secunda Secundae; the 
Blackfriars edition takes up seventeen volumes, with several 
virtues getting a book or two each. These categories are, of 
course, not unique to Aquinas, even though he synthesised 
and codifi ed them more systematically than any other Chris-
tian thinker before or since. Aquinas’s Summa represents ‘an 
encyclopedic bringing together and harmonizing’ of thinking 
around virtues and vices from Aristotle to the thirteenth cen-
tury – encompassing even Islamic thinkers such as Avicenna 
and Al-Ghazali, and the Jewish philosopher Maimonides – 
which was inherited by the Renaissance.25 Even if the specifi c 
confi gurations of the virtues and vices we encounter in lit-
erature might differ slightly from Aquinas’s codifi cation, his 
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comprehensiveness offers a good starting point. As I hope to 
have shown in the list above, Aquinas considers many more 
than seven virtues and, indeed, more than seven vices, but the 
heavenly virtues each represent a type of node around which 
‘lesser’ virtues and vices cluster. 
This can lead to some confusion around exactly which 
vices count as cardinal sins and which do not. For example, 
even though Gregory the Great folded ‘vainglory’ into pride 
when defi ning his seven deadly sins in 590,26 Aquinas still 
devotes a whole question to it; however, he seems to defi ne 
it as ‘the desire of glory’ rather its typical associations with 
excessive pride in one’s achievements.27 The word persists 
into the sixteenth century and is used extensively in early 
modern English. Shakespeare, for example, uses it three 
times: in Troilus and Cressida (III, iii, 258–9), Cymbeline 
(4.1.7) and Henry VIII (III, i, 126). However, it seems to 
have been downgraded into being just a common vice rather 
than a cardinal sin; for example, when Christopher Marlowe 
depicts the allegorical fi gures of the seven deadly sins in 
Doctor Faustus (A-Text, 2.3.108),28 it is the embodiment of 
pride rather than vainglory who appears. 
We must also be aware that Aquinas’s seven heavenly vir-
tues (combining the four cardinal virtues and three theological 
virtues) are not the same as the seven contrary virtues, as fi rst 
depicted in Prudentius’s Psychomachia.29 The seven contrary 
virtues are those specifi cally designed to combat the seven car-
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Aquinas accounts for each of these in the Summa, even though 
they are not listed as such. But these seven virtues and vices far 
from exhaust Aquinas’s account. We might also add: 




Peace versus Discord / War / Strife / Sedition
Benefi cence versus Scandal
Wisdom versus Folly
Prudence versus Imprudence / Negligence
Prudence versus Carnal Prudence (‘Prudence of the Flesh’)
Friendliness / Affability versus Flattery / Quarrelling
Obedience versus Disobedience
Honesty versus Lying / Dissimilation and Hypocrisy / Boasting
Gratitude versus Ingratitude
Perseverance versus Effeminacy (‘Softness’) / Pertinacity
Sobriety versus Drunkenness




There are more, no doubt. As is traditional in Catholic think-
ing, Aquinas distinguishes between two categories of sin: 
venial and mortal. The former is a forgivable – in Aquinas’s 
phrase, ‘reparable’30 – lesser sin that does not necessarily 
require repentance before death – which is to say that it does 
not require sacramental confession – while the latter is much 
more serious, leading to damnation in Hell if the sinner is 
unrepentant. On some vices he is not entirely clear as to their 
status as sin; for example, he argues that curiosity ‘may be sin-
ful’ if the knowledge sought results in bad ends.31 Curiosity, 
as a minor vice, can lead to much greater sins. For example, 
by following curiosity in the pursuit of knowledge we can 
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succumb to pride, a cardinal sin that itself begets many other 
vices. Aquinas’s advice on most of these matters, therefore, is 
to err on the side of caution; his is a system of moderation that 
is akin to Aristotle’s ‘Golden Mean’.
John Wylkinson translated the Ethics into English for 
R. Grafton in 1547 and there is direct evidence that Shake-
speare had some familiarity with it, mentioning Aristotle 
in connection with moral philosophy twice in Troilus and 
Cressida.32 There is also an echo of the Ethics in King Lear, 
when Lear, upon seeing Poor Tom, exclaims, ‘Thou art the 
thing itself’ (III, iv, 96–7); Aristotle uses the phrase ‘a thing 
itself’.33 Aquinas’s works, meanwhile, could be readily 
bought at the booksellers in St Paul’s churchyard.34 Despite 
this, there is some reason to doubt that Shakespeare read 
the Summa: a work of over 3,500 pages, which, in its mod-
ern Blackfriars edition, takes up sixty volumes, and which 
was not translated into English until 1911. That said, he 
seems at least conceptually familiar with the Thomistic 
framework,35 which was widely disseminated in the period 
through mediated forms such as Thomas Wright’s The 
Passions of the Minde in Generalle (1604) and Sir Walter 
Raleigh’s ‘A Treatise of the Soul’.36
However, I think we must caution against too readily 
asserting any centrality for Aquinas, as perhaps Beauregard 
does in his, at times, narrow focus. It is important to be aware 
that Aquinas was idiosyncratic among the scholastics, and 
hardly a typical thinker in his own period. As Peter Adamson 
makes plain:
[I]f one were to choose the 13th century thinker whose 
ideas had most infl uence in the following century then 
Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent – or, for that matter, Albert 
the Great – would be at least as plausible choices as 
Aquinas. His emergence as the most indispensable thinker 
of the middle ages was a slow one and owes something to 
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Renaissance authors like John Cabrol [‘Jean Capréolus’], 
the fi fteenth-century author of a work called Defences 
of the Theology of Thomas Aquinas, and later, in the 
sixteenth century, the great exponent of Aquinas, Cardinal 
Cajetan [Thomas de Vio].37 
Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Albert the Great (who was 
Aquinas’s mentor) were all, in some respect, infl uenced in 
their moral thinking by Aristotle, whose complete works had 
only recently been translated into Latin – his centrality is 
not in question. But Aquinas’s teachings were not canonised 
by papal authority until Leo XIII in 1879,38 and we must 
remember that the Renaissance humanists had a strong dis-
taste for his style of medieval Scholasticism, preferring the 
more literary dialogues found in Plato or Cicero. None the 
less, it is true to say – as will be evident throughout my dis-
cussion of ethics across all traditions below – that we fi nd 
Aquinas embedded in the works of practically every major 
theologian of the period, Catholic or Protestant. 
Capréolus (1380–1444) – dubbed by some ‘the Prince 
of Thomists’39 – was a French Dominican friar who trained 
in the Order in Paris, but spent most of his life teaching in 
Toulouse. Cajetan (1469–1534), also a Dominican, lectured 
at various universities during the 1490s in Northern Italy, 
most notably in Padua and Milan, before moving to Rome 
in 1501 to carry out administrative business; he was made a 
cardinal in 1517 and spent the remainder of his life, until his 
death in 1534, battling the Protestant Reformation. He trav-
elled to Germany to confront Martin Luther in 1518, and was 
later a vocal opponent of Henry VIII’s attempts to annul his 
marriage to Catherine of Aragon.40 While it is unlikely that 
he would have had knowledge of Capréolus, Shakespeare 
may well have been aware of Cajetan, not only because of 
his involvement in Henry VIII’s attempted divorce, but also 
because there is a possible allusion to his altercations with 
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Luther in Romeo and Juliet when Sampson says ‘I’ll bite my 
thumb at them’ (I, i, 42). Joseph Hunter seems to have been 
the fi rst to spot this in 1845:
It ought to have been added in the notes that this is a 
trait of Italian manners. Thus [Thomas] Fuller, in his Abel 
Redivivus [1651] . . . after relating a conversation between 
Luther and the messenger of Cardinal Cajetan, says, ‘at 
this the messenger, after the Italian manner, biting his 
thumb, went away’.41 
Although Fuller was writing after Shakespeare, Cajetan’s three 
days in Augsburg were famous across Europe, and it is pos-
sible that the detail of the thumb-biting was well disseminated 
in both Catholic and Protestant circles. 
Pausing on a fi gure like Cajetan illustrates that moral 
philosophy in early modern England was almost entirely 
bound up with matters of religion, and we cannot gloss over 
this by trying to maintain the modern distinction between 
philosophy and theology. In this period, ‘ethics and theology 
were entangled through institutional structures’ and there-
fore ‘the boundaries between ethics and theology’ are not 
‘very clear’.42 Moral thinking is, in a sense, muddied by both 
religious upheaval (the Reformation, Protestantism in gen-
eral) and political realities, which is to say that the offi cial 
state religious doctrines of England at any given moment 
might not necessarily refl ect the reality of moral thinking 
‘on the ground’. 
Both Capréolus and Cajetan were considered scholastic 
revivalists, and this revival was taking place in parallel with 
(and in reaction to) the emergence of Renaissance human-
ism in France and Italy, but not necessarily in England, where 
Erasmus’s repudiation of medieval Scholasticism was gain-
ing purchase at the same time: for example, in the work of 
Thomas More, who saw Aquinas’s incorporation of ideas 
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from Aristotle and others as one of ‘corrupting novelties’ that 
had taken Christianity away from the original inspiration of 
God.43 Someone like Thomas Wyatt, who had travelled to 
Italy, had certainly read the work of Cajetan (and translated 
some of his psalms),44 but this was an elite discourse, requiring 
technical knowledge of Latin, French or Italian, and confi ned 
to the courts and universities. We cannot, therefore, draw a 
straight line from Aristotle to Aquinas to ‘Renaissance cham-
pions’ such as Cajetan and expect that this thinking naturally 
trickled down to the general populace in any straightforward 
way. We also cannot overlook the fact that this thinking was 
primarily taking place abroad and not in England. David A. 
Lines has shown that while Aristotelian ethics formed a core 
part of university training in England (just as in France, Spain 
and Italy), the country seems to have produced scant media-
tions on the subject itself:
What is astounding . . . is the dearth of works on the Ethics 
produced in England. We know of only one prolusion for 
the fi fteenth century and of the commentaries by John Case, 
William Temple, and Cuthbert Tunstall for the sixteenth.45 
Of the writers that Lines names, as a philosophical inter-
preter of Aristotle, John Case (c. 1556–1600) was undoubt-
edly the most infl uential and important, his Sphaera civitatis 
(‘The Sphere of State’) (1588) becoming compulsory read-
ing for students at Oxford by 1590.46 Sir William Temple 
(1555–1627; not to be confused with his more famous 
grandson of the same name) was a logician who worked as 
a secretary for Robert Devereux, the Earl of Essex, before 
which he served as the Master of Lincoln Free School and 
after which he became Provost of Trinity College, Dublin; 
his work was admired by Philip Sidney. Cuthbert Tunstall 
(1474–1559), meanwhile, was the Bishop of Durham under 
Henry VIII, exiled from his original bishopric of London 
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after opposing the divorce from Catherine of Aragon. 
These authors all wrote their key ethical studies in Latin 
and they were not translated into English. Therefore, it 
seems unlikely to me that Shakespeare himself would have 
been familiar with any of these works, although it is pos-
sible he had a general awareness of each of the men them-
selves. There is an echo of Case in Perdita and Polixenes’s 
disputation on art and nature in The Winter’s Tale (IV, iv, 
86–97), but it is not clear that Case is the source.47 William 
Temple was still in Essex’s services during the Essex Rebel-
lion of 1601, but claims to have had no knowledge of the 
plot. We cannot know for sure whether he was present dur-
ing the Lord Chamberlain’s Men’s special performance of 
Richard II on the eve of the rebellion, where he might fea-
sibly have encountered Shakespeare in person. In a letter to 
Robert Cecil, he claims to have been kept in the dark about 
the rebellion. In the previous weeks, he had been employed 
primarily as a messenger, and so was not close to Essex’s 
person during this time, which suggests that his presence at 
the performance was unlikely.48 Even though Tunstall does 
not appear in Henry VIII, in writing that play, Shakespeare, 
along with John Fletcher, demonstrates a good working 
knowledge of the key religious and political fi gures of the 
period and it is not unreasonable to think that they would 
have known about his political exile to Durham. 
If Shakespeare was unlikely to have read Capréolus, 
Cajetan, Case, Temple or Tunstall, even if he had heard of 
some of them by reputation, it is also stands to reason that 
Italian works providing Thomist reinterpretations of Aris-
totelian ethics, such as Donato Acciaiuoli’s Expositio super 
libros ethicorum (‘Exposition on the Books of Ethics’) 
(1481),49 were not on his intellectual radar either. In short, 
I am suggesting that while Shakespeare possessed some 
knowledge of both Aristotle and Aquinas, he did not engage 
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signifi cantly with the burgeoning body of scholarly work 
around them – he was a playwright, not Richard Hooker.
In fact, Hooker, perhaps the most famous English theo-
logian of the period, probably deserves special mention. E. 
M. W. Tillyard famously used his Of the Laws of Ecclesi-
astical Polity (1594–7) as the basis for his argument that 
Shakespeare and his contemporaries believed strongly in the 
Great Chain of Being. Indeed, in a characteristic moment of 
overstatement, for Tillyard, ‘It is what everyone believed 
in Elizabeth’s days.’50 Hooker’s writings on the relation-
ship between the Church and State were deeply indebted to 
Aquinas’s idea of law and justice.51 And the cosmic order 
that Tillyard outlines in The Elizabethan World Picture 
(1952) is not dissimilar to Aquinas’s model, though Tillyard 
seems to de-emphasise his infl uence, instead foregrounding 
St Paul, the Platonic–Augustinian tradition, and the physi-
ology of Hippocrates and Galen, which he argues under-
pinned the Elizabethan belief in the four passions (pleasure, 
pain, desire and fear) and four humours (melancholic, 
phlegmatic, choleric and sanguine). For Aquinas, there 
were, in fact, eleven passions. Lily B. Campbell provides a 
neat summary:52
Concupiscible Irascible
Love and Hatred Hope and Despair
Desire and Aversion Courage and Fear
Joy (or Pleasure) and Sadness (or Grief) Anger
As Campbell and Beauregard argue, this idea of there being 
eleven passions, following Aquinas, was popular in Shake-
speare’s time. But others, such as Rolf Soellner, have insisted 
that Shakespeare, being a well-known fan of Cicero and 
Seneca, followed the Stoics in maintaining only four.53
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Even allowing for qualifi cations about the extent and 
centrality of his infl uence, in the Summa Aquinas essentially 
provides us with an index to the full lexicon of ethical lan-
guage as it was still being used in 1590s and early 1600s, 
and extensively in Shakespeare’s plays. We can see it in virtu-
ally any passage that touches virtues or vices that we care to 
pluck out. To choose one almost at random, here is Helena 
in All’s Well That Ends Well:
Yet these fi xed evils sit so fi t in him
That they take place when virtue’s steely bones
Looks bleak i’th’ cold wind withal. Full oft we see
Cold wisdom waiting on superfl uous folly. (I, i, 98–101)
‘Evils’ here seems to trigger in Shakespeare’s imagination its 
opposite, ‘virtue’, which in turn triggers a single instance of 
‘wisdom’ and, as per Aquinas, its opposite, ‘folly’. Aquinas 
thus provides a skeleton key with which to unlock the ways 
in which Shakespeare and his audiences would have under-
stood how various virtues and acts are connected, and indeed 
how they are juxtaposed with specifi c vices.
In summary
• The prevalent mode of morality in Shakespeare’s time was a 
Christian version of Aristotelian virtue ethics as mediated by 
Thomas Aquinas.
• Aristotle views the highest good as the achievement of eudai-
monia, a combination of happiness and fl ourishing achieved 
by excellence in virtue, whereas for Aquinas the highest good 
is God, which necessarily assumes a combination of virtue, 
reason and eudaimonia, as each by nature implies the other.
• Both Aristotle and Aquinas draw a distinction between rea-
son and emotion, and recognise that the emotions do not 
always respond to reason and can be diffi cult to control. In 
this way, their thinking bears some striking similarities with 
Moral Foundations Theory.
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• In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas systematically outlines the 
seven heavenly virtues, which act as nodes for many other 
acts and virtues. He also outlines eleven passions, and many 
vices, which are subdivided into venial and mortal sins. 
• Shakespeare is likely to have read Aristotle and have had 
some familiarity with the key tenets of Aquinas, but is not 
likely to have read Jean Capréolus, Cardinal Cajetan, John 
Case, William Temple or Cuthbert Tunstall because they 
wrote their key works almost exclusively in Latin as part of 
an elite discourse.
• Aquinas codifi es ideas that were deeply embedded in both 
medieval and early modern culture, and therefore provides a 
useful guide to the ethically charged language that we fi nd in 
Shakespeare’s plays.
II
‘Inward Government’: Stoicism, the Will and the Self
Let us turn now to the Stoics, who were transmitted to the 
early modern period chiefl y by Cicero and Seneca. As I have 
mentioned, the Stoics believed that the highest (and, indeed, 
only) good consisted in virtue. For them, however, unlike 
in Aristotle or Aquinas, where action can cultivate habitual 
virtue, it is possible to achieve virtue only through reason, 
which is seen as being consistent with the laws of nature and 
the universe. The actual virtues and vices are not dissimi-
lar from what we saw in Aristotle or Aquinas but the basis 
for their application is very different. The Stoics were hard 
materialists, who believed that there was nothing incorpo-
real in the universe and that matter is ordered by an absolute 
law of logic. To ‘live according to nature’, therefore, is to 
live a rational life. Cicero gives us a good fl avour of how the 
early Stoics proceeded in their rational arguments for vir-
tues in Tusculanae Disputationes (‘Tusculan Disputations’), 
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‘perhaps the most celebrated guide to Stoic philosophy in 
the sixteenth century’:54
[A1]  Anyone who is courageous is also confi dent.
[A2]  Moreover, anyone who is confi dent does not become 
greatly frightened.
[A3]  But anyone who is subject to distress is also subject 
to fear,
[A4]  distress is incompatible with courage.
[A5]  But no one is wise who is not also courageous.
[A6]  Therefore, the wise person will not be subject to distress. 
Furthermore,
[B1]  Anyone who is courageous must also be great in spirit.
[B2]  A person great in spirit must also be indomitable.
[B3]  The indomitable person must be able to disregard the 
circumstances of human life as matters beneath his 
notice.
[B4]  But no one can disregard things that are capable of 
causing him distress.
[B5]  Therefore, the courageous man cannot ever be distressed.
[B6]  But everyone who is wise is courageous.
[B7]  Therefore, the wise person is not subject to distress.55 
Thus, the early Stoics relied primarily on syllogism to advance 
their arguments. In this way, it can appear rather abstract 
and divorced from real-world practical application. We can 
see from the above that it is good to be wise and courageous, 
and bad to be distressed, but there are no real guidelines for 
how to achieve wisdom or courage. It is an ‘all or nothing’ 
proposition.
In their ethics, the Stoics held to two central tenets: fi rst, 
that the passions – irrational emotions – are mostly always bad 
because they steer us from the path of reason. As Cicero puts 
it, they saw emotions as a ‘sort of wild lack of self-control’.56 
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Second, they held that everything external to virtue is indif-
ferent – although, somewhat inconsistently, both its founder, 
Zeno of Citium, and its most infl uential exponent, Chrysippus, 
maintain, contra Aristo of Chios, that some indifferent things 
are preferable to others. Here is Cicero on Zeno in Academica 
(‘On Academic Scepticism’):
Well, Zeno was not at all the sort of person to hamstring 
virtue, as Theophrastus had. Quite the reverse: his position 
was that everything belonging to the happy life depends on 
virtue alone. He admitted nothing else into the category 
of goods, and gave the name ‘honourable’ to the uniform, 
unique, and only good there was. But, though everything 
else was neither good nor bad, he claimed that some of 
these indifferent things were in accordance with nature and 
others contrary to nature – and in between the latter two 
he added a further class of intermediates. He taught that 
those in accordance with nature were worthy of selection 
and assigned them a degree of value, and the reverse for 
the opposite class, while those that were neither he left in 
the intermediate class, to which he ascribed no practical 
weight at all. But among those worthy of selection or disse-
lection some were assigned considerable value or disvalue; 
he called the former ‘preferred’ and the latter ‘dispreferred’ 
indifferents.57 
Thus we get a sort of ‘indifference’ index ranking things from 
preferable to undesirable. For example, health is considered 
to be morally indifferent, but it is preferable to be healthy 
than to be ill. Cicero himself appears to have thought this 
absurd, as he outlines in De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 
(‘On Moral Ends’) in his dialogue with the Stoic, Cato the 
Younger:
At least Aristo’s [principles] are straightforward; yours are 
convoluted. Ask Aristo whether he thinks the following are 
goods: freedom from pain, wealth, health. He will say no. 
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Well then, are their opposites evils? Similarly, no. Now ask 
Zeno the same question, and his reply will be the same. In 
our astonishment, we ask both philosophers how it will be 
possible to live a life if we think it makes no difference to 
us whether we are well or ill, free from pain or in agony, 
able to stave off cold and hunger or not. Aristo says we will 
live great and glorious lives, doing whatever we think fi t, 
without sorrow, desire or fear. 
‘What does Zeno say?’ That Aristo’s doctrine is a mon-
strosity; no life can be lived by such a rule. His own view 
is that there is a huge, an utterly immense, gap between 
morality and immorality, but that between all other things 
there is no difference whatsoever. So far, this is still the 
same as Aristo. Hear the rest and choke back your laughter 
if you can.58 
Cicero is arguing that Zeno’s insistence that his ‘preferred’ 
categories of indifference are still indifferent is logically con-
tradictory and guilty of mere word-play, or, as he puts it, 
borrowing a phrase from Accius, ‘false-speaking trickery’. He 
rejects Stoicism in its strictest form, as preached by Aristo, 
because, when ‘you do away with concern for one’s health, 
care of one’s household, public service, the conduct of busi-
ness and the duties of life[, u]ltimately morality itself, which 
you regard as everything, must be abandoned’.59 He also dis-
regards Stoicism in its more accepted modifi ed form – as in 
Zeno or Chrysippus – because, in his view, they are merely 
reproducing Aristotle’s ethics using different words. He there-
fore sees no real difference between Aristotelian ethics and 
Stoicism. 
Even in these few passages from Cicero that I have quoted, 
we can see the Roman rhetorical fl ourishes that were so pop-
ular with Renaissance readers, which stand in sharp contrast 
to the dry, academic style of Aquinas’s scholastic disputa-
tions. Sixteenth-century taste, with its deep appreciation of 
rhetoric, was predisposed to prefer dialogues to scholastics, 
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but Cicero’s prose tended towards expansion and complexity 
rather than rhetorical fl air; for that, the early modern reader 
could turn instead to Seneca. As Tobias Reinhardt tells us,
Seneca is the main representative of so-called Silver Latin 
prose. The hallmark of his style is a clipped, paratactic way 
of writing, which depends for its effect on particular stylis-
tic devices like parallelism, antithesis, and the pointed and 
brilliant one-liner, the epigram or sententia.60 
It is fair to say that this rhetorical fl ashiness accounts for 
the enormous popularity of Seneca in early modern England. 
Indeed, ‘during this period, Seneca prevails over Cicero as a 
stylistic model’.61
Seneca, far from sharing Cicero’s antipathy towards the 
Stoics, identifi ed as one as part of the ‘Roman Stoa’, a Roman 
revival of Stoicism during the fi rst and second centuries that 
was at its apex during the reign of Marcus Aurelius c.161–180. 
Here is Seneca taking Aristotle to task for his apparent defence 
of anger in his dialogue De Ira (‘On Anger’):
Aristotle stands as the defender of anger and forbids that it 
be cut out of us: it is, he says, the spur to virtue, and, if the 
mind is robbed of it, it cannot defend itself and becomes 
lazy and indifferent to great endeavours. And so we must 
fi rst of all prove how loathsome and savage a thing anger 
is, and set before the eyes what a monster a man is when 
he rages against another man, with what violence he rushes 
on to wreak destruction, while bringing it on himself, and 
seeks to wreck what can only be sunk if he, too, sinks in the 
process. So, tell me, will someone call a man sane who, as if 
caught up in a tempest, does not walk but is driven along, 
and takes as his master a furious demon, a man who does 
not entrust his revenge to another but executes it himself, 
and so becomes a savage in thought and deed, the execu-
tioner of those persons he holds most dear and destroyer 
of the things whose loss will soon make him weep? Is this a 
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passion that anyone can assign as a helper and companion 
to virtue, when it makes havoc of the resolutions essential 
to virtue achieving anything?62 
Seneca plainly does not think that anger is a good thing, but 
then – if you recall the passage I quoted earlier – neither does 
Aristotle. The key difference is that Aristotle saw anger, and 
other emotions, as fl aring up in spite of our efforts to con-
trol them with reason. They are in some sense involuntary, or 
rather undeliberate – that is, ‘not chosen’ – but Seneca, con-
forming to a core Stoic doctrine, maintains that an emotion 
such as anger involves the assent of the moral agent and there-
fore is only ever a voluntary act.
For Seneca, the question of self-control comes down to 
one of his key concepts: the will. Consider his remedy for 
anger:
Do battle with yourself: if you have the will to conquer 
anger, it cannot conquer you. Your conquest has begun if 
it is hidden away, if it is given no outlet. Let us conceal the 
signs of it, and as far as is possible let us keep it hidden 
and secret. This will cost us a great deal of trouble (for it is 
eager to leap out and infl ame the eyes and alter the face), 
but if it is allowed to display itself outside ourselves, it is 
then on top of us. In the lowest recess of the heart let it be 
hidden away, and let it not drive, but be driven. Moreover, 
let us change all its symptoms into the opposite: let the 
expression on our faces be relaxed, our voices gentler, our 
steps more measured; little by little outer features mould 
inner ones.63 
This psychological notion of a struggle within the self, of the 
will battling with a passion such as anger, is characteristically 
Senecan and is missing in Aristotle and the earlier Stoics, but it is 
present in Aquinas, who inherited the concept from Augustine.64 
In Aristotle, as we saw, anger is something that a person experi-
ences and, once it takes hold, reason is not enough to extinguish 
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its fl ames. Seneca’s moral compass, meanwhile, is one of near-
total self-determination; as he puts it elsewhere, ‘Whatever can 
make you a good man is there in you. What do you need to 
be a good man? Willpower.’65 Thus we can see in Seneca’s eth-
ics something approaching the sort of advice we might fi nd in 
modern self-help books. His emphasis is always on mental self-
improvement and self-shaping. Seneca also seems to us much 
more practical and realistic than the early Stoics such as Zeno, 
who, as we have seen, seemed in their abstract way to wish 
for an impossible utopia of perfect sages but offered few guide-
lines for achieving it. In contrast, Seneca lived in the real world. 
For example, the lines I have just quoted come from a letter he 
writes in a quiet moment while everyone else is attending a box-
ing match. There is, just as in Shakespeare, a real situatedness 
in Seneca’s treatment of morality, and we can appreciate why 
aspects of his version of Stoicism might have been attractive to 
people in late sixteenth-century England.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, just as Beauregard has made 
strides to claim Shakespeare for the Aristotelian–Thomist tra-
dition, Charles and Michelle Martindale have tried to show 
that he was infl uenced by Stoicism, rejecting claims that he was 
hostile to it.66 As they point out, he was certainly aware of the 
tradition; for example, as in Taming of the Shrew, when Tranio 
says, ‘while we do admire / This virtue and this moral discipline 
/ Let’s be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray’ (I, i, 29–31). Likewise 
in Hamlet, when Horatio says, ‘Give me a man / That is not 
passion’s slave’ (III, ii, 71–2). According to the Martindales, 
Stoicism was admired by many in the period:
[T]he treatise De Constantia by Julius Lipsius (1547–1606) 
was a major infl uence from the date of its publication in 
1584. The cultivation of detachment, of freedom from pas-
sion, led to an admiration for people whose attitudes were 
unwavering in viewpoint, attitude or mood, who despised 
the vicissitudes of Fortune, showed equanimity in the face 
of death, disregarded the changing fashions of the world 
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and possessed an unshakable inner serenity. This idea of 
personality – repellent to many today – could be presented 
as something moving or thrilling.67 
With its emphasis on self-control, Stoicism was fundamen-
tally compatible with Christianity, especially in its Augustine 
form. The ‘accepted view’ is that English Stoicism ‘reached a 
height of popularity and infl uence during the age of Shake-
speare’.68 
In Thomas James’s preface to Guillaume du Vair’s The 
Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks (1598), a French treatise 
that he had ‘englished for the benefi t of them which are 
ignorant of that tongue’, he wrote:
Christians may profi t by the Stoicks . . . Philosophie in gen-
erall is profi table vnto a Christian man, if it be well and 
rightly vsed: but no kinde of philosophie is more profi table 
and neerer approching vnto Christianitie (as S. Hierome 
saith) then the philosophie of the Stoicks.69 
One example of a Christian following James’s advice can be 
found in the works of Joseph Hall (1574–1656), whose advo-
cacy of Stoicism was such that Thomas Fuller, in his History 
of the Worthies of England (1662), reported that he ‘was 
commonly called our English Seneca’. Fuller gives a pithy 
assessment of his output: ‘very good in his Characters, bet-
ter in his Sermons, best of all in his Meditations’.70 Although, 
as Fuller suggests, his best-known work is Mediations and 
Vowes (1605), we can get a better measure of his moral vision 
in Two Guides to a Good Life (1604), in which he gives us a 
clear view of his conception of virtue: 
Virtue, is a proportion and vprightnesse of life agreeable 
to reasonne, and consisteth in mediocritie, as Vice doth in 
excesse or defect: It is neither subject to Fortune, sclander, 
sicknesse, ol[d]-age, aduersitie, or tyrannie. Of vertues there 
are two kindes, contemplatiue and morrall: contemplatiue, 
which is a quiet and setled beholding of all those good things 
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gathered together by reason, and approoued by iudgement: 
and morrall, which consisteth in the practise and dispersing 
of those good thinges to the benefi te of humane societie; so 
that it is not suffi cient to thinke well, but to doe well. And 
the bodie of vertue is of that nature, that it must be complet, 
not found of one lim[b], and lame of another.71 
We can see here how Hall has taken key aspects of tradi-
tional Stoicism – seeing virtue in reason and contemplation, 
demanding total rather than partial virtue – and blended 
them with elements of the Aristotelian–Thomist tradition, 
such as seeing vice in excess and virtue in positive action. 
Hall departs from the Stoics in his view of the passions, in 
that he does not see them as being necessarily bad:
I would not bee a Stoick to haue no Passions; for that were 
to ouerthrow this inward gouernme[n]t, God hath erected 
in me; but a Christian, to order those I haue: and for that 
I see that as in commotions, one mutinous person drawes on 
more, so in passions, that one m[a]kes way for the extremitic 
of another (as excesse of loue causes excesse of grie[f]e, vpon 
the losse of what we loued): I will doo as wise Princes vse, to 
those they misdoubt for faction, so holde them downe, and 
keepe them bare, that their very impotencie & remisnesse 
[s]hall affoorde me security.72 
Hall’s idea of an ‘inward government’ and a ‘holding down’ 
of excessive and extreme emotions echoes Seneca’s belief in 
the power of the will. There is in this too, just as in Seneca, 
an admission that we have to live in the real world. 
It is evident, then, how deeply Stoicism touched England 
in the 1590s and early 1600s – undoubtedly part of the moral 
fabric during this period, it held ‘considerable currency’73 – 
and indisputably it is registered in Shakespeare’s plays. But as 
we have seen so far, this fabric has the quality of a patchwork 
quilt rather than a uniform cloth. In a thinker like Joseph 
Hall we fi nd, as befi tting the manner of Renaissance eclecti-
cism, a mingling of ideas from different traditions.
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In summary
• The Ancient Stoics, such as Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus, 
see virtue as its own end, which could be achieved only through 
reason.
• Accordingly, they view all passions as bad and seek to live by 
reason alone.
• They argue that everything outside of virtue is morally indif-
ferent, although, contrary to Aristo, they maintain that some 
things – for example, good health – are preferable to others. 
• Cicero sees this as contradictory and argues that it is mere 
word-play; in his view the Stoics reproduced Aristotelian virtue 
ethics using different language.
• Seneca updates and adds to the early Stoics by being more 
situated in lived experience (and therefore more realistic); 
he adds the concept of the will, which can be used to battle 
against strong emotions, such as anger.
• Seneca argues that virtue can be achieved through sheer 
willpower; his is an inward philosophy of self-control and 
self-determination.
• Joseph Hall, who wrote at the same time as Shakespeare, takes 
elements from the Ancient Stoics, Seneca, Aristotle and Aquinas; 
his ethics represent a kind of Renaissance eclecticism.
• Stoicism was thus, in various ways, embedded in the ethical 
milieu of England in the 1590s and early 1600s.
III
‘Suspension of Judgement’: The Revival of Scepticism
I will turn now to consider another powerful philosophical 
current in the period: scepticism. Although scepticism seems 
generally more concerned with epistemology than with 
ethics, it is directly relevant to us in at least two ways: fi rst, 
even though it rejects most known moral systems, it is itself 
a covert form of ethics. It might appear to maintain that 
there is no single answer to the question ‘what is the best 
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way to live?’, but it does, in fact, provide one: most of its 
exponents argue that the sceptical life results in a form of 
tranquillity (ataraxia), in contrast to the perpetual mental 
turmoil of dogmatism.74 In this way, it has an ethical end: the 
best way to live is to achieve ataraxia. Second, it is relevant 
because it is possible that, in their apparent refusal to judge, 
Shakespeare’s plays themselves implicitly endorse a sceptical 
outlook. In this section, I will explain the key tenets of 
Academic scepticism as mediated by Cicero, Pyrrhonian 
scepticism as mediated by Sextus Empiricus, and the ‘new 
scepticism’ of the late 1500s as represented by Michel de 
Montaigne, before considering again whether Shakespeare 
can be aligned with this philosophical approach to ethics. 
 In antiquity, after Arcesilaus took over Plato’s Academy 
c.266 bc there was a prolonged period of Academic scepti-
cism in the mainstream of Greek philosophy. The Academic 
sceptics enjoyed nothing more than attacking the key argu-
ments of the Stoics, to whom they were entirely opposed. 
Once again, we can count on Cicero, who tended to side 
with the sceptics against the Stoics, for an account. Here he 
is, in reply to his interlocutor Lucullus:
[1]  If the wise person ever assents to anything, he will 
sometimes hold an opinion;
[2]  but he will never hold an opinion;
[3]  so he won’t ever assent to anything.
Arcesilaus approved this argument, since he supported 
the fi rst and second premises. Carneades sometimes gave 
as his second premise the concession that the wise person 
would sometimes assent; and from this it followed that the 
wise person would hold opinions (a conclusion you won’t 
accept, and rightly, in my view). But the Stoics, with Antio-
chus in agreement, thought that the fi rst premise – if the 
wise person were to assent, he would hold opinions – was 
false: they thought that he could distinguish false from true 
and inapprehensible from apprehensible impressions.75 
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The debate between the Stoics and Academics is largely epis-
temological: it is concerned with the question of what can 
be known. The Stoics hold that true knowledge is possible, 
whereas the Academics argue that there is always reason to 
doubt and therefore it is impossible. Because true knowledge 
is not possible, for the Academic the only wise course of 
action is what Cicero calls, following Carneades, the ‘sus-
pension of all assent’, or judgement, also known as epokhê.76 
Although the Academics admit probabilities for the practical 
purpose of living, in the fi nal analysis they can be sure of 
nothing – not even of that very fact. 
Scepticism somewhat fell out of fashion during the medi-
eval era. Generally, Scholasticism was not predisposed to 
epistemological questions, although there are some traces of 
scepticism; for example, in William of Ockham.77 The ideas of 
Pyrrho of Elis (360–270 bc), the mysterious founder of scep-
ticism, ‘were practically unknown in the Middle Ages’.78 But 
this was to change in 1562, when Henri Estienne translated 
the major work of Sextus Empiricus (160–210), Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, which simultaneously summarised Pyrrho’s think-
ing while offering an alternative strand of scepticism to that 
known from the Academics, and somewhat side-lining as the 
chief source Cicero’s Academica, and Diogenes Laërtius’s The 
Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (which had been 
available in Latin since the 1430s).79 A translation of Sextus’s 
Against the Professors by Gentian Hervant followed in 1569. 
These translations were to have an explosive impact in the 
1570s. Widely read among the literary and intellectual elites 
in Europe, the Pyrrhonian form of scepticism was fi rst used as 
a weapon of argumentation in the theological wars during the 
period of the Counter-Reformation by both Catholics and Prot-
estants. The intellectual foundations of European thought had 
been rocked by several seismic events: the discovery of the New 
World, Nicolaus Copernicus’s advances in astronomy, Martin 
Luther and the outbreak of Protestantism, the dissemination 
of Machiavelli’s The Prince and, as we have seen, the revival 
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of many competing systems of ancient thought. As Richard H. 
Popkin puts it: 
In such a ferment – with the intellectual world losing its 
established footing, on all sides and with competing claims 
and beliefs on all sides – the revival of ancient Greek scepti-
cism was an attempt to focus the problems, pose a univer-
sal ‘sceptical crisis’, and force men like Francis Bacon and 
René Descartes to look for new foundations for the entire 
intellectual world.80 
In 1576 came the publication of two key works of the 
‘new scepticism’: Frances Sanches’s Quod nihil scitur (‘That 
Nothing is Known’) and Michel de Montaigne’s An Apology 
for Raymond Sebond. For our purposes, Montaigne is more 
directly relevant to Shakespeare than Sanches.
However, before moving to Montaigne, let us take a look 
at how Sextus Empiricus moves beyond the Academic scep-
tics. The fi rst and most striking way is that Sextus – perhaps 
because he was a practicing physician – is content to take 
certain things for granted: let us say, for example, the appear-
ance of one’s own hand. In the strictest sense, a sceptic in 
Sextus’s vein would say, ‘it seems to me that I have a hand’ – 
the observation ends with the description. Sextus is not 
ambiguous about this:
When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not 
take ‘belief’ in the sense in which some say, quite generally, 
that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to 
the feelings forced upon them by appearances – for exam-
ple, they would not say, when heated or chilled, ‘I think I 
am not heated (or: chilled)’. Rather, we say that they do 
not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief 
is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sci-
ences; for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear.81 
They do not reject ‘what is apparent’. The problem starts 
when these things begin to be explained. And, for Sextus, 
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scepticism consists in attacking the explanations given for 
such phenomena by philosophers and scientists, which he 
consistently labels as ‘Dogmatists’, who ‘in the proper sense 
of the word think they have discovered the truth’.82 
Sextus – just like the Academic sceptics – advocates the sus-
pension of judgement, but following Aenesidemus, who revived 
Pyrrho in the fi rst century, outlines ten modes through which 
Pyrrhonists conclude that this is the only course of action; then, 
following Agrippa the Sceptic, he offers ‘the fi ve grounds of 
doubt’. He offers a truly exhaustive account; I will do my best 
to summarise these modes as succinctly as possible:
 The Ten Modes
 1. From differences among animals.
 2. From differences among human beings.
 3. From differences among the senses.
 4. Contrasting circumstances.
 5. Contrasting positions, distances and places.
 6. Contrasting mixtures.
 7. Contrasting qualities and compositions.
 8. From relativity.
 9. According to constant or rare occurrence.
10. Contrasting ways of life, customs, laws, myths and dogmatic 
assumptions.83
Paul Woodruff provides a neat summary:
The fi rst seven Modes show the relativity of perceptual 
appearances in various ways; these are summed up in the 
Eighth Mode, Relativity, which may also go beyond the 
seven to argue for the relativity of all things. The Ninth and 
Tenth modes deal with issues of value.84 
We can recognise in this something approaching modern 
cultural relativism; however, in moral terms, we should not 
mistake it for the liberal value of pluralism, described by 
Isaiah Berlin, in which individuals are faced with diffi cult 
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choices between ultimate ends (that foreclose alternative 
ends).85 To assent to value pluralism entails admitting that 
there are, in fact, (valid) absolute claims, which the sceptic 
would de facto deny; faced with such a choice, the sceptic 
should make no choice. I think this distinction is important 
to grasp. Modern cultural relativism is implicitly a doctrine 
of toleration that accepts that others will believe in whatever 
they will (think back to my quotation from Patti Smith in 
Chapter 1), but the Pyrrhonist overtly doubts any such belief 
and, if true to their philosophy, will necessarily be moved to 
argue against it. This is not to say that the Pyrrhonist is 
intolerant of others (despite their indifference to any form of 
settled or dogmatic position), but rather that we should not 
anachronistically see their relativism as a mark of toleration.
Next, here the fi ve doubts of Agrippa: 
 The Five Modes
 1. The mode deriving from dispute.
 2. The mode throwing one back ad infi nitum (infi nite regress).
 3. The mode deriving from relativity.
 4. The hypothetical mode.
 5. The reciprocal (circular) mode.86 
It might seem here that we are not a long way from Descartes – 
surely this is the mental toolkit he uses in Discourse on the 
Method (1637) – but this would be to misrecognise the dif-
ference between the Pyrrhonists and their most extreme suc-
cessor. For Sextus, true to the foundations of scepticism, these 
modes are enough to resolve in the ‘tranquillity’ of suspension 
of judgement: ‘those who make no determination about what 
is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything 
with intensity; and hence they are tranquil’.87 Scepticism is 
thus an end in itself but, for Descartes, it is only a means, the 
vehicle by which he arrives at his famous cogito ergo sum, 
a new ‘foundation’ for knowledge.88 Furthermore, the force 
and intensity of Cartesian scepticism are the very opposite of 
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tranquil; they are disquieting. Thus, we can see how Cartesian 
scepticism ‘is methodologically (rather than ethically) con-
ceived’,89 and by the same token Pyrrhonism is ethically rather 
than methodically conceived. As I pointed out in the introduc-
tion to this section, scepticism – at least as practised by both 
the Academics and the Pyrrhonists – is a form of ethics.
Let us move forward now to Shakespeare’s time. Before 
we get to the looming fi gure of Montaigne, we must pause 
to ask a question: was Shakespeare familiar with Sextus 
Empiricus or, indeed, with the concept of scepticism at all? 
As with most questions pertaining to Shakespeare’s reading, 
we do not know for sure, and the answer depends on who 
you ask. Graham Bradshaw, famously hostile to historicism, 
simply sidesteps the question in his still brilliant and broadly 
convincing Shakespeare’s Scepticism.90 For Sarah Hutton, 
apparently free of the agenda that a thesis can often impose, 
‘the writings of Sextus Empiricus do not appear to have been 
well known in Tudor England’.91 John D. Cox, meanwhile, 
points out that ‘Shakespeare does not use the word “skeptic” 
or its derivatives . . . It seems unlikely that a poet so sensi-
tive to words would have ignored “skeptic” had he known 
it and understood its importance.’92 For those who want to 
make Shakespeare’s plays ‘exhibit the effects of a potent phil-
osophic skepticism verging upon nihilism’, as Millicent Bell 
does, we can perhaps detect a touch of hope for the play-
wright’s closer personal connection:
Those meetings at the Mermaid Tavern in which Shake-
speare lifted a tankard with Ben Jonson and others, includ-
ing Raleigh, may be only legend, but Shakespeare could 
have seen Raleigh’s translation of the Hypotyposes of 
Sextus Empiricus. It was circulating – also in manuscript – 
as early as 1591, when one of the ‘university wits’ Shake-
speare undoubtedly knew, Thomas Nashe, read it. The 
clever young men who caught the latest word on the wind 
would have been eager to get a look at Montaigne – a 
writer who knew Sextus but went beyond him in brilliance 
and daring – as soon as the translation was heard of.93 
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Whether or not Shakespeare had read Sextus Empiricus or 
knew the word ‘scepticism’, two things are not in doubt. 
The fi rst is that, as many critics including A. C. Bradley, A. 
P. Rossiter, Graham Bradshaw, Millicent Bell, Hugh Grady, 
Andy Mousely and John D. Cox have pointed out, his plays 
often enact the ‘suspension of judgement’; he often gives us 
the arguments but always gives us reasons to doubt them, and 
then does not take sides or give us the satisfaction of didactic 
resolution.94 Of this, as per the second section of Chapter 1, 
I am entirely convinced. This does not mean that Shakespeare 
was a fully card-carrying sceptic, however – as we have seen, 
his plays also strongly register both virtue ethics and sto-
icism. It is possible to see the ‘suspension of judgement’ as 
part of his mimesis. The second is that Shakespeare read 
Montaigne, whose works were translated by John Florio in 
1603, and the evidence for this is incontrovertible, registered 
as it is in plays such as King Lear and The Tempest. Some 
have tried to push the date of Shakespeare’s reading back to 
1600 or even earlier on the grounds that Florio’s manuscripts 
were in circulation well before publication.95 
In Montaigne, I think we fi nd something missing in ear-
lier sceptics: namely, a natural sympathy for the human con-
dition. According to Diogenes Laërtius, such was Pyrrho’s 
indifference to the world around him that he would not even 
move out of the way of wagons, or change his direction if 
he was near the edge of a cliff; his followers would have to 
intervene to save him.96 It is diffi cult to imagine Montaigne 
carrying on in this way. As we have seen, in its pursuit of 
ataraxia, there is an ethical charge to Pyrrhonian scepticism, 
but I think in Montaigne the moral force is coming from a 
quite different place:
Presumption is our natural and original infi rmity. Of all 
creatures man is the most miserable and frail, and there-
withal the proudest and disdainfulest. Who perceiveth and 
seeth himself placed here, amidst their fi lth and mire of the 
world, fast tied and nailed to the worst, most senseless, 
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and drooping part of the world, in the vilest corner of the 
house, and farthest from the heavens’-cope, with those 
creatures, that are the worst of the three conditions. And 
yet dareth imaginarily place himself above the circle of the 
moon, and reduce heaven under his feet. It is through van-
ity of the same imagination, that he dare equal himself to 
God, that he ascribeth divine conditions unto himself, that 
he selecteth and separateth himself from out of the rank 
of other creatures . . . . How knoweth he by the virtue of 
his understanding the inward and secret motions of beasts? 
By what comparison from them to us doth he conclude the 
brutishness ascribed unto them? 
When I am playing with my cat, who knows whether she 
have more sport in dallying with me, than I have in gaming 
with her? We entertain one another with mutual apish tricks, 
if I have my hour to begin or to refuse, so hath she hers.97 
Although this is recognisably an argument derived from scep-
ticism, note the morally charged language here. He accuses 
mankind of vices that we saw in Aquinas: pride, vanity and pre-
sumption. There is, therefore, also a corresponding appeal to 
humility and magnanimity. At some level this is an assent to the 
belief that pride, vanity and presumption are undesirable quali-
ties. I do not think that we can call Montaigne a true sceptic in 
the Pyrrhonian sense because, even in expressing his scepticism, 
he seems unable to exercise the suspension of judgement, and in 
this case moral judgement. Indeed, he seems aware of this him-
self: ‘I see the Pyrrhonian philosophers, who can by no man-
ner of speech express their general conceit; for they had need 
of a new language. Ours is altogether composed of affi rmative 
propositions.’98 Montaigne’s suspension of judgement – similar 
to the polyvalent perspective of Shakespeare’s drama – comes 
not in the particular instance of any statement, but rather, as 
Zahi Anbra Zalloua has argued to convincing effect,99 in the 
formal contradictions of the essay taken as a whole, in its refusal 
of coherent structure, in its rambling digressions and apparent 
inability to come to any resolution. 
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Readers of Shakespeare will have already noted the 
striking similarity of the Montaigne passage I quoted to 
Isabella’s speech in Measure for Measure:
But man, proud man,
Dressed in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he’s most assured – 
His glassy essence – like an angry ape
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
As makes the angels weep, who with our spleens
Would all themselves laugh mortal. (II, ii, 118–24)
Although I am not the fi rst to point out the similarity of 
the sentiments expressed by Montaigne and Shakespeare 
in these passages – a distinction that it seems we can attri-
bute to Elizabeth Robbins Hooker in 1902100 – I have not 
been able to fi nd any commentary on the close proximity 
of the ‘apish tricks’ in Florio’s Montaigne to Shakespeare’s 
‘angry ape’ that ‘plays such fantastic tricks’. Whether this 
likeness is because Shakespeare wrote Isabella’s speech 
with Montaigne’s essay fresh in his mind, or simply by 
dint of coincidence, I think it is self-evident that the two 
writers have a natural affi nity: an apparent love of bom-
bastic rhetorical strategies undercut by the refusal to offer 
the certainty of fi nal resolution; they share an inbuilt sense 
of sceptical doubt that serves to strip away the surety of 
the single narrow reading.101 For Bertrand Russell, this is 
a consequence of their historical moment: 
And so the curiosity of the Renaissance. . . . Such a cat-
aract of new facts overwhelmed men that they could, at 
fi rst, only be swept along with the current. . . . Montaigne 
and Shakespeare are content with confusion: discovery is 
delightful, and system is its enemy.102 
Here, I think, Russell gets it both right and wrong. He is 
surely correct that the sceptical disposition we fi nd in the 
late 1500s and early 1600s is the result of a vast confl uence 
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of competing systems of ideas and philosophical discourses 
all bearing down on a moment in history in which tradi-
tional certainties had been shattered, and orthodoxies chal-
lenged in ways that were previously unthinkable. But I am 
not sure that ‘content with confusion’ is the right way to put 
it; rather, Montaigne and Shakespeare have every reason to 
be uncertain, and every reason to doubt all of the absolutist 
discourses (‘dogmas’) that different groups are trying to sell 
them. 
In summary
• The Academic sceptics, such as Arcesilaus and Carneades, 
argue that true knowledge is impossible because there is 
always a reason to doubt.
• Because of this, they maintain that the wisest course of action 
is epokhê (the suspension of judgement, the refusal to have 
opinions), which achieves ataraxia (tranquillity).
• The Pyrrhonian sceptics (named after their founder, Pyrrho of 
Ellis), meanwhile, accept ‘what seems apparent’, but will not 
assent to any explanations derived from dogmatism.
• The Pyrrhonists develop a number of ‘modes’ with which to 
cast doubt on any argument. These include relativising the 
apparent reliability of sense perceptions in various ways, 
and the apparent certainty of cultural norms and doctrines; 
demonstrating how most arguments, when pressed hard 
enough, can either be disputed, or else succumb to infi nite 
regress, relativity, unfounded hypothesis or circularity.
• Michel de Montaigne, infl uenced by the Pyrrhonists after 
reading Sextus Empiricus, uses various sceptical modes to 
attack the hubris of mankind and the edifi ces it has built up 
around itself.
• Montaigne is an infl uence on Shakespeare, even though 
scholars disagree over the extent of this. They share a similar-
ity in that both writers demonstrate a sceptical ‘suspension of 
judgement’ in their works.
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IV
Epicureanism: From Lucretius to Machiavelli
During my account of ethics in Shakespeare’s time thus far, 
I have scarcely mentioned the infl uence of one of the major 
Hellenistic schools: that of Epicurus (341–270 bc), whose 
ideas were transmitted to the Renaissance, in part, by Lucre-
tius’s poem De rerum natura (‘On the Nature of Things’) 
(56 bc), which had been rediscovered in 1417. For Epicurus, 
the summum bonum, or highest good, is not eudaimonia (as 
in Aristotle), virtue (as in Stoicism) or in the suspension of 
judgement (as in scepticism), but in pleasure. Here pleasure 
is, in fact, the only good. As in scepticism, the ultimate end 
for Epicurus’s ethics is achieving ataraxia, a state of tranquil-
lity – or rather, imperturbability, the absence of mental dis-
turbances as well as physical pain (aponia) – but the means 
of reaching it are different. 
Epicureanism should not be misunderstood, as it so fre-
quently has in the popular conception across history, as 
hedonistic pleasure-seeking, but rather, as is more often the 
case, the careful avoidance of pain. For example, while we 
get a modicum of sensual pleasure from eating rich foods, 
doing so can result in indigestion and therefore greater pain, 
and so Epicurus advocates basic consumption: ‘content with 
water and plain bread’, stretching to some cheese if he needs 
to entertain a feast.103 Seneca, adapting Epicurus, argued:
For water and barley groats or a crust of barley bread is not a 
pleasant thing but it is the greatest pleasure to be able to fi nd 
pleasure even in these foods and to have brought oneself to 
the level which no unjust act of fortune can snatch away.104 
A meagre crust of bread when we are very hungry can bring 
greater pleasure than the richest of foods eaten every day. In 
this way, Epicureanism ‘was not designed to stimulate the 
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appetite to desire more but rather to train it to be satisfi ed 
with less’.105 
Likewise, while power gives pleasure by bestowing a cer-
tain amount of self-satisfaction for those who wield it, the 
combined weight of responsibility and expectation induces 
greater anxieties (a threat to ataraxia), and so Epicurus 
advocates avoiding political and public offi ces. To use his 
phrase, ‘The wise man will not go into public life, unless 
something interferes.’106 Thus, according to Diogenes, ‘from 
an excess of modesty, [Epicurus] voided affairs of state’.107 So 
it is too, with wealth: riches can help one seek pleasure, but 
the prospect of its loss produces a greater amount of anxi-
ety – this is something we can readily recognise today, in the 
pithy phrase of the late rapper, The Notorious B.I.G.: ‘Mo’ 
Money, Mo’ Problems’.108 Epicurus thus cautions against 
the accumulation of wealth and advocates instead living on 
moderate means. Again, in his phrase, ‘Happy poverty is 
an honourable condition.’109 In each case, we can see that 
a true Epicurean, far from living a life of hedonistic excess, 
instead tends to exercise restraint and moderation. Epicurus 
reasoned that exposure to great pleasures – which might be 
facilitated by power or wealth – has the potential to create 
in us needs that cannot be fulfi lled. We moderns can read-
ily recognise this notion of a ‘created need’ in advertising; 
as Bob Dylan once wrote, ‘Advertising signs they con / You 
into thinking you’re the one / That can do what’s never been 
done / That can win what’s never been won.’110 
Such are the austerity and moderation of the Epicurean 
life that it is somewhat surprisingly reminiscent of its rival 
school, Stoicism. Indeed, Seneca seemed to think that many 
aspects of Epicureanism and Stoicism are compatible and 
thereby incorporated Epicurus’s teachings into his version of 
Stoicism, even though the two schools were seen to be fun-
damentally at odds. He justifi ed drawing on Epicurus many 
times on the basis that ‘it is my custom to visit the opposite 
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camp, not as a deserter but as a spy’.111 He saw it as a form 
of philosophical ‘plundering’. Just because he was not an 
Epicurean, it did not mean that Epicurus did not sometimes 
speak the universal truth: ‘You may perhaps ask me why 
I take so many fi ne sayings from Epicurus rather than our 
own school. But why do you think these sayings belong to 
Epicurus and are not common to us all?’112 Ironically, Seneca 
quotes Epicurus far more often than he does the founder of 
Stoicism, Zeno. For Seneca, the wisdom of Epicurus seems to 
falter only at the fi nal hurdle: in insisting that virtue should 
be pursued for the pleasure it brings, rather than as an end 
in itself. 
Epicurus’s ethical teachings drew the ire of the other 
schools, and later Christians, because of three controversial 
beliefs: fi rst, he maintained that the gods, having achieved 
ataraxia, are entirely indifferent to human life, and would 
not deign to concern themselves with our affairs by interven-
ing in them. It follows, therefore, that we need not have anxi-
ety about the gods because they are not ‘watching’. Second, 
there is therefore no divine plan for the universe: which is to 
say, Epicurus opposed the notion of providence. Third, he 
argued that we should not fear death because there is noth-
ing after death (annihilation). Since we cannot experience 
death, we have no reason to fear it. There is also no after-
life, so the only thing that matters is what we do on Earth. 
In Book III of De rerum natura, Lucretius offers over forty 
arguments against fearing death. For Lucretius, the fear of 
death is at the root of many of mankind’s ills: ‘This man it 
persuades / To break bonds of friendship and another / To 
violate honour’ (3.40–2). It causes people to ‘make wealth 
for themselves / And heap up riches, murder upon murder / 
Piling in greed’ (3.70–2). If only we could free ourselves of 
the crippling fear of death, which we cower from ‘like chil-
dren in the dark’ (3.87),113 we would conquer the most nag-
ging and constant of all anxieties and fi nally reach ataraxia. 
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The insistence on a non-interventionist God in a non-
providential universe, and especially the refusal of the after-
life, led to ‘the widespread and persistent conviction’ among 
Christians that Epicurus ‘and his disciples were atheists’.114 It 
was for this that Dante placed Epicureans in the sixth circle 
of Hell in The Inferno: ‘Epicurus and his followers have their 
cemetery in this part, who make the soul die with the body’ 
(10.13–14).115 But this did not mean that all Renaissance phi-
losophers de facto dismissed Epicurus out of hand; Petrarch, 
for example, said he was ‘a philosopher unpopular with the 
multitude but considered great by the wise men’.116 Some, 
who actually deigned to read Epicurean writings, tried to 
think seriously through his ethics. Agostino Nifo conducted 
one of the most vehement critiques of Epicureanism in De 
Amore Liber Secundus (‘The Second Book of Love’) (1549):
Epicurus thus offered something for everyone: he prohib-
ited the indolent from participating in politics, the slothful 
from exercising and the cowardly from fi ghting; the irreli-
gious were told that there was no divine providence; and 
the miserly were taught that they could live on bread and 
water.117 
Nifo thus attacks Epicurus through the Thomist prism of vir-
tues and vices: his is a system that rewards vice, so how can it 
be virtuous? Viewed cynically, as Cicero was also inclined to 
view him, Epicurus provides convenient and robust excuses 
for those so inclined to evade responsibility, ‘the worst kind 
of intellectual evasion’.118 
Lorenzo Valla had a more charitable view and pitted 
the Epicureans in a winning effort against the Stoics in his 
dialogue De vero falsoque bono (‘Of the True and False 
Good’) (1431) on the simple grounds that they are more 
realistic about how human beings really are. Here is his 
Epicurean speaker, Maffeo Vegio, replying to the advocate 
for the Stoics:
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Now, to go back to your argument, Catone, the primary 
reason that it dissatisfi es is that you Stoics, unhappy and 
infl exible as you are, desire that nothing should exist that 
is not wicked and vile; you measure everything by a hollow 
wisdom that is in all respects fi xed and complete. Thus, 
while you take joy in fl ying prodigiously and in striving 
toward the higher regions, your wings melt (not being 
natural to you but artifi cial and made of wax), and like 
the foolish Icarus [who fl ew too close to the sun] you fall 
into the sea. Truly, what kind of farfetched subtlety is it 
to describe the wise man in such a way that, by your own 
admission, no example can be found among us men, and 
to declare that he alone is happy, that he alone is friendly, 
good, and free?119 
Even though the austere adjudicating monk ends by con-
demning both schools for not being Christian, he rules in 
favour of the Epicureans because their idea that people are 
by instinct naturally pleasure-seeking is much more realistic 
than the Stoics, who seek to eschew emotion. Valla saw in 
this honest view of human nature a compatibility with Chris-
tian notions of virtues and vices: Christianity accepts that no 
one is perfect and that we are drawn to earthly pleasures, but 
preaches (contra Epicurus) that ‘we must abstain from the 
pleasure here below if we want to enjoy the one above’.120 
Just as we have seen other thinkers in the Renaissance blend 
and synthesise disparate ethical systems, in Valla we get what 
Lynn S. Joy calls ‘a sophisticated amalgam of Epicurean and 
Christian belief’.121
Before moving on, I want to consider one last vital aspect 
of Epicurus’s thinking, which, although not strictly speaking 
a part of his ethics, is none the less important to grasp: I am 
talking about his materialism and conception of the cosmos, 
which to our eyes can seem breath-taking in its apparent 
anticipation of modern molecular theory. Following the pre-
Socratic philosopher Democritus (c.460–370 bc), Epicurus 
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was a hard materialist and an atomist, who conceived of an 
infi nite corporeal universe made up of an infi nite number of 
tiny atoms ‘beyond all calculation’ that have somehow been 
compelled to act together. Let us consider a passage quoted 
by Diogenes:
Now, of bodies, some are combinations, and some the ele-
ments out of which these combinations are formed. These 
last are indivisible, and protected from every kind of trans-
formation; otherwise everything would be resolved into 
non-existence. They exist by their own force, in the midst of 
the dissolution of the combined bodies, being absolutely full, 
and as such offering no handle for destruction to take hold 
of. It follows, therefore, as a matter of absolute necessity, 
that the principles of things must be corporeal, indivisible 
elements.122 
According to Epicurus, therefore, matter cannot be cre-
ated or destroyed. Readers of Shakespeare will no doubt 
be reminded of Lear: ‘Nothing will come of nothing. Speak 
again’ (I, i, 88). Because they cannot be broken down into 
anything smaller and cannot be destroyed, corporeal entities 
are thus ‘full elements’, but being so must therefore reside in 
something that is specifi cally not matter: namely, an empti-
ness or void:
The universe is infi nite. For that which is fi nite has an 
extreme, and that which has an extreme is looked at in rela-
tion to something else. Consequently, that which has not 
an extreme, has no boundary; and if it has no boundary, 
it must be infi nite, and not terminated by any limit. The 
universe then is infi nite, both with reference to the quan-
tity of bodies of which it is made up, and to the magnitude 
of the vacuum; for if the vacuum were infi nite, the bodies 
being fi nite, then, the bodies would not be able to rest in any 
place; they would be transported about, scattered across the 
infi nite vacuum for want of any power to steady themselves, 
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or to keep one another in their places by mutual repulsion. 
If, on the other hand, the vacuum were fi nite, the bodies 
being infi nite, then the bodies clearly could never be con-
tained in the vacuum.123 
An infi nite number of atoms are therefore contained by an 
infi nite vacuum. 
Although seemingly a long way away from his talk of 
cheese and crusty bread, this conception of the universe does, 
in fact, have an impact on Epicurean ethics. It seemed to 
Epicurus that even atoms in an infi nite void needed some 
means of being compelled to move, and hence he determined 
that this was achieved by weight – this seems similar to how 
we understand gravity, but Epicurus thought that atoms were 
compelled only downwards, rather than towards each other 
(which was Isaac Newton’s breakthrough). This appeared to 
render the universe deterministic, which seemed at odds with 
the human free will and agency apparent from lived experi-
ence, and so – in a move that seems to apprehend Chaos 
Theory – Epicurus reasoned that sometimes atoms randomly 
‘swerve’ to create the conditions necessary for free will. Here 
is a hostile Cicero on this:
Epicurus realised that if atoms were borne downwards 
by their own weight, free will would be out of the ques-
tion, because the movements of the atoms would be fi xed 
and inevitable. So he devised a means of avoiding such 
determinism . . . he stated that when the atom was borne 
directly downwards by the force of gravity, it swerved ever 
so slightly. This explanation is tawdrier than his inability to 
defend his thesis would have been.124 
Lucretius has a more sympathetic rendering:
While atoms move by their own weight straight down
Through the empty void, at quite uncertain times
And uncertain places they swerve slightly from their course.
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You might call it no more than a mere change of motion.
If this did not occur, then all of them
Would fall like drops of rain down through the void,
There would be no collisions, no impacts
Of atoms upon atom, so that nature
Would never have created anything.125 (217–23)
This provides the proof that human beings and even animals 
are able to use their will to compete with external deter-
ministic forces: ‘Though men are driven / By an external 
force, compelled to move / Often in headlong rush against 
their will, /Yet in our breasts there’s something that has the 
power / To fi ght against this force and resist it’ (276–80).126 
If we think back to Seneca’s idea of the will, we can see how 
the Roman Stoics built on this idea, and some have argued 
that it lies at the heart of our modern concepts of liberty 
and self-determination.
The past decade has seen the publication of two signifi cant 
studies that argue for the central importance of Lucretius’s 
notion of the will to the Renaissance transformation from 
medieval to early modern. The fi rst is Alison Brown’s The 
Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence (2010), which 
contends that Lucretius and Epicureanism have been under-
represented in previous accounts of the philosophical boiling 
pot of the 1400s and 1500s.127 The second is Stephen Green-
blatt’s Pulitzer Prize-winning The Swerve: How the World 
Became Modern (2011), which, somewhat more dramati-
cally, claims that Lucretius’s poem lays the ‘foundations on 
which modern life has been constructed’.128 Aimed at a popu-
lar audience, and under the spotlight that such a major award 
brings, Greenblatt’s thesis has come under much scrutiny for 
its caricatured account of the medieval period being one of 
monastic self-fl agellation.129 In giving short shrift to rigorous, 
sensitive and nuanced thinkers of the period, such as Thomas 
Aquinas, Greenblatt’s version of an unyieldingly dogmatic 
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medieval period is essentially a fi ction. Aquinas was aware of 
the Epicureans and treated them with seriousness. For exam-
ple, In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum: 
expositio (‘Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’) 
he points out:
Even the Epicureans, who considered pleasure the highest 
good, carefully cultivated the virtues. They did so, how-
ever, on account of pleasure, that is, for fear their pleasure 
would be hindered by means of contrary vices. The vice 
of gluttony, for instance, causes bodily suffering through 
excessive eating; because of theft a man is thrown into 
prison. So different vices are an impediment to pleasure 
in different ways. Since then the ultimate end is exceed-
ingly delectable, they who make pleasure the highest good 
intensely love the life of pleasure.130 
Here we can see how he diligently takes the time and space 
to note Epicurus’s arguments without necessarily condemn-
ing them wholesale – hardly the words of the closed-minded 
and dogmatic thirteenth-century monk we might imagine. As 
I have stressed throughout this chapter, I think it is important 
for us to avoid making hyperbolic claims about philosophical 
currents in general, especially when dealing with eras marked 
by their eclecticism and heterodoxy, which we undoubtedly 
are in both the Renaissance and the early modern periods.
Greenblatt is surely right to say, as he does in a brief 
response to John Monfasani’s review, that ‘something signif-
icant happened in the Renaissance’. I would prefer, though, 
to view the recovery of Lucretius’s poem as one small part of 
the wide and wildly eclectic re-appropriation of Ancient phi-
losophy that the period saw – which is to say, there is good 
reason to doubt any single claim to centrality for any single 
text or philosophy. I think it is fair to say that both Brown 
and Greenblatt, in the pursuit of their respective agendas, 
have somewhat overstated the centrality, importance and 
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infl uence of Lucretius for Renaissance and early modern 
thinkers in the fi fteenth or sixteenth century, although the 
infl uence of Epicurean ideas in England during the seven-
teenth century, especially after 1650, is beyond doubt.131 
Both Brown’s and Greenblatt’s accounts are sharply at odds 
with the view that we get from authorities in the History of 
Philosophy, such as Jill Kraye, who argues:
For most medieval and Renaissance moral philosophers, 
Epicureanism was the unacceptable face of classical ethics. 
Of the four major ancient philosophical schools, Epicure-
anism had the worst reputation and the least infl uence. . . . 
Renaissance authors continued to rely on Cicero and Seneca 
for information about Epicureanism. But in addition to these 
traditional sources, two new texts became available in the 
early fi fteenth century. By far the more important of these 
was Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers, book X 
of which contains three letters by Epicurus and a list of his 
principal doctrines. . . . The other newly rediscovered text 
was Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Virtually unknown since 
the ninth century, this poetic exposition of Epicurean phi-
losophy was discovered in 1417 and gradually entered the 
repertoire of classical authors cited and studied by human-
ists. Although admired for the artistry of his poetry, Lucre-
tius never attained the popularity and canonical status of 
Horace, Virgil and Ovid, precisely because of his commit-
ment to unacceptable Epicurean doctrines.132 
Accordingly, for the vast majority of ordinary people in Shake-
speare’s time, Epicureanism was a byword for hedonism, 
especially of the sensual pleasures associated with gluttony, 
drunkenness and lust, and summarily dismissed without being 
read. This is registered in Shakespeare, as Don Cameron Allen 
noted in 1944: ‘[Robert] Greene and [Thomas] Nashe lived 
according to what was thought to be the creed of Epicurus, but 
united in assailing the philosopher as an advocate of gluttony 
and license. With this opinion Shakespeare agreed.’133 Allen 
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picks up on two lines in Shakespeare suggesting this: ‘Then fl y, 
false thanes / And mingle with the English epicures’ (Macbeth, 
V, iii, 7–8), and ‘Epicurism and lust / Makes it more like a 
tavern or a brothel’ (King Lear, I, iv, 208–9). As Mary Floyd-
Wilson has pointed out, Shakespeare does not have in mind 
‘Epicureanism in its complex form as a philosophical classi-
cal position’, but depends instead on ‘a popular conception of 
epicures as degenerately self-indulgent and directly opposed 
to the tempered and controlled stoic’.134 It could also be an 
in-joke of sorts to his contemporary audience, a reference to 
his old forebears, the ‘University Wits’ – Thomas Nash, Robert 
Greene and possibly Christopher Marlowe too135 –who, 
as Allen mentions, were known to be Epicureans. Back in 
1848, in his An Inquiry into the Philosophy and Religion of 
Shakspere, W. J. Birch speculated that Shakespeare probably 
learned much of what he knew about philosophy, and Epicu-
reanism in particular, from them:
They were followers of Lucretius and Epicurus in philoso-
phy, and they were Epicureans, unfortunately, in the mod-
ern sense of the word. They all died early from the effects 
of dissipation. Greene was taken ill, and died a month after 
a drunken feast with his friend Nash. . . . They were nearly 
all University Men, and Shakespeare may have derived 
much of his learning, philosophy and idiosyncrasies from 
his acquaintance with them.136 
But this, I think, may be to assume too much of Greene’s 
own reading. In Planetomachia (1585), a work that, on the 
face of it, owes something to Lucretius, he does not men-
tion Lucretius at all, and makes only one fl eeting reference 
to ‘this Epicurean herd, dim-witted and born to eat up the 
earth’s produce’,137 which seems to echo Petrarch’s line about 
Epicurus reducing men to ‘an animal good, the senses’.138 
Even Greene’s view of Epicureanism seems to be a form of 
received humanist wisdom.
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In another of his popular books, Will in the World: How 
Shakespeare became Shakespeare (2004), Greenblatt imag-
ines that Greene was, in fact, Shakespeare’s inspiration for 
Falstaff: ‘The deeper we plunge into the tavern world of 
Falstaff – gross, drunken, irresponsible, self-dramatizing and 
astonishingly witty . . . – the closer we come to the world of 
Greene.’139 It seems clear that Shakespeare, at some level, had 
a fascination with the popular conception of the Epicurean 
life, as he may have seen manifest fi rst-hand in a fi gure like 
Greene. But this appears to have little, if anything, to do with 
the actual teachings of Epicurus. Allen maintains that no one 
read Epicurus seriously in England for at least another fi fty 
years, until ‘after the Restoration’, when ‘there is a defi nite 
change in the English attitude’ and ‘Epicurus becomes quot-
able and worth reading.’140
Ada Palmer’s pioneering work on marginalia in Renais-
sance copies of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura gives us 
a unique insight into how the poem was actually read in 
Europe in the 1500s.141 As she has shown, in restoring vari-
ous ancient texts, including that of Lucretius, the Renais-
sance humanists had a broad agenda that assumed that 
reading the classics would have a positive, restorative and 
moralising effect: 
Humanism was supposed to produce virtuous men, who 
would imbibe in childhood the loyalty, nobility, courage, 
and patriotism which made ancient Rome strong, and with-
out which the modern world was wracked by corruption, 
petty ambition, and cowardly self-interest. The beauty of 
ancient rhetoric was supposed to arm authors and orators 
to inspire virtue in others, especially princes. This human-
ism did not value learning only for learning’s sake but had 
a very practical agenda, to repair Europe through the edu-
cation of its elite. As my fi ndings demonstrate, the specifi c 
methods of reading taught by this humanist agenda, with 
its focus on moral concerns and repairing Europe along 
5829_Parvini.indd   122 03/08/18   11:51 AM
 Moral Philosophy [ 123
classical lines, preserved and circulated the radical con-
tent of classical texts, even while only a tiny sliver of the 
humanists responsible for this transmission were demon-
strably interested in the radical content.142 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, Renaissance 
thinkers – much like their Roman forebears – tended 
towards eclecticism and synthesis. They were prone to bor-
row from disparate, sometimes even diametrically opposed, 
Hellenistic schools, to form hybrid moral systems blend-
ing Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, scepticism and Epicureanism 
with Christianity. It is clear that Epicurus was in this more 
general mix, but his more controversial ideas, such as those 
traditionally considered atheist or those on atomism, were 
paid little heed; they were ‘obscure and stigmatized in the 
same period’.143 
In fact, there was only one Renaissance reader who paid 
any signifi cant attention to the atomist passages – those that 
contain the idea of ‘the swerve’, made to do so much work 
by Greenblatt: Niccolò Machiavelli. Indeed, Machiavelli had 
transcribed De rerum natura by his own hand and it had a 
profound effect on his thinking.144 As Paul Rahe argues, ‘by 
1517 or so, if not well before, Machiavelli had made Lucre-
tius’ repudiation of religion and his rejection of natural tele-
ology his own’.145 Machiavelli’s knowledge of Epicureanism 
arguably underpins three aspects of his thinking: his hard 
materialism, his concept of fortune (that the nature of real-
ity is fundamentally chaotic) and his rather dim and cynical 
view of human motives. Consider this passage in Discourses 
on Livy (1531):
Besides this, human appetites are insatiable, for since from 
nature they have the ability and the wish to desire all things 
and from fortune the ability to achieve few of them, there 
continually results from this a discontent in human minds 
and a disgust with the things they possess.146 
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We can see here how Machiavelli inherits the Epicurean view 
that people are naturally inclined to seek out pleasure and that 
they have free will, but this takes on a fundamentally ambitious 
character that brings humans up to the limits of an unpredict-
able world, which they cannot control. Humans are thus in a 
perpetual state of anxiety because their desire can never be ful-
fi lled. Unlike Epicurus, whose entire moral system can be seen 
as a kind of therapeutic coping mechanism to help people live 
a life freed from such anxieties, Machiavelli proposes no real 
solutions. Rather, he insists that we must recognise the reality 
of the situation; we cannot try to avoid or hide from ‘every 
type of fi lth’ because human vices exist in every age.147 It is on 
this recognition, of course, that Machiavelli builds his amoral 
political consequentialism in The Prince (1532): ‘For a man 
who wants to practice goodness in all situations is inevitably 
destroyed, among so many men who are not good.’148
The nature of human desire in Machiavelli has at times a 
palpably capitalist character, an idea to which I will return 
in the next chapter, as he seems to think that people value 
property and possessions more than the lives of others. In 
a letter to Giovanni de’ Medici (the future Pope Leo X) in 
1512, he writes:
Men feel more grief at a farm that is taken away from them 
than at a brother or father put to death, because sometimes 
death is forgotten, but property never. The reason is evi-
dent: everybody knows that a brother cannot rise from the 
dead because of a change in regimes, but there is a good 
possibility of regaining a farm.149 
He echoes this later in The Prince: ‘Men are quicker to forget 
the death of a father than the loss of an inheritance.’150 
Again, we can see some root traces of Epicureanism here: 
property produces both avarice and loss aversion, and death 
is annihilation.
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In England and elsewhere, of course, like Epicurus, Machi-
avelli was reduced to caricature.151 Vilifi ed and despised, 
Machiavellianism was seen as a byword for evil, both on 
stage and in print. However, as Michael J. Redmond has 
demonstrated, Shakespeare’s contemporaries could scarcely 
hide their excitement and fascination with the forbidden 
Florentine. Despite loud displays of disapproval, a politi-
cal writer such as Barnable Barnes still could mask ‘his clear 
preference for Machiavelli’ over other Italian Renaissance 
humanists such as Francesco Guicciardini. Barnes evokes 
Guicciardini as a historical authority while attacking Machi-
avelli at length, but his superfi cial treatment of the former is 
in sharp contrast with the careful and meticulous treatment 
of the latter. For Redmond, this belies a ‘furtive enthusiasm’ 
for Machiavelli in the period that is made manifest in the 
prologue of Christopher Marlowe’s Jew of Malta, in which 
the stage Machiavel boasts:152
Admir’d I am of those that hate me most:
Though some speak openly against my books,
Yet will they read me, and thereby attain
To Peter’s chair; and, when they cast me off,
Are poison’d by my climbing followers.
I count religion but a childish toy,
And hold there is no sin but ignorance. (9–15)
Machiavelli thus asserted infl uence even as he was reviled; he 
was actively being read. And, regardless of whether he had 
encountered his works directly, Shakespeare appears to have 
shared a profound interest in Machiavellian ideas, which are 
so recognisable in his plays. Just as in the case of Montaigne, 
there has been no shortage of book-length studies that con-
sider Machiavelli’s possible infl uence on Shakespeare’s think-
ing.153 Thus, alongside Shakespeare the sceptic, we can fi le 
Shakespeare the pragmatic realist. 
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In summary
• For Epicurus, the highest and only good is pleasure and, at 
the same time, the absence of pain and anxieties (the state of 
ataraxia or tranquillity).
• Epicurus argues that we should live moderately because 
excesses, while pleasurable, can result in greater pain and 
anxiety. For example, rich foods can cause indigestion, while 
plain foods only satiate hunger. We should shun wealth, 
power and political infl uence because they each create addi-
tional (unfulfi lled) desires and produce anxieties.
• Epicurus was considered an atheist by Renaissance thinkers 
because he rejected three ideas that would later become cen-
tral to Christian theology: the concept of an interventionist 
God, the concept of Divine Providence and the concept of an 
afterlife.
• His ethics are underpinned by his atomist cosmology, which 
fi nds its most articulate expression in Lucretius’s De rerum 
natura (‘On the Nature of Things’). In this conception, atoms 
are naturally drawn downwards by their own weight but 
sometimes randomly ‘swerve’, and so chance and free will 
enter into the universe.
• Recent studies by Alison Brown and Stephen Greenblatt have 
claimed a centrality for Lucretius’s poem in the early modern 
period that it plainly did not have, and Epicurean ideas were 
somewhat limited in their impact.
• The popular conception of Epicurus in early modern England 
was that of a hedonist who lived in pursuit of sensual plea-
sures, and this is the context in which Epicureanism is most 
widely used by Shakespeare and his contemporaries.
• Machiavelli, however, was profoundly infl uenced by Epicure-
anism, and though he was vilifi ed and seen as a byword for 
evil, early modern English writers, including Shakespeare, seem 
fascinated by his amoral and pragmatic realist view of politics. 
Coda
This chapter has shown that Shakespeare wrote during a 
time in which there were many competing ethical systems. 
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These were inherited from Ancient Greece by way of Roman 
mediation (chiefl y through Cicero, Seneca and Lucretius) and 
were being re-appropriated and synthesised to be compatible 
with Christian thought. Even if Shakespeare did not encoun-
ter much of this material directly, we can see versions of each 
of the major approaches to ethics – Aristotelian–Thomist 
virtue ethics, Stoicism, scepticism, and Epicureanism – reg-
istered in his plays, although, in the spirit of Renaissance 
eclecticism, they do not fi nally endorse any of them. In Part 
II, when we come to consider each of the six moral founda-
tions outlined by modern cognitive psychology, we will be 
doing so through the kaleidoscope lens of this complex cul-
tural moment. Before doing so, however, in the next chap-
ter, we must complicate our vision yet further by taking on 
board the radical moral interventions of both the Protestant 
Reformation and capitalism.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REFORMATION, CAPITALISM AND 
ETHICS IN ENGLAND DURING THE 
1590s AND EARLY 1600s
Introduction
In my account of moral philosophy in Shakespeare’s England 
so far, I have concentrated on traditions of thought inherited 
from antiquity and refracted through Renaissance human-
ism. I have painted a picture of four competing moral systems 
– Aristotelian–Thomist virtue ethics, neo-Roman Stoicism, 
scepticism and Epicureanism – which swirled around in the 
social milieu of England at the turn of the seventeenth cen-
tury: a moment of uncertainty and confusion. In Diarmaid 
MacCulloch’s phrase, ‘if you study the sixteenth century, you 
are inevitably present at something like the aftermath of a 
particularly disastrous car-crash’.1 Into this already messy 
scene, we must lob another Molotov cocktail. It comprises 
two parallel social currents with far-reaching consequences: 
on the one hand, the Reformation, and on the other, the rise 
of capitalism. In this chapter, I seek to assess their impact on 
moral ideas in Shakespeare’s England. I will do this in two 
parts. First, I will summarise the most important ideas of 
the Reformation as they came to be understood in England, 
and discuss their moral ramifi cations. I will do this chiefl y 
with reference to John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian 
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Religion (1559), William Perkins’s A Golden Chain (1591) 
and Thomas Becon’s The Governance of Vertue (1556). 
Second, I will turn to the question of how increasingly capi-
talistic modes of thinking in the period further complicate 
the picture. In so doing, I will consider the famous thesis of 
Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism (1905) before contemplating the moral implications of 
capitalist thinking in Giovanni Botero’s Treatise, Concerning 
the Causes of the Magnifi cencie and Greatnes of Cities . . . 
(1606), John Wheeler’s A Treatise of Commerce (1601) and 
Walter Raleigh’s A Cleare and Evident Way for Enriching the 
Nations of England and Ireland (1650).
I
The Moral Thought of the Reformation
The seismic events of the Reformation dominated the 1500s 
in Europe and in England. These events encompass several 
enormous topic areas, including but not limited to Martin 
Luther and the German Reformation, Ulrich Zwingli and the 
Swiss Reformation, John Calvin and the Geneva Experiment, 
the Anabaptists and the Münster Rebellion, the Reformation 
in England, John Knox and the Reformation in Scotland, 
and the extent and effi cacy of the Counter-Reformation. The 
far-reaching scale of these events is quite beyond the scope of 
this book, and one could stock a generous library with the 
studies written about each of them. My concern must remain 
restricted to a single question: what were the consequences 
of Protestantism for moral philosophy in England during the 
1590s and early 1600s? In order to answer this, I will attempt 
to look beyond the specifi cs of political intrigue and cultural 
contingencies to defi ne the general principles of Protestant 
thinking around moral questions – in other words, I attempt 
only to provide an intellectual history, and one that parses 
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religious writings for moral rather than theological content. 
In drawing this distinction, I assume that moral questions 
concern the matter of how best human beings should live, 
whereas theological questions pertain to scriptural interpre-
tation or religious practices. For example, there was a huge 
amount of ink – and indeed blood – spilled over the question 
of the sacraments, and the nature of the Eucharist in par-
ticular, ‘which affi rme that Christes naturall body and bloud, 
is carnally eaten and dronken in the lordes supper’2; I have 
treated such an issue as theological rather than moral, and 
therefore placed it beyond the scope of my study.
My task is made diffi cult by the fact that – unlike the Renais-
sance, which was arguably an intellectual development before 
it was a social one – the Reformation was propelled as much by 
political events, ‘an explosion of different concerns’,3 as it was 
by theology. Any true understanding of this passage of history 
must look back to the Great Schism, which lasted from 1378 to 
1417. During this period, which remains a source of embarrass-
ment for the Catholic Church, there were rival popes in Rome 
(Urban VI [1378–89]; Boniface IX [1389–1404]; Innocent VII 
[1404–6]; Gregory XII [1406–15]) and Avignon (Clement VII 
[1378–94]; Benedict XIII [1394–1403]), who were little more 
than proxies for the Holy Roman Empire and France, respec-
tively. By 1409, the election of yet a third pope (Alexander V 
[1409–10]; John XXII [1410–15]) made the situation, for all 
practical purposes, a farce. Denys Hay provides a concise sum-
mary of its consequences:
These consequences were: a forced administrative division 
of the Church into regions largely corresponding with king-
doms; a sharp decline in the standing of the pope vis-à-vis 
princes; a doctrine that councils of the Church were in the 
last resort superior to popes; and a recognition of a divided 
Church in the concordats. . . . Beyond that the Schism 
weakened the Church by putting it in the power of princes 
to choose which pope they would obey.4 
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All of these factors made ‘churches more regional in spirit 
and more secular in their control’. The Church in many 
places had become fl agrantly corrupt in its pursuit of money 
in exchange for tithes, burial services and, most notoriously, 
indulgences.5 The clergy often did not perform their services 
adequately and ‘were frequently absent from their parishes’.6 
‘Ignorant priests, vagabond friars and monks, and licentious 
nuns are not found everywhere and all the time, but they are 
all too common.’7 
Dissidents who called for reform, such as John Wycliffe in 
England (1320s–1384), and Jan Hus in Prague (1369–1415), 
had been denounced as heretics and their writings banned 
by the Church; Hus was burned at the stake. Bishoprics 
had become the offi ces of territorial lords driven by land 
and power, and ‘secured through dubious means . . . rely-
ing upon the family connections or the political or fi nancial 
status of the candidates’.8 This is embodied in a fi gure such 
as Luigi d’Aragona, the Cardinal of Aragon (1474–1519), 
who is depicted so memorably as a villain in John Webster’s 
The Duchess of Malfi  (1612–13). Perhaps the ultimate exam-
ple is Roderic Borgia, Alexander VI (papacy 1492–1503), 
who openly kept mistresses and fathered children as pope 
and then used his offi ce to create one of the most power-
ful families in Europe. In Barnabe Barnes’s play The Devil’s 
Charter (1606) – performed by Shakespeare’s company, the 
King’s Men9 – he is portrayed as selling his soul to the devil in 
exchange for the papacy. The Church not only was corrupt, 
but also suppressed criticism through naked abuses of power 
and brutal methods of oppression. By the time Giovanni di 
Lorenzo de’ Medici – to whose nephew, Lorenzo, Niccolò 
Machiavelli dedicated The Prince – became Pope Leo X in 
1513 (the fi rst of four popes from this powerful family), the 
situation was out of control. At the same time, there were 
increasing numbers of university-educated laymen who were 
reading vernacular translations of the Bible. In short, as the 
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Church had strayed furthest from its ostensible mission to 
continue the work of Jesus Christ, more people were read-
ing the Bible for themselves than ever before. Viewed from 
this perspective, change – dramatic and violent change – was 
practically inevitable. 
It came in the form of the Reformation, a complex series 
of events, which are typically marked as being triggered by 
Martin Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses published in 1517, pop-
ularly imagined as being nailed to the doors of All Saints’ 
church in Wittenberg. The Reformation began in earnest 
after Luther’s return to Wittenberg in 1522 following his 
condemnation at the Diet of Worms a year earlier. Looking 
back to the medieval era, Shakespeare puts a list of popular 
anti-papal grievances into the mouth of King John:
Though you and all the kings of Christendom
Are led so grossly by this meddling priest,
Dreading the curse that money may buy out,
And by the merit of vile gold, dross, dust,
Purchase corrupted pardon of a man,
Who in that sale sells pardon from himself;
Though you and all the rest, so grossly led,
This juggling witchcraft with revenue cherish,
Yet I alone, alone do me oppose
Against the Pope and count his friends my foes. (King John, 
III, i, 88–98)
Here, King John alludes to the sale of indulgences. He argues 
that the clergymen who sell these pardons ironically end up 
condemning themselves to damnation because only God has 
the power to pardon sinners. The speech strikes a decidedly 
Lutheran note. We can see Shakespeare in the mid-1590s 
anachronistically reading Martin Luther’s arguments against 
indulgences from the 1520s back into the 1210s.
Even from this brief account of the period from the 
Middle Ages to the 1500s, it is plain to see that the causes 
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of the Reformation are as much structural and political as 
they are philosophical. If there is a moral impetus, it is fi rst 
as a corrective to corruption and power, and only second 
as a corrective to the perceived corruptions of scholastic 
theology. Indeed, as Denys Hay says cryptically: 
[T]he really profound change in the moral climate of 
Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – by 
which a belief in renunciation of the world was replaced 
by a belief in virtue of action in the world – owed, I think, 
little to the theologians either Protestant or Catholic. But 
that, as they say, is another story.10 
We will get to that story in the second part of this chapter, 
which looks forward to capitalism. For now, I will briefl y 
sketch the core tenets of Reformation belief with a view to 
their moral implications, which look backwards to the fi rst 
fi ve centuries of Christianity.
Theologically, the Reformation is best understood as a 
‘back to basics’ purifi cation of Christian thinking, which, in 
the view of the Reformers, had become corrupted by endless 
commentaries and scholastic disputations, and tainted by 
pagan philosophy – as we saw in the last chapter – especially 
that of Aristotle. They looked back to a time before these 
‘corruptions’ to the early Church Fathers, especially Augus-
tine of Hippo (395–430) and, to a lesser extent, Jerome 
(347–420) and Origen (184–254). During the 1400s, this 
process had already begun as the great synthesiser of classi-
cal and Christian ethics, Thomas Aquinas, came under attack 
from William of Ockham, Duns Scotus and the via moderna. 
University theology became preoccupied by debates over the 
primacy of the intellect over the will, or vice versa. The clas-
sical intellectualism of Aquinas insisted on the primacy of 
the intellect and the fundamentally hierarchical nature of 
the logos, which can be discerned through human reason 
and observation. In contrast, the voluntarism of Ockham 
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and Scotus emphasised the primacy of the will and the per-
sonal nature of the logos (that is, Christ himself), which is 
not bound by logic or any cosmic order and, as such, can-
not be accessed through human reason. If this is the case, 
classical teachings from Aristotle and others, which Aqui-
nas draws on frequently, are fundamentally incompatible 
with Christianity. Furthermore, in some quarters, the teach-
ings of Pelagius (360–418), a contemporary of Augustine, 
caused controversy. Pelagius was opposed both to the idea 
of original sin and to the idea of predestination; he empha-
sised the role of free will and human agency in salvation.11 
Pelagius was declared a heretic at the Council of Carthage, 
and accordingly Pelagianism came to be viewed as a form of 
heresy. Therefore, it was mainly applied as a pejorative label 
by critics rather than being self-affi rmed. For example, one 
of the leading lights of the via moderna, Ockham, explicitly 
rejected Pelagius on the matter of original sin12 but none the 
less insisted on the ‘moral centrality of the agent’.13 For later 
Reformers, this refl ected the obscure and technical quibbling 
typical of the period, but nevertheless they continued the vol-
untarists’ movement away from trying to reconcile classical 
philosophy with Christianity. Luther, for example, is strongly 
critical of Pelagius in his ‘Disputation against Scholastic 
Theology’.14 The Reformers followed Augustine in insisting 
on the fallenness of man: human beings are ‘contaminated 
by sin from the moment of their birth . . . Augustine portrays 
sin as inherent to human nature.’15 
In what follows, I will concentrate primarily on the theology 
of Calvin. This is chiefl y because it was his ideas that were to 
have a greater infl uence than Luther’s on Protestant England. 
The fi nal version of Calvin’s Institutes of Christian Religion 
(1559) was translated into English by Thomas Norton in 1561, 
and reprinted fi ve times before 1600. Indeed, ‘by the late 1590s 
. . . England’s print culture and its book trade were fl ooded with 
Calvinist writings’.16 ‘The work of Luther’, meanwhile, ‘was 
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much less read in England.’17 ‘Luther’s ideas had only slight 
impact in England before Henry [VIII] – for his own, decidedly 
un-Lutheran reasons – turned against the pope.’18 The Geneva 
Bible (1560) – compiled by Englishmen who were given sanctu-
ary in Calvin’s Geneva during the time of Mary Tudor’s perse-
cution of Protestants in the 1550s19 – was in wide circulation 
after its fi rst printing in 1576. Elizabeth I herself owned a copy 
and wrote of ‘the pleasant fi elds of the holy scriptures’ in its 
front cover. This was also, of course, the Bible that Shakespeare 
used.20 It was effectively replaced, over time, by the King James 
Version, whose titular monarch had been raised in the Church 
of John Knox, who was one of the English exiles given sanc-
tuary in Calvinist Geneva during the 1550s. Another Marian 
exile, John Foxe, whose Actes and Monuments (1563) – widely 
known as The Book of Martyrs – was so instrumental in the 
development of English puritanism, was also a staunch Calvin-
ist. I will return to the theme of Protestantism during the reigns 
of Elizabeth I and James I in due course, but for now it is enough 
to note that its spiritual – as opposed to political or practical – 
supporters were Calvinists to whom Geneva seemed ‘a far more 
clear and logical realization of evangelical aspirations than 
anything they had been acquainted with in England’.21 I would 
include in their number John Bradford (1510–55, burned at the 
stake by Mary), Hugh Latimer (1487–1555, burned at the stake 
by Mary), John Foxe (1516–87), John Jewel, Bishop of Salis-
bury (1522–71), Thomas Becon (1511–67), William Perkins 
(1558–1602) and John Norden (1547–1625). The Church of 
England, even still, is best understood as a compromise between 
the political interests of successive monarchs from Henry VIII 
onwards, and the more purely theological interests of Puritans 
– this is the via media that would culminate in Elizabeth’s reign 
and form the basis for Anglicanism. Its architects were, in suc-
cession, Thomas Cranmer (1489–1556, burned at the stake 
by Mary),22 Archbishop of Canterbury under Henry VIII and 
Edward VI; Matthew Parker (1504–75), Archbishop of Canter-
bury under Elizabeth I; and the infl uential theologian Richard 
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Hooker (1554–1600). Calvinist disappointment in the English 
Reformation would be the ultimate cause of emigration to New 
England in the 1620s, the English Civil War of the 1640s, and 
perhaps more indirectly, the American War of Independence 
over a century later.
Before continuing, I should note that in asserting the pri-
macy of the Calvinist infl uence in England during the late 
1500s, I fi nd myself at odds with some distinguished histori-
ans such as Peter White and Diarmaid MacCulloch, who in 
different ways somewhat downplay the infl uence of Calvin in 
England. White considers James I’s doctrinal Calvinism to be 
a ‘myth’.23 MacCulloch, meanwhile, argues that the English 
connection with Zurich and Ulrich Zwingli’s successor, 
Heinrich Bullinger, was more infl uential in the development 
of the Church of England.24 This is true, I think, from the 
point of view of the establishment, especially if one takes (as 
MacCulloch seems to) Anglicanism as an endpoint. Against 
this general position, Nicholas Tyacke has argued that ‘man-
ifestly by the 1590s Calvinism was dominant in the highest 
reaches of the Established Church’.25 His strongest evidence 
is that Calvinist writings were not censored in this period, 
while anti-Calvinist writings (such as works by the Armin-
ianist Peter Baro, based at the University of Cambridge) 
were. It seems to me that although Calvinism was prevented 
from truly dominating the Church of England by moderate 
establishment fi gures, such as Archbishop Parker, and later 
by the High Anglicanism of Hooker, it none the less cer-
tainly had enough momentum during Elizabeth’s reign to be 
an acceptable mainstream position for an ordained minister 
or bishop to hold. Furthermore, the weight of evidence that 
Calvin’s ideas had a wide reach in the popular consciousness – 
the high frequency of Calvinist reprints, for example – is 
impossible to ignore. 
I do not think it is controversial to posit that there was a 
political spectrum in Elizabethan England that encompassed 
conservative Catholic traditionalists, establishment via media 
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centrists (infl uenced by Bullinger’s Zurich) and more extrem-
ist Puritan reformers (infl uenced by Calvin’s Geneva). It 
seems likely that the clear majority of regular Elizabethans 
would have found themselves somewhere along this spec-
trum, with some reason to believe that most were towards 
the conservative end.26 I would also warrant that for the lay-
person – Shakespeare and most of his audience included – we 
should not expect a thorough understanding of theological 
debates at the cutting edge.27 It is not diffi cult to imagine an 
Elizabethan who held strong anti-papal sentiments, especially 
after hearing the gory stories of Mary’s persecution of 
Protestants, who, to all intents and purposes, was still broadly 
Catholic in his or her beliefs and practices. We can easily reg-
ister such confused and contradictory positions in a play such 
as Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, which seems to 
reject Calvinism in adopting a broadly Catholic framework 
of forgiveness and redemption, yet openly mocks the papacy. 
In Chapter 8, I will return to this question when discussing 
Shakespeare’s view of sanctity.
So what exactly were the ideas that fuelled all of this 
division? Following Augustine, John Calvin insisted on the 
three solas: 
1. Sola scriptura (‘by scripture alone), the belief that we should 
take our religious beliefs exclusively by reading the Bible and 
not through later commentaries. In short, if a practice is not 
justifi ed explicitly in the text itself, there are no grounds for 
believing in it.
2. Sola fi de (‘by faith alone’), the belief that Redemption through 
Christ cannot be achieved by any human ‘works’ but rather is 
granted by ‘justifi cation’, which can only be received by faith.
3. Sola gratia (‘by grace alone’), the belief, à la Augustine, that 
despite the unworthiness of humans, God in his benevolence 
may still grant them divine favour.
On sola scriptura, Calvin especially opposed ‘speculations’ 
beyond the biblical text that had gradually crept into the 
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Christian mythos. For example, let us consider the writings 
of Pseudo-Dionysus, an obscure Syrian monk of the late 
fi fth century, who falsely claimed to be the biblical fi gure 
Dionysus the Areopagite, a judge who is converted by Paul 
(Acts 17: 34). It was Pseudo-Dionysus who fi rst codifi ed 
the hierarchies of angels in De Coelesti Hierarchia (‘On the 
Celestial Hierarchy’); in fact, it is believed that he invented 
the word ‘hierarchy’.28 Because it was believed that he was a 
biblical fi gure, the Dionysian schema of angels gained much 
purchase and was given prominence by Peter Lombard, on 
whose Sentences it was a scholastic theologian’s rite of pas-
sage to write commentaries. Thomas Aquinas cites Pseudo-
Dionysus over 1,700 times and follows his ranking of angels 
into nine orders.29 For this, Calvin has no time at all; he dis-
misses Dionysus, ‘whoever he was’, for being, for the most 
part, ‘nothing but talk’. He cautions that ‘the theologian’s 
task is not to divert the ears with chatter’.30 He goes on to 
show that there is scant textual evidence in the Bible for the 
advanced angelology we see in Pseudo-Dionysus and Aqui-
nas, and likewise for the demonology that so enthralled 
medieval mystics.31 For Calvin, these things devolve into 
superstition, and ultimately distract from worship of God 
alone because ‘divine glory does not belong to the angels’. 
He has similar scorn for the cults of personality that arose 
around the Virgin Mary and the Catholic veneration of saints, 
in which ‘stupidity has progressed to the point that we have 
here a manifest disposition to superstition’.32 It is easy to see 
from this how there arose the Puritan opposition not only to 
idolatry but also to all manner of customs, rituals and feast 
days. Later, infamously, the Puritans under Oliver Cromwell 
banned Christmas – perhaps Malvolio’s ultimate revenge on 
Sir Toby and the Lord of Misrule – ‘thus the whirligig of time 
brings in his revenges’ (Twelfth Night, V, i, 363).
However, for our purposes, it is the second and third solas – 
sola fi de and sola gratia – that are of special interest. It is 
worth pausing on them because these concepts are particularly 
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diffi cult to understand for the modern secular mind and the 
source of much confusion. We must grasp two crucial things 
here: fi rst, that the word ‘justifi cation’ does not correspond 
to our modern usage of the word. Alister McGrath provides 
a clear-sighted explanation: ‘In everyday English, the word 
“justifi cation” usually means either “a defense of an idea or 
a person,” or “the process of alignment of margins in word 
processing or typesetting”.’ In its theological sense, however, 
‘it refers to the “rectifi cation” of the relationship between 
humanity and God – the “putting right” of something that 
has become fractured, damaged, or distorted’.33 This, in 
Calvin’s view, is entirely out of our hands – human beings can 
do nothing to ‘put right’ the relationship; only God can do 
this by his ‘grace’. We can see, therefore, that he is the agent, 
while human beings are the ones being acted upon. In his own 
words, ‘the question is not how we may become righteous but 
how, being unrighteous and unworthy, we may be reckoned 
righteous’.34 
The second principle of vital importance is that ‘faith’ is the 
passive acceptance of God’s grace and not an active affi rma-
tion. In other words, ‘praying harder’ or otherwise making a 
great show of one’s faith has no effect at all on God’s grace. To 
do so would be to ‘puff up our hearts with vainglory’. Rather, 
faith is a form of readiness to receive grace; it is ‘obedience 
to the divine will’.35 There is nothing you can ‘do’, one way 
or the other, to change the outcome of your judgement. Only 
God will decide who is permitted entry into Heaven. What is 
interesting, however, is that in this schema human beings still 
have agency to do good or evil works:
For works righteousness is perfect obedience to [God’s] 
law. Therefore, you cannot be righteous according to works 
unless you unfailingly follow this straight line, so to speak, 
throughout life. The minute you turn away from it, you slip 
into unrighteousness. From this it is apparent that righteous-
ness does not come about from one or a few good works 
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but from an unwavering and unwearying observance of the 
divine will. But very different is the rule for judging unrigh-
teousness. For a fornicator or thief is by one offence guilty of 
death because he has offended against God’s majesty.36 
There is thus a moral imperative not to do evil things – as 
defi ned by the Bible in the Ten Commandments and elsewhere; 
that imperative, however, is not defi ned by the possible out-
come of one’s fi nal judgement but ‘by faith alone’. To do some-
thing evil – murder, for example – is de facto to turn away 
from God and to deny his grace. For Calvin, it is vital that 
there should be no self-seeking motive for any decision. To put 
this plainly: if you are restraining yourself from sinful acts only 
because you are worried that you will be sent to Hell, that is 
not good enough. By the same token, if you are doing ‘good 
works’ only in the hopes that it will raise your moral stock 
in the eyes of God, think again. The reason must be because 
of your devotion and obedience to God’s will because there is 
no other logical reason: the very categories of good and evil 
are defi ned only with reference to the Bible. Killing is wrong 
because God said it is wrong, not because it will get you into 
trouble or any other reason. 
If this sounds a particularly zealous note, we should 
remember that, at the same time, Calvin urges that believers 
should not spend all of their time worrying about offending 
God because in his infi nite wisdom he knows that human 
beings are fl awed. In a compassionate passage, he envisions 
the relationship not as one of master and slave, but as a 
doting father who overlooks the faults in his son.
Those bound by the yoke of the law are like servants 
assigned certain tasks for each day by their masters. These 
servants think they have accomplished nothing, and dare 
not appear before their masters unless they have fulfi lled 
the exact measure of their tasks. But sons, who are more 
generously and candidly treated by their fathers, do not 
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hesitate to offer them incomplete and half-done and even 
defective works, trusting that their obedience and readiness 
of mind will be accepted by their fathers, even though they 
have not quite achieved what their fathers intended. Such 
children ought we to be, fi rmly trusting that our services 
will be approved by the most merciful Father, however 
small, rude, and imperfect these may be.37 
But this is not to be taken as a licence to misbehave, as it 
were, since ‘its purpose is to encourage us to good’.38 Thus 
he warns against complacency, nihilism or fatalism because 
– despite the insistence on sola gratia – there are still valid 
reasons to do good works and avoid doing evil ones, even if 
our best efforts are still deeply fl awed. It is simply that these 
works do not affect the fi nal judegment, and not that we 
should not care about them either way.
This line of thought leads logically to the doctrine of pre-
destination because, since God already knows the outcome 
of his judgement on every sinner, it stands to reason that who 
is pardoned and who is damned has already been decided. 
We have no way of knowing how or why God will decide 
on his judgements and no means of affecting the outcome. 
From the human perspective, God’s judgements must appear 
completely arbitrary (insomuch as they are inscrutable) and 
outside the control of the individual. McGrath, again, pro-
vides much clarity on this point:
Why is it that some are more fortunate than others in life? 
Why does one person possess intellectual gifts denied to 
another? Even from the moment of birth, two infants may 
fi nd themselves in totally different circumstances through 
no fault of their own: one may fi nd a full breast of milk to 
suck and thus gain nourishment, while another may suffer 
malnutrition through having to suck a breast that is nearly 
dry. For Calvin, predestination is merely a further instance 
of a general mystery of human existence, in which some 
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are inexplicably favoured with material or intellectual gifts 
which are denied to others. It raises no diffi culties which are 
not already presented by other areas of human existence.39 
Read charitably, Calvin’s view of predestination might be a 
great equaliser: whether you are rich, poor, clever or below 
average intelligence, you still have the same chance of being 
saved by God’s grace.
Where does this leave morality? For Calvin, human 
morality is merely an extension of God’s will: ‘For God’s 
will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that what-
ever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be con-
sidered righteous.’40 And so we are back to the circular logic 
of faith: the source of all goodness is God, so whatever God 
wills is always already good, and it is not for us to ques-
tion this through reason or any other means. To do so is 
wicked. On the scale of MFT, then, we can see that Calvin 
rests very heavily on the moral foundations of authority 
and purity, and virtually not at all on liberty, care, fair-
ness or loyalty (other than loyalty to God alone). It seems 
that, for Calvin, the summum bonum is the complete sub-
mission of the individual will to God’s will (authority) as 
defi ned by the Bible, which is the only legitimate source of 
ethical guidance (sanctity). What you are left with is a more 
offi cious and strident, and rather less forgiving, version of 
Christianity that seems always to demand the abasement of 
the individual to duty, yet, at the same time, one that recog-
nises the near-impossibility of ever achieving such a thing. 
If the scholastics such as Aquinas or Ockham, as well as 
the Renaissance humanists following any of the four ethi-
cal models outlined in Chapter 2 (Aristotelianism, Stoicism, 
scepticism and Epicureanism), were all marked by a deep-
seated rationalism trying to overcome the emotions, Calvin 
in fact represents the reverse: a deep-seated emotionalism 
trying to overcome the human urge to rationalise.41
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Calvin’s ideas on predestination are given direct purchase 
in England by William Perkins in A Golden Chain (1591), in 
which he comes to seven conclusions:
I. The Predestination, and Reprobation of God, doe not 
constraine or inforce any necessitie upon the will of man.
II. God hath predestinated all men, that is, hee hath 
appointed and disposed all men, so as they might 
obtaine eternall salvation.
III. Man is neither by necessitie nor chance saved or con-
demned, but voluntarily.
IV. God hath Predestinated some, other hath he rejected.
V. Those whom God hath predestinated by his absolute 
predestination, which cannot be lost, they shall infalli-
bly die in grace: But they which are predestinate by that 
predestination which being according to preset justice, 
may be lost by some mortall sinne which followeth, 
are not infallibly saved, but oftentimes such are con-
demned, & loose their crown & glory. Hence ariseth 
that position[n] of theirs, that hee which is justifi ed may 
be a reprobate, and perish eternally. Therefore predesti-
nation is not certaine, seeing it may be lost.
VI. God alone doeth know the certaine and set number of 
them which are predestinate.
VII. There is one set number of them which are predesti-
nate, or reprooved, and that can neither be encreased 
nor diminished.42 
As we can see, at least on the matter of predestination, Perkins 
is a doctrinaire Calvinist, and there are few ideas here that 
one cannot fi nd in the Institutes. By the 1590s, it is obvious 
that predestination was yet another set of moral ideas swirling 
around in the complex milieu of Elizabethan England.
 To gain an idea of how this manifested itself in the moral 
thinking of English men and women infl uenced by Calvin, I 
will consider briefl y the popular writings of Thomas Becon, 
whose The Sick Man’s Salve (1561) ‘was so popular that the 
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Stationer’s Company kept it constantly in print till the seven-
teenth century’; there were at least twenty-nine editions.43 Just 
as with Perkins, the infl uence of Calvin on a writer like Becon 
is obvious: he consistently adheres to sola scriptura by system-
atically providing examples from the Old and New Testaments 
for each of his arguments. He provides citations in the margin 
of chapter and verse, which were fi rst numbered in the manner 
that we know today in the Geneva Bible. In The Governance 
of Vertue (1556), a book that ‘was to remain very popular 
throughout the Elizabethan age and beyond’,44 he outlines a 
number of moral instructions. Most of these are entirely what 
one would expect from a sixteenth-century Christian of any 
stripe. He writes against a long list of sins: ‘swearing’, ‘lying, 
slaundering and fi lthy or uncleane talke’, ‘pride or vayneglory’, 
‘feasting glotony, and dronkennes’, ‘fornication and adultery’, 
‘covetousnes’ and so on.45 
We can see the specifi cally Calvinist nature of his thinking 
only if we zoom in to look at a section in detail. Let us take, 
for example, the section ‘Against Idleness’:
Against Idlenes.
If Sathan moue the[e] vnto idelnes, which is the wel 
spring and rote of al vice, et before the eyes of thy mind 
both these sentences and examples of the holy scripture. 
Sentences out of the olde Testament. 
The Lord toke Adam, and put him into the garden of 
Eden, that he might dresse and kepe it. In the sweate of thy 
face shalt thou eat thy bread, vntil thou turnest into the earth, 
from whence thou wast taken. For dust thou art and into 
duste thou shalt bee turned agayne. A man is borne to labour, 
and a byrde to fl ye. Thou shalt eate the labour of thy hand.46
Becon cites three verses from the Old Testament:47 
• Genesis 3: 19 – ‘In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till 
thou return to the earth, for out of it wast thou taken, because 
thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return.’
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• Job 5: 7 – ‘But man is born unto travail, as the sparks fl y upward.’
• Psalms 128: 2 – ‘When thou eatest the labors of thine hands, 
thou shalt be blessed, and it shall be well with thee.’
Becon sees human toil as being as natural as the fl ying of 
birds. Because God commanded Adam to ‘sweat’ for his 
bread, it is morally good to work. Idleness, meanwhile, is the 
work of Satan. 
For further evidence, Becon draws from Ezekiel 16: 49 
and the New Testament. He points out that Jesus’s disciples 
were all working men and women: 
Christ was a carpenter. The Apostles of Christe were 
fi shermen. Paule laboured with his own hands . . . Saint 
Luke was a Phisicion, and as some write a painter also. 
Aquila was a maker of tentes, of the which occupation saint 
Paule was. Simon S. Peters host was a tanner. Dorcas that 
vertuous woman made garmentes with her owne handes & 
gaue them to the poore people.48 
Becon echoes Calvin’s thinking about the ‘calling’ here, 
which is as strong an ethical statement as Calvin makes in the 
Institutes: ‘The Lord’s calling as a basis of our way of life’. 
Just as each of Christ’s disciples had a day job, ‘each indi-
vidual has his own kind of living assigned to him by the Lord 
as a kind of sentry post so that he may not heedlessly wander 
about through life’.49 We should not regard this emphasis on 
the inherent worth of professional work as something that 
would have been self-evident to any early modern Christian. 
As McGrath points out, ‘we need to understand the intense 
distaste with which the early Christian tradition, illustrated 
by the monastic writers, regarded work’.50 Thus, for example, 
although Thomas Aquinas considered sloth (or ‘apathy’) to 
be a mortal sin and one of the seven capital vices,51 he none 
the less saw monastic withdrawal as being superior to the 
pursuit of a profession. In fact, he ordered the professions 
into a hierarchy based on inherent value to society (derived 
from philosophical investigation): ‘Signifi cantly, merchants 
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and shopkeepers were rated not only lower than farmers 
and peasants, but also lower than artisans. The priesthood 
and other sacred callings were ranked highest.’52 In drawing 
attention to the everyday professions of the disciples, we can 
see Becon arguing strongly against this line of thinking. Here 
we can see what Max Weber would later call the ‘Protestant 
work ethic’ in its nascent state, which I will discuss in the 
second part of this chapter.
Before I do so, I think it is worth pausing on Shakespeare’s 
attitude towards puritanism, which seems – at least by his judi-
cious standards – unusually hostile. This is, of course, entirely 
to be expected because, by the 1590s, ‘puritan animus against 
theater was . . . of long standing and of increasing intensity’.53 
In May 1603, puritans got their way in persuading James I 
to forbid public performances on Sundays,54 and, of course, 
by 1642 they would shut down the theatres completely. Thus, 
they represented a direct threat to Shakespeare’s livelihood, 
and to the world in which he lived and operated. I do not think 
puritans rankle with Shakespeare because of any deeply held 
theological conviction on his part,55 but rather because they 
deeply offend his sense of fun. As we saw in Chapter 2, he had 
a fascination with the ‘Epicurean’ university wits of the tav-
ern. Our thoughts turn inevitably to Twelfth Night, in which 
Malvolio is identifi ed as ‘a kind of puritan’ (II, iii, 130), which 
is seen by Sir Andrew and Sir Toby as suffi cient cause to beat 
him. While we cannot align Shakespeare too closely with any 
of his characters, it seems to me that his plays sound a recurring 
note of human outrage against puritanical moralising. It is the 
same sort of reaction evoked by that most twenty-fi rst-century 
of phrases, ‘virtue signalling’.56 We can spot it when Sir Toby 
says, ‘Dost thou think because thou art virtuous, there shall be 
no more cakes and ale?’ (II, iii, 106–7). Falstaff makes much 
the same argument in the play-within-the-play in 1 Henry IV: 
‘If sack and sugar be a fault, God help the wicked. If to be 
old and merry be a sin, then many an old host that I know is 
damned. If to be fat be to be hated, then Pharaoh’s lean kine 
are to be loved’ (II, iv, 428–32). We see a similar logic in 
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Pompey’s riposte to Angelo’s puritanical order against prostitu-
tion in Measure for Measure: 
If you head and hang all that offend that way but for ten 
year together, you’ll be glad to give out a commission for 
more heads. If this law hold in Vienna ten year, I’ll rent the 
fairest house in it after threepence a bay. (II, i, 217–20) 
All of these lines are spoken by comic characters who would 
have got a big laugh from the crowds at the Globe, but in 
them is the recognition that the puritans hold human beings 
to impossible moral standards that are generally unwelcome. 
We can also recognise a general disdain for the stickler or 
jobsworth. Even so, Shakespeare’s instinct is towards empa-
thy and understanding. He might bring Malvolio and Angelo 
down a peg or two but he does not destroy them.57
In summary
• Corruption and inadequate service in the Catholic Church 
were endemic by the 1520s, when Martin Luther started the 
European Reformation in earnest.
• The Reformation is best understood as a ‘back-to-basics’ 
return to studying the Bible and the early Church Fathers, 
especially Augustine of Hippo (395–430).
• Augustine stressed the ideas of original sin and predestina-
tion, which were especially infl uential on the Reformers.
• Of the various strands of the Reformation, the theology of 
John Calvin (1509–64) proved to have the most infl uence on 
Elizabethan England.
• Calvin, following Augustine, insisted on sola scriptura (‘by 
scripture alone), sola fi de (‘by faith alone’) and sola gratia (‘by 
grace alone’), which lead logically to a belief in predestination. 
In short, this is the belief that human salvation can be achieved 
only through God’s will and cannot be affected at all by human 
action (sola gratia). Since God is all-knowing, he already 
knows who will be saved (to Heaven) and who will be damned 
(to Hell). Our only recourse is to have faith (sola fi de).
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• Calvin’s moral compass heavily emphasises the moral foun-
dations of authority and sanctity (sola scriptura); Calvinists 
and puritans therefore tend to stress, above all else, a sense of 
duty to God at the expense of individual expression.
• The infl uence of Calvin’s ideas about predestination on 
English thought can be seen in William Perkins’s A Golden 
Chain (1591), which was wildly popular.
• It can also be seen in Thomas Becon’s The Governance of 
Vertue (1556), which, among other things, stresses the 
importance of maintaining a strong work ethic and warns 
‘against idleness’.
• In his plays, William Shakespeare seems unusually hostile to 
puritanism. We can see this especially in Twelfth Night, 1 Henry 
IV and Measure for Measure.
II
Capitalism and Ethics in Shakespeare’s England
At the same time as the Reformation was carving a deep and 
divisive rift through Europe, there was a great fl ourishing of 
commercial and industrial activity that we recognise today as 
being capitalism in its nascent state and, with it, seemingly, a 
new attitude towards work, money and profi ts. Why did this 
happen shortly after the Reformation? Could it be that some-
thing in the mindset and moral character of people altered 
because of a change in their religious belief? It was this ques-
tion that ultimately animated Max Weber’s famous essay The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), which 
was translated in 1930 by the renowned American sociol-
ogist Talcott Parsons. In it, Weber argued that, by way of 
Calvin’s doctrine of callings, the Protestant work ethic lies at 
the heart of modern-day capitalism and it was ultimately this 
that propelled the Industrial Revolution of the 1800s. This 
view found support in Ernst Troeltsch’s Protestantism and 
Progress (1912). A few years after the English translation 
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of Weber’s essay, Robert K. Merton, a student of Parsons, 
published ‘Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth 
Century England’ (1938), in which he outlined an argument, 
later known as ‘the Merton thesis’, that effectively extended 
Weber’s argument to correlate Protestantism not only with 
capitalism but also with the rise of science.58 Christopher 
Hill expanded the thesis further in Intellectual Origins of the 
English Revolution (1965), which was put to much scrutiny 
by Hugh Trevor-Roper in a lengthy review and then later 
a long essay, ‘The Religious Origins of the Enlightenment’ 
(1967). Trevor-Roper sought to challenge Hill’s view that the 
puritans were ‘the Moderns’ and the Catholics (and, later, the 
English Cavaliers) ‘the Ancients’.59 More recently, Weber’s 
thesis was revived in David S. Landes’s magisterially sweeping 
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998).60 
Weber’s thesis, often misread to be more reductive than it 
is, would fi nd many opponents61 – far too many to list here. 
I will note just six key objectors:
1. Werner Sombart, who argued in The Jews and Modern Capitalism 
(1911) that capitalism developed mainly because of the Jews 
being excluded from medieval guilds and pushed into usury.62 
2. R. H. Tawney, whose still towering Religion and the Rise of 
Capitalism (1926) argued that Weber’s thesis is too linear and 
simplistic, and that the practical consequences of the Reforma-
tion resulted in a moral travesty in which religion now jus-
tifi ed trade, commercialism and ultimately self-interest, greed 
and profi t.63
3. H. M. Robertson, who, in Aspects of the Rise of Economic 
Individualism (1933), insisted that the causes of capitalism 
were secular rather than religious and, in any case, predate the 
Reformation.64
4. The aforementioned Hugh Trevor-Roper, who, in a long essay, 
‘Religion, the Reformation and Social Change’ (1967), locates the 
‘spirit’ of capitalism not in Lutherism or Calvinism but in ‘Eras-
mianism’. He argues that the developments of the Reformation 
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are a natural extension of Renaissance humanist thinking and 
are not necessarily Protestant in character.65
5. Fernand Braudel, who, in his masterpiece, Civilization and 
Capitalism (1993), argued along materialist lines that ‘there 
are more things in the world than the Protestant ethic’ and 
that Northern Europe overtook the Mediterranean after 1590 
because of ‘its lower wages, its increasingly unbeatable indus-
try, its cheap transport, its fl eet of coasters . . . this was a mat-
ter of pounds, shillings and pence, of competitive costs’.66 
Incidentally, this view is widely held by economists today.67
6. G. R. Elton, who, in his characteristically positivist approach 
to history, objected strongly to Weber’s theoretical approach 
(as well as to Tawney’s and Hill’s) and argued that the Weber 
thesis was effectively a ‘faith in despite of the facts’, which 
are that the Protestant leaders were almost always moralis-
tic and explicitly preached charity against profi teering and 
worldly success. ‘It was not Calvinism that freed man from 
the restraints of the traditional moral concepts in economics, 
but emancipation from religion and theology in general which 
enabled men, pursuing the logic of palpable economic fact, 
either to ignore the thunders of the clergy or ultimately to 
persuade some clergy to come to terms.’68
Just as the tumultuous specifi cs of the Reformation across 
Europe are beyond my scope here, so too is the question of 
the ultimate causes of modern capitalism. For my purposes, 
a survey of the evidence shows that two things are beyond 
doubt: fi rst, capitalism – or at least rampantly self-interested 
commercial activity – predates Protestantism; even as Weber 
says himself, it is ‘as old as the history of man’.69 However, 
before the late 1500s, it was ‘allowed only sporadic manifes-
tations’.70 Second, despite all this disagreement, there is wide 
consensus that something in the moral temper of Europe, 
and England especially, changed during the 1500s.
In passing, I will add that, to my mind, the true spirit 
of capitalist thinking must have an entrepreneurial element 
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as well as a work ethic. I do not think that Calvin provides 
much in the way of capitalist enterprise; we can fi nd it instead 
in Niccolò Machiavelli, whose ‘instrumental opportunism’,71 
not to mention – as we saw in Chapter 2 – his emphasis on 
the self-interested nature of human beings and their capacity 
for free will and agency in the face of contingency, seems to 
me entirely in keeping with individualist capitalist enterprise. 
The march towards modern business ethics is more obviously 
found in Englishmen infl uenced by Machiavelli – Thomas 
Cromwell, William Camden, Walter Raleigh, Francis Bacon 
and, dare I say, possibly also William Shakespeare – than it is 
in those infl uenced by Calvin, even if Machiavelli tended to 
emphasise civic greatness and social order over profi t-making.72 
I do not think it is too crude to suggest that a Machiavellian 
would make a fantastic entrepreneur (a calculated risk-taker 
and pragmatist who acts for self-gain), whereas a Calvinist 
would make an excellent factory worker (a dutiful employee 
whose anxiety about salvation ensures maximum produc-
tivity). Of course, both are necessary for capitalism to keep 
ticking along.
However, my aim is not to locate the spirit of capital-
ism but moral philosophy, that which lies in ‘the unchart-
able realms of the mind’.73 In this regard, Weber was surely 
correct that there was a general re-orientation of the self in 
the period towards what he calls ‘practical rationalism’.74 
We may observe the parallel development of ‘individualis-
tic–civic English nationalism’. We see the rise of joint-stock 
companies, including the Merchant Adventurers of England, 
the Muscovy Company, the Levant Company and, of course 
– a name that would become synonymous with capitalism – 
the East India Company. With this development, we see both 
a renewed justifi cation of the profi t motive and an emphasis 
on individual enterprise. Before 1601, the only work pub-
lished in English that overtly advertised business in its title 
was Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice; by the end of 
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that decade, books about business had become a burgeoning 
industry.75 Their contents are revealing. Consider these state-
ments from Giovanni Botero – notably, an Italian Jesuit and 
a Thomist who believed in natural law and strongly opposed 
Protestantism – whose Treatise, Concerning the Causes of 
the Magnifi cencie and Greatnes of Cities . . . was translated 
into English in 1606 by Robert Peterson:
This Profi t is of such power, to unite and tye men fast 
unto one place; as the other causes aforesayd, without 
this accompany them with all, are not suffi cient to make 
any city great. . . . profi te is the verie thing from whence, 
as from the principall cause, the greatnesse of citties 
growth. . . . There is not a thing of more importance to 
encrease a state, and to make it both populous of Inhabit-
ants, and rich of all good things; than the industrie of men, 
and the multitude of Artes.76
Botero stresses the positive effects of commercial growth. He 
sees profi t as a force that can bring people together under a 
common goal, bound in industry, even if they are competi-
tors. On this score, it would appear that he has been vindi-
cated by modern scholarship.77 Botero suggests that growth 
in one industry will lead to growth in other industries, which 
will make a city ‘rich of all good things’. It is interesting that 
he mentions the ‘Artes’ here, which is almost certainly meant 
in the sense of ‘learning’ or education; Botero is making an 
unmistakably bourgeois link between commercial prosperity 
and education.
In A Treatise of Commerce (1601), John Wheeler, the sec-
retary of the Merchant Adventurers of England, echoes this 
line of thinking:
To conclude, all that a man worketh with his hand, or 
discourseth in his spirit, is nothing els but merchandise, 
and a trial to put in practice the Contracts . . . the which 
words in effect comprehend in them all negotiations . . . 
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and are none other than mere matter of merchandise and 
Commerce. Now albeit this affection bee in all persons 
generally both high and low, yet there are of the notablest, 
and principallest, Traffi quers which are ashamed, and 
think scorn to be called Merchants: whereas indeed mer-
chandise, which is used of proper vacation . . . is not to 
be despised, or accounted base by men of judgement, but 
to the contrary, by many reasons and examples it is to be 
proved, that the estate is honourable.78 
If you will recall from the fi rst part of this chapter, Thomas 
Aquinas had placed merchants right at the bottom of his hier-
archy of professions, below farmers, artisans and even peas-
ants. In the Middle Ages, profi t-seeking was tantamount to 
avarice, a damnable sin. Economic interests were secondary 
to seeking salvation for one’s soul and understood as being 
antagonistic to that goal. Business transactions were by neces-
sity, for the simple trade of goods and services, and not for 
any ends beyond that. Thus, there was a long-lasting stigma 
in Christian moral thought on commercial matters, especially 
on the question of usury (the charging of interest rates).79 
This persisted in the Elizabethan era: for example, in Thomas 
Wilson’s A Discourse Upon Usury (1572). It is unsurprising, 
then, to fi nd Wheeler somewhat embattled in his defence of 
merchants and the profi t motive here, but rather telling that 
he feels so emboldened as to make it in the fi rst place.
To all of this, Walter Raleigh adds a note of nationalistic 
competitiveness:
No[t] so[ev]er a Dearth of, Wine, or Corn here, or other 
merchandise, but forth with the Emb[e]deners, Hamburgers 
and Hollanders, out of their Storehouses lade 50. 100 
or more ships, dispersing themselves round about this 
Kingdom, and carry away great store of Coin and wealth 
for little Commodities, in those times of Dearth: by which 
means they suck our Commonwealth of their Riches, cut 
down our Merchants, and decay our Navigation, not with 
their Natural commodities which groweth in their own 
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Country, but the Merchandises of other Countries and 
Kingdoms. Therefore it is far more easie for us to serve 
our selves, hold up our Merchants, increase our Ships and 
Mariners, strengthen the Kingdome, and not only keep our 
money in our own Realm, (which other Nations still rob 
us of) but bring in their who carry ours away, and make 
the Bank of Coin and Storehouse to serve other Nations as 
well and far better cheap then they in England.80 
Where Botero still thought on the level of the city, Raleigh 
thinks on the level of the nation-state. Raleigh is palpably 
angry about foreign traders making profi ts at England’s 
expense. What is interesting, however, is that his anger appar-
ently stems from the fact that England already has enough 
goods. It appears that because foreign merchandise is fl ood-
ing the market, supply is outstripping demand and this is 
hurting local merchants both by competing directly and by 
keeping the price of their wares low. In a plan that would 
not be alien to President Donald Trump, Raleigh’s solution 
is to fi ght the foreigners at their own game: increase English 
exports while adopting a form of protectionism at home. We 
can see in Raleigh’s line of thought the burgeoning mercantil-
ism that dominated European economic theory until Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776).81
The radical implications of the ideas outlined by Botero, 
Wheeler and Raleigh cannot be overestimated, and in them 
we can see the eventual and inevitable overthrow of the 
nobility by the bourgeoisie. Between them, they make at least 
three crucial theoretical moves:
1. Human industry and commerce are inextricably linked, and 
this is natural.
2. Profi ts and capital growth create a net benefi t for society, and 
this is good.
3. Nation-states must therefore virulently protect their own 
interests (that is, ensuring capital growth) by out-manoeuvring 
other nations because their gain is your loss.
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Today we can recognise in this line of thinking both utili-
tarianism and Machiavellian consequentialism, working 
backwards from the perceived positive ends of commerce to 
the means. What is interesting to me is the specifi cally moral 
dimension that this post hoc justifi cation for commerce 
acquires. It is the birth of what Jonathan Haidt has called 
homo economicus.82 
Weber was keenly aware of the fact that capitalism justi-
fi ed itself through this ethical rationalisation, ‘a heroism’, but 
he gives it a specifi cally puritanical edge:
In fact, the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of 
more and more money, combined with the strict avoid-
ance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life, is above all com-
pletely devoid of any eudaemonistic, not to say hedonistic, 
admixture. It is thought of purely as an end in itself, that 
from the point of view of the happiness of, or utility to, 
the single individual, it appears entirely transcendental and 
absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of 
money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life.83 
Later, he continues:
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced 
to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monas-
tic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly 
morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos 
of the modern economic order. . . . In Baxter’s view the care 
for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 
‘saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any 
moment’. But fate decreed that the cloak should become an 
iron cage.84 
For Weber, the ‘calling’ in question takes a specifi cally Calvinist 
form, but rather than being an embrace of self-interest, human-
istic agency and individualism (as per Machiavelli, Botero, 
Wheeler or Raleigh), it is in fact a denial of those things. 
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He views it as a ‘tyranny’, ‘the most absolutely unbearable 
form of ecclesiastical control of the individual which could 
possibly exist’.85 And I think this view is borne out in my 
discussion of Calvin in the fi rst part of this chapter. It is pos-
sible that the unresolved tension between the buccaneering 
humanistic and individualist spirit of the Merchant Adven-
turers and the automaton-like ‘worker ant’ mentality that 
emerges from Weber’s iron cage remains at the heart of capi-
talism. They are two countervailing forces, pulling in oppo-
site directions, yet paradoxically towards the same ends. We 
can glimpse in these forces what Friedrich Nietzsche called 
‘a master morality and a slave morality’. The master moral-
ity ‘creates values . . . proud of the very fact that he has not 
been made for compassion’ – this is Machiavelli, Raleigh, et 
al.86 In contrast, the slave morality harbours ‘a pessimistic 
suspicion towards the whole human condition [that] would 
fi nd expression, perhaps a condemnation of man together 
with his condition’. Seeking solace in ‘compassion’ and 
‘the obliging helping hand’, it is ‘essentially a morality of 
usefulness’ – this is Calvin.87 
In closing, let us pause very briefl y on the question of what 
Shakespeare might have made of this nascent capitalism. We 
know, for starters, that he made a lot of money himself from 
it. He was a joint stockholder in the Globe Theatre and the 
Lord Chamberlain’s / King’s Men. He bought property, illic-
itly hoarded grain, evaded taxes and bought the right to col-
lect tithes.88 It does not seem like too much of a stretch to say 
that Shakespeare was a type of capitalist. But do his plays 
endorse such ribald profi teering? Unsurprisingly, much has 
been made of this question, with critics mostly taking their 
cue from The Merchant of Venice, or else using Shakespeare 
to play out contemporary squabbles between Marxist social-
ism and free-market neo-liberalism.89 As ever, Shakespeare 
is not a systematic thinker: he does not think on the level of 
economies and systems of value, but rather in the immediacy 
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of the reduced human scale. In The Moral Foundation of 
Economic Behaviour (2011), David C. Rose argues that 
‘opportunism is the single greatest impediment to the devel-
opment and operation of a market economy capable of 
producing a condition of general prosperity’. In a society 
in which no one can be trusted, and in which the fair rules 
of the market are not upheld, there are weak incentives for 
entrepreneurial behaviour because ‘it is not rational to expect 
that contracts will be impartially enforced by courts when 
disputes arise’.90 Rose is, of course, writing in the twenty-fi rst 
century with over 400 years of economic theory from which 
to draw.
Shakespeare was writing as the fi rst shoots of that eco-
nomic theory were beginning to sprout, and almost 200 years 
before Adam Smith. It seems to me that Shakespeare imag-
ines the capitalistic spirit primarily in terms of stolen moments 
of opportunism that refl ect the zero-sum game of mercantil-
ist economics: if you win, that means someone else is losing. 
But, characteristically, he operates on a human rather than 
national scale. Here, his own hoarding of grain at a time of 
shortage is instructive: other people were starving but their 
loss was Shakespeare’s gain. And this spirit enters his plays 
in numerous ‘stolen moments’. For example, in 1 Henry IV, 
when Falstaff brings Hal the grave news of Percy’s rebellion, 
he undercuts the seriousness of the message with the imp-
ish ‘You may buy land now as cheap as stinking mackerel’ 
(II, iv, 328–9). It is telling that where Hal’s mind goes to women 
(he replies with a crude quip about the taking of virginity as 
a war spoil), Falstaff’s goes to money-making. There is also 
something of this quick-witted opportunism in Othello when 
Iago swindles Roderigo into selling his lands to fund a trip 
to Cyprus (I, iii, 339–40).91 We might also think of Edmund 
in King Lear, whose unscrupulousness in spotting an opening 
takes him from bastard to the Earl of Gloucester (III, v, 14) in 
the space of a couple of scenes, or, of course, the Macbeths, 
5829_Parvini.indd   168 03/08/18   11:51 AM
 The Reformation, Capitalism and Ethics [ 169
whose ruthless opportunism gains them the throne of Scotland. 
In every case, self-interested expediency equates to land and 
wealth at the expense of another economic agent. In every 
case, too, it is also clear that the gains are bought at a moral 
cost. Shakespeare registers both the emergent capitalism – or 
rather mercantilism – of early modern England, as embodied 
in the buccaneering spirit of a Walter Raleigh, and residual – 
which is to say, medieval or feudal – anxieties about the pur-
suit of self-interest above obligations to the common good as 
well as to salvation. 
In summary
• In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), 
Max Weber argued that John Calvin’s doctrine of callings 
developed a ‘Protestant work ethic’, which lies at the heart of 
modern capitalism.
• Although many commentators have disagreed with Weber, he 
is right to suggest that there was a change of attitude towards 
both work and money-making during the 1500s.
• The ‘spirit of capitalism’ can be located as much in Niccolò 
Machiavelli as it can in John Calvin: if Calvin represents the 
work ethic of the capitalist employee, Machiavelli represents 
the entrepreneurial spirit of the capitalist enterprise.
• We can see this change of attitude in the writings of Giovanni 
Botero, John Wheeler and Walter Raleigh, who severally argue 
for a natural and inextricable link between human industry 
and commerce, the positive benefi ts of profi ts and capital 
growth (which are good), and the importance of outmanoeu-
vring rivals because their gain is your loss.
• There is an unresolved tension in capitalist ethics between the 
‘master morality’ of Machiavellianism and the ‘slave morality’ 
of Calvinism.
• Shakespeare’s plays register the cynical and self-interested 
opportunism of mercantilism but they do not wholly embrace 
it, instead resolving in moralistic caution.
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Coda
In this chapter, which concludes Part I of Shakespeare’s 
Moral Compass, I sought to complicate further the already 
complex picture of moral thinking in Shakespeare’s Eng-
land that I outlined in Chapter 3. There, four moral sys-
tems – virtue ethics in the Aristotelian–Thomist tradition, 
Stoicism, scepticism and Epicureanism – competed and 
intertwined in early modern England. Here, we have added 
at least two more modes of morality: puritanism (as infl u-
enced by John Calvin), and the ruthless dog-eat-dog mer-
cantilism of early capitalism (as infl uenced by Niccolò 
Machiavelli). 
Thus we are left with six major competing moral sys-
tems, which, by coincidence, is also the number of moral 
foundations I have inherited from Jonathan Haidt, out-
lined in Chapter 1, and around which Part II of this book 
is structured. As a reminder, these are authority, loyalty, 
sanctity, fairness, care and liberty. If MFT is to carry any 
weight, we need to assume that these six foundations are 
both universal and a fact of being: which is to say, where 
we will fi nd human beings, we will also fi nd these six foun-
dations, which are felt intuitively. The moral systems I have 
been outlining in Chapters 2 and 3, however, are all post 
hoc rationalisations and attempts to codify and schema-
tise this ‘basic fact of being’ in ways that are behaviourally 
instructive; they are – to use the phrase from Chapter 1 
again – cultural scripts. In Part II, when considering Shake-
speare’s treatment of each of the six moral foundations, 
we will constantly have to keep in mind the various cul-
tural scripts that may be in play at any given time. I am 
especially interested in the potential tension between these 
cultural scripts and the instinctive moral intuitions derived 
from human nature as they inform the myriad-minded 
playwright’s moral compass.
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CHAPTER 5
PAST REFLECTIONS ON SHAKESPEARE 
AND MORALITY
Postmodern criticism, with its propensity to reduce all ideas to 
ideology in the service of power, has had precious little to say 
about morality in Shakespeare’s plays. Indeed, the relentless 
narrowness of its vision is such that ‘it’s diffi cult to avoid the 
conclusion that a model that’s unable to distinguish between 
a Stalin and a Gandhi is of limited value’ to moral questions.1 
But that does not mean that Shakespeare criticism more gen-
erally has not had a great deal to say about the playwright’s 
moral imagination, even if many of the books on this theme 
have fallen into neglect or been forgotten to time. In this 
chapter, I will survey the major studies on Shakespeare and 
morality from 1775 to 1964. There have been several useful 
studies written since 1964, which I reference elsewhere in this 
book.2 In focusing on older criticism here my aim is threefold: 
fi rst, I wish to build an understanding of how critics from the 
past have typically thought about and approached the ques-
tion of morality in Shakespeare’s plays. Second, I will be on 
the lookout for valuable critical insights that I might retain 
for this study moving forward, especially if patterns of such 
insight recur across the generations. Third, in the researching 
of this book I have found that no such survey on this topic 
exists, so I hope this will be of signifi cant use and benefi t to 
later scholars.
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The fi rst major study on Shakespeare and morality was 
The Morality of Shakespeare’s Drama Illustrated (1775) by 
Elizabeth Griffi th, the Irish novelist, playwright and blue-
stocking. She had collaborated with David Garrick on her 
successful comedy, The School for Rakes (1769), and accord-
ingly her Shakespearean study is dedicated to him with a pref-
atory note. Griffi th took her cue from Elizabeth Montagu’s 
defence of Shakespeare against Voltaire’s attacks, An Essay 
on the Writings and Genius of Shakespeare (1769) – inciden-
tally, the fi rst book of Shakespeare criticism – in which she 
wrote, ‘we are apt to write Shakespeare only as a poet; but he 
is certainly one of the greatest moral philosophers who ever 
lived’.3 Griffi th’s method consists chiefl y in approaching each 
of the plays in turn and outlining what she determines as 
the underlying didactic moral message. The shortcoming of 
this approach to Shakespeare reveals itself when she reaches 
Measure for Measure and starts by confessing ‘I cannot see 
what moral can be extracted from the fable of this Piece.’ Her 
chief thesis, however, is broadly consistent with what later 
generations of critics have concluded – that Shakespeare’s 
gifts are to show and not tell: ‘the dramatic moralist pos-
sesses a manifest advantage over the doctrinal one . . . mere 
descriptions of virtue do not strike us as strongly as the vis-
ible representations of them . . . [which] avail us more than 
Tully’s offi ces or Seneca’s Morals’.4 None the less, Griffi th’s 
imagination was such that she assumed at all times that there 
must be an intended ‘moral’ for each ‘fable’.
Much of the subsequent century of Shakespeare criticism, 
however, proceeded in a different direction, focusing less on 
Shakespeare the moral philosopher and more on Shakespeare 
the psychologist and master of characterisation. In The Charac-
ters of Shakespear’s Plays (1817), William Hazlitt successfully 
synthesised the contributions of other great Shakespeareans 
such as August Wilhelm Schlegel and Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
to produce a strain of character criticism that would culminate 
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at the end of the Victorian era in the work of A. C. Bradley. 
There is none the less in Hazlitt the lingering quest for moral 
meaning, which often becomes a matter of which characters 
arrest the audience’s sympathies and which repel them. Like 
Griffi th, he too seemed defeated on this front by Measure for 
Measure, in which he found ‘our sympathies are repulsed and 
defeated in all directions’. But he is content, as I quoted in 
Chapter 1, to see the playwright’s ‘fellow-feeling’ for his char-
acters and, by extension, for other people in the real world.5
Other nineteenth-century publications devoted to Shake-
speare and morality were restricted chiefl y to compilation vol-
umes aimed at the contemporary Victorian readership with 
selections of ‘moral quotations’ from Shakespeare. These were 
not unlike the books of fi lleted quotations one might easily 
fi nd on any trip to Shakespeare’s Globe or the gift shops of 
Stratford-upon-Avon today. These publications include The 
Wisdom and Genius of Shakespeare, Comprising Moral 
Philosophy . . . (1839) with selections by Reverend Thomas 
Price, and Shakespeare’s Morals: Suggestive Selections . . . 
(1880) with the selections made this time by Arthur Gilman. 
According to Price, the wide range of moral wisdom to be 
found in the lines penned by Shakespeare provides ‘evidence 
of his mind having been deeply imbued with the pure morality 
of the Gospel’.6 Gilman, meanwhile, suggests that the ‘greatest 
value’ of Shakespeare’s morals, by which he means maxims 
spoken by individual characters in the plays and stripped from 
their original contexts, ‘will be found in the truths they con-
vey and the practical wisdom they express’.7 Although both 
Price and Gilman seem at pains to point out that disseminated 
parts of Shakespeare cannot hope even to glimpse the whole, 
there seems to be an uneasy tension between the experience of 
actually watching and reading Shakespeare and the purposes 
of moral instruction into which they are attempting to press 
his service. This was in no small part because of their assump-
tion that Shakespeare conformed to orthodox Reformation 
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Protestant belief, which was common in the period. This was 
the argument, for example, put forth by Charles Wordsworth, 
Bishop of St Andrews, in On Shakespeare’s Knowledge and 
Use of the Bible (1864),8 and echoed by Charles Knight in 
Studies of Shakespeare (1868).9 
At the turn of the twentieth century this view began to be 
challenged along the lines I began to outline in Chapter 4. Not 
only was it unlikely for a non-specialist in Shakespeare’s time 
to be an ‘orthodox protestant’, but also it was not exactly clear 
what it would mean to be one in the 1590s. Chief among those 
who led the charge against this view was Richard Simpson, 
whose manuscript writings on Shakespeare were collected by 
Henry Sebastian Bowden and published as The Religion of 
Shakespeare (1899). As Bowden outlines, in Simpson we fi nd 
‘an endeavour is made to show that Shakespeare, so far from 
being the product of his times, or the voice of his times, was in 
direct antagonism to his time’. The concluding chapter of this 
collection is called ‘Shakespeare’s Ethics’, which is a sustained 
argument that Shakespeare’s moral philosophy was broadly 
Catholic in the virtue ethics tradition and explicitly anti-
Calvinist. The argument emphasises the role of free will in 
moral agency as against Calvinist notions of predestination and 
providence. On this Simpson (as well as Bowden, for it is not 
possible to know who wrote which parts) is quite convincing:
And indeed if each character were necessarily determined 
by the moral principle within, or by circumstance, or by 
both, the whole interest, power, and pathos of Shakespeare’s 
plays would be gone. If Iago were a villain, Henry V a hero, 
Isabel pure, and Cressida stained, solely by necessity, how 
could any measure of praise or blame be attributed to them? 
They would be no more responsible for their moral conduct 
than for the height of their stature or the colour of their hair. 
Virtue and vice would be meaningless. But Shakespeare’s 
aim was to show ‘virtue her own feature, scorn her own 
image’, and virtue and vice with him have a real meaning. 
Their very notion consists in the fact that the agent in each 
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case might have done the opposite. Isabella’s purity is admi-
rable because she voluntarily preferred her own honour to 
her brother’s life. Cressida lashes Troilus to desperation 
because she was voluntarily forsworn. She ‘is and is not 
Cressida’.10
It is a striking insight. Shakespeare often seems at pains in 
plays to provide a sense of contingency and real alternative. 
We fi nd characters in two minds with alternative paths clearly 
signposted: not only in the most famous examples, such as 
when Macbeth chooses to pursue the plot to kill Duncan, per-
suaded by Lady Macbeth against his own instincts, but also in 
easily forgotten or incidental passages. One such passage can 
be found in 2 Henry VI, in a polaroid negative of Macbeth’s 
judgement, when Humphrey, the Duke of Gloucester, ignores 
his wife’s goading to make a play for the crown himself 
(I, ii, 62–7).11 Humphrey could have become king of England 
just as Macbeth could have remained thane of Cawdor. It is 
remarkable that in both cases Shakespeare’s own historical 
account shows that much bloodshed might have been averted 
if the men in question had decided differently. While it is plain 
to see, then, that Simpson and Bowden are correct to high-
light Shakespeare’s emphasis on moral responsibility, it is not 
entirely clear that he did so with a fi xed idea of good and 
evil. Humphrey made the opposite call to Macbeth but the 
outcome was similar. Does Shakespeare’s moral vision encour-
age us to consider only intentions or does it encourage us to 
think also about consequences? Bowden and Simpson insist 
that Shakespeare is always clear that morality speaks – through 
God – in the conscience of his characters. For them,
Shakespeare knows nothing of man’s evolution from a brute, 
and he is wholly a stranger to the doctrine of Professor 
Huxley, that ‘the cunning and brutal instincts of the ape or 
tiger ancestors must at times break out in any human being’. 
Man can with God’s help keep all God’s law, and be ever 
chaste, true, loyal, and just.12
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This view is in stark contrast to W. J. Birch’s earlier study, 
An Inquiry into the Philosophy and Religion of Shakspere 
(1848), which argued that Shakespeare’s moral thinking was 
‘interwoven in the nature of things’: ‘His philosophy went 
to paint morality as independent of religious considerations. 
With him the laws of morality were written with suffi cient 
plainness on the tablets of the human heart.’13 Birch even 
goes so far as to suggest Shakespeare was an atheist. Thus, 
broadly speaking, by 1900 there were at least three differ-
ent visions of Shakespeare’s moral thinking: the fi rst, fol-
lowing Griffi th, and then Knight and Bishop Wordsworth, is 
that his values are straightforwardly Protestant, even if the 
audience must sometimes do some mental work to ‘fi nd the 
message’. This view foregrounds notions of divine provi-
dence in Shakespeare’s thinking. Second, following Bowden 
and Simpson, his values are Catholic, built on the notions of 
moral responsibility, conscience, vices and virtues. Third, fol-
lowing Hazlitt and Birch, his vision is primarily secular and 
centred on the nature of human beings, despite their obvious 
shortcomings. For the sake of shorthand convenience and 
clarity I will label these traditions of thinking about Shake-
speare’s treatment of morality as follows:
1. The Protestant tradition foregrounding divine providence 
(Elizabeth Griffi th, Charles Knight, Charles Wordsworth).
2. The Catholic tradition foregrounding moral conscience (Henry 
Sebastian Bowden, Richard Simpson).
3. The secular–humanist tradition foregrounding human nature 
(William Hazlitt, W. J. Birch).
As we shall see, studies focused on Shakespeare’s moral phi-
losophy in the twentieth century did much to refi ne these three 
different visions, but they did little to overturn them. Indeed, 
even the present study can be viewed as a hybrid between the 
Catholic and secular–humanist traditions, although with sig-
nifi cantly updated scientifi c knowledge and the advantage of 
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another 168 years of historical hindsight. Although Birch was 
a contemporary of Darwin’s, he does not mention him. One 
critic who does mention Darwin, if only in passing, is Frank 
Chapman Sharp, whose book, Shakespeare’s Portrayal of 
the Moral Life (1902), draws some strikingly similar conclu-
sions. He points out that ‘certain of Shakespeare’s characters 
who, cheered by no sure faith either in personal reward or 
the ultimate triumph of the good cause, deliberately ranged 
themselves on the side of right, and hold their allegiance in 
defeat as in victory’. In a stunning passage, Sharp fl eshes out 
his argument:
Such men, Shakespeare saw, are facts. He was, furthermore, 
convinced that their judgements of value would still remain 
sound, the ends they pursued worth attaining, even if the 
universe should turn out to be nothing better than a lifeless 
machine. For if his tragedies are studies in failure, failure 
does not consist for him, as it does and must for Dante and 
Bunyan, in losing the chance of heaven, whether through 
the omission of some rite, through entanglement in a plau-
sible heresy, or through death in the midst of unrepented 
and unexpiated sin. Just as little does it consist in disobedi-
ence to a supersensible law, or failure to prepare for some 
higher mode of existence. The tragedy of life, in his eyes, 
is that men do not know how to gain the best in life itself, 
or that knowing, they have not the power to guide will by 
insight, or that knowing and willing, they may be cut off 
from attainment by forces beyond their art to control.14 
This appears to anticipate something like the existential 
uncertainty found in Jan Kott’s Shakespeare Our Contem-
porary (1964): ‘In Shakespeare’s world there is a contradic-
tion between the order of action and the moral order. This 
contradiction is human fate. One cannot get away from it.’15 
In other words, Shakespeare put forward some version of the 
constrained or ‘tragic’ vision in which there are no solutions, 
only trade-offs. Virtuous deeds are not necessarily rewarded, 
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evil ones not necessarily punished, and answers from the void 
fail to materialise.
Just a year after Sharp’s book came another great study of 
Shakespeare and morality, The Moral System of Shakespeare 
(1903) by Richard G. Moulton. This imagines Shakespeare 
running a great ‘zoological experiment’:
Humour is often occupied with the ways of human nature. 
Zoology gravely studies the ways of animals: not merely 
the structures of their skeletons as an element in compara-
tive anatomy, but the lightest turn of habit and custom, as 
that one spider spreads a web, another lives in a box with 
a lid to it. The ways of the animal man have a similar inter-
est, even the infi nite variations of individuality: how the 
carriers talk with ostlers in free slang; how a tavern hostess 
adapts herself to impracticable guests; distracted drawers 
fl inging ‘anons’ in every direction; what permutations of 
the human scarecrow can be mustered into Falstaff’s com-
pany of soldiers; what combination of social absurdities 
can hold revel in Shallow’s orchard.16 
This is a similar idea to the game scenarios I outlined in 
Chapter 1. However, unlike Sharp’s, Moulton’s vision is not 
a secular one and strikes some Protestant notes: ‘These moral 
accidents are sudden openings into the unknown, giving us 
scattered intimations of a supreme Power behind the visible 
course of things, overruling all.’17 This makes the moral 
world of Moulton’s Shakespeare ‘a system’, as indicated by 
his title, rather than one of free agents as we fi nd in Bowden 
or Birch.
The next major study on Shakespeare and morality came 
in the form of The Shakespeare Symphony: An Introduction 
to the Ethics of Elizabethan Drama (1906) by Harold Bayley, 
conceived largely as a corrective to Edward Dowden’s claim 
that the period is ‘for the most part absolutely devoid of a con-
scious purpose’,18 and claims made by Schlegel and Emerson 
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that Shakespeare is unique among its writers. This is a largely 
historicist study that reveals some interesting points of cross-
over to demonstrate commonplace ideas about morality in 
the 1590s and early 1600s. For example, Shakespeare’s line 
‘Thought is free’ (Twelfth Night, I, iii, 63, and The Tempest, 
III, ii, 116) is also found in Heywood, Randolph, Beaumont and 
Fletcher, Martson, and Webster and Rowley. Bayley reminds 
us that ‘When these sentiments were uttered Thought was not 
free: it was cribbed, cabined and confi ned. When it attempted 
to fl utter from its prison it was struck down by the relentless 
claws of Authority.’19 But passages of insight such as these are 
relatively few and far between. While Bayley is still useful as 
a repository of information, the study contents itself with the 
trivial little questions from which this book set out to escape. 
To an almost comical extent, the opposite is true of 
Harold Ford’s Shakespeare: His Ethical Teaching (1922), 
which is written in a style so generalised and overwrought 
that the ‘intangible, impalpable something’ for which it is 
looking never seems to arrive.20 One is tempted to dismiss 
it entirely as empty bardolatry, but Ford does eventually 
stumble on something approaching a thesis: 
Shakespeare, though he offers no solution of the vexed prob-
lem of good and evil, yet recognises the moral constitution 
of nature, by insisting on the supremacy of moral goodness, 
and the ultimate defeat of evil; that the unbridled passions 
of men when uncontrolled by the law of man’s higher 
nature lead inevitably to damnation and death; that though 
wickedness may seem temporarily to have dethroned the 
good, yet goodness still reigns supreme in the moral world. 
The good remains good, and goodness is the more radiant 
because of the gloom which cannot extinguish it.21 
This is precisely the opposite conclusion to that drawn by 
Sharp in 1902. It is also demonstrably untrue. Where is the 
goodness that reigns supreme in the moral worlds of Hamlet 
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or Measure for Measure? If there are shimmering beacons of 
radiant goodness emanating from these plays, I must have 
missed them. Ford continues:
No one whoever came into contact with the arch-villain, 
Iago, or the Gorgons, Regan and Goneril, was moved with 
admiration for such characters, much less by any impulse 
to emulate or imitate them. No, we instinctively repudiate 
them; our whole moral nature recoils from them as from 
something morally loathsome; and the more vividly such 
characters are portrayed on the stage, the intenser become 
our feelings of abhorrence.22 
There is, I think, some truth to this. All three of these charac-
ters offend our moral intuitions, but at the same time, there 
is still something of a morbid curiosity about and fascination 
with them. We are somehow drawn closer as we are repelled. 
The same is true of the Macbeths or Richard III. Perhaps we 
are drawn in because we recognise in ourselves some poten-
tial in their behaviour? Even in the most extreme cases, such 
as Goneril or Regan, would anyone say with certainty that, 
granted land and wealth by an aged parent, we would be 
happy to acquiesce to their conditions (in this case, food and 
shelter for six months with a hundred men)? We do recoil 
from the villains, but I would warrant that we do so only 
because we see our own faces in the mirrors they hold back 
at us.
I think it is worth persevering with Ford because the sim-
plicity of the straightforward moral lessons he draws from 
Shakespeare is so unsatisfactory. But why are these lessons so 
unsatisfactory? Let us consider one more passage: 
In Hamlet the tragedy springs from adultery in the past. In 
Macbeth it is criminal ambition. In Othello it is the poison 
of slander. In Measure for Measure it is the sin of sensuality. 
In Antony and Cleopatra it is illicit love. In The Merchant 
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of Venice it is religious bigotry. Thus, it is moral evil in one 
or other of its many Protean shapes that produces the pains 
and penalties which issue in the resultant tragedy.23 
I cannot help but wonder if there was ever a theatregoer 
whose chief response to Hamlet was to draw the lesson that 
‘adultery is evil’. This level of reduction – so certain, so ‘black 
and white’ – seems entirely antithetical to Shakespearean 
thinking, moral or otherwise. Even in the ‘sins’ Ford lists, 
there are immediate questions. Does Measure for Measure 
condemn sensuality? Is the moral point of The Merchant of 
Venice really to highlight religious bigotry? One reason that 
so much has been written on Shakespeare is because his plays 
are uniquely resistant to exactly these sorts of readings.
In Christ in Shakespeare: Ten Addresses on Moral and 
Spiritual Elements in Some of the Greater Plays (1928), 
George H. Morrison’s conclusions stand in stark contrast 
to Ford’s and belong in the secular–humanist tradition. 
‘Shakespeare is the most intense of individualists’, he argues: 
Christ was severe just as Shakespeare is. He proclaimed an 
inexorable law. He knew that sin is dead, and that as a man 
soweth, so shall he also reap. But side by side with that, in 
Christ, there is a hope of rescue for the vilest, which is not 
recognisable in Shakespeare.
Macbeth shows no traces of repentance, even when he 
is told his wife is dead. Iago, to the last, has a heart as the 
nether-millstone. Regan and Goneril are never visited by 
any yearning to be right with God again – they pass on, 
hardened, to the night. 
That is to say you do not fi nd in Shakespeare what 
thousands of sinful men have found – a power that can 
redeem, and save the vilest and most hardened heart.24 
It is striking that a scholar from the 1920s, who set out to 
write a book about Christ in Shakespeare, found that the 
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plays are notable not only for the fact that so many char-
acters do not fi nd redemption, but also because they do not 
even look for it. It is clear that the world of moral absolutes 
that Ford describes does not exist in Shakespeare’s dramatic 
vision. There is no overriding ethical karma at work.
The next decade saw the publication of Shakespearean 
Selves: Essays in Ethics (1938) by Arthur Temple Cadoux, 
who was an English Congregational Church minister. 
Cadoux returns to the method of Elizabeth Griffi th, turning 
to each play and teasing out the ethical interest, but he is a 
shrewd reader of Shakespeare and this study remains valu-
able. His key insight is that characters show us the limits 
of their own moral visions. Thus, of Angelo in Measure for 
Measure he writes, ‘His scheme of life had no decent place 
for sex, and therefore no foothold from which to fi ght its 
indecencies.’ Cadoux presents an elaborated version of the 
Bowden / Simpson thesis, although stripped of its Catholic 
implications. He stresses Shakespeare’s emphasis on ‘the 
working of more inward factors of destiny’. In this view, 
‘Shakespeare catches in his mirror the inmost cavities of the 
soul, and more than any other helps a man to know himself.’ 
However, the refl ection is ‘distorted by self-bias’, which ‘was 
to Shakespeare the common root of human ruin’. As I out-
lined in Chapters 1 and 2, modern evolutionary psychology 
has found human thinking to be strewn with systematic con-
fi rmation bias and other heuristics that often render us blind 
to our own hubris. Cadoux recognises this in what he calls 
‘the dominance of self-regard’; but for him, if we give into 
this, we are ‘heading for spiritual catastrophe’.25
This emphasis on character is developed in Alfred Harbage’s 
As They Liked It: A Study of Shakespeare’s Moral Artistry 
(1947), a study fi rmly in the secular–humanist tradition that 
stands in sharp contrast to the historicist work that dominated 
its decade, which was, of course, fi xated on notions of divine 
providence. For Harbage, there is no way of discussing moral-
ity in Shakespeare’s plays without recourse to characters who 
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are ‘the foci of moral interest’. He goes on to outline an earlier 
version of Michael Bristol’s ‘vernacular intuitions’ argument, 
which I discussed in Chapter 1. Characters are perpetually on 
trial, and the audience’s judgement is either ‘a sentence – or 
else it is an accolade’.26 Harbage is reluctant to attribute inten-
tions to Shakespeare, and stresses that audiences are likely to 
see their own pre-existing notions of good and evil refl ected in 
the plays: the playwright is moral without ever moralising. He 
also develops an idea that Shakespeare’s gifts were primarily as 
artist rather than as a moral philosopher, as in the following 
characteristic passages:
Shakespeare is a dramatic artist, and the relation of dramatic 
art to the moral nature of man is about that of wind to the 
surface of water. It keeps the surface agitated, spanking it 
into sunny little ripples or driving it into powerful surges, 
but it does not trouble the depths. Dramatic art neither raises 
nor lowers the level, and the business of the dramatic artist 
is to know the height of the surface upon which he works.27
Certain words common in Shakespeare criticism have been 
avoided in the foregoing discussion: indifference, impar-
tiality, irony. . . . The word accommodating would be pref-
erable to any of them were it not for the ignobility of its 
suggestions. The best word of all, obvious but inevitable, 
is simply artistic. These plays are deft. We are the instru-
ments, and Shakespeare knows our stops.28 
His message is ultimately life-affi rming: Shakespeare ‘knows 
our stops’ because he is one of us and writes ultimately in 
solidarity. He does not so much teach us anything new but 
shows us more clearly what we already know.
Harbage’s most idiosyncratic and bizarre (and therefore 
most interesting) observation is that the plays tend to be 
populated in the majority by ‘indubitably good’ characters 
who throw the others into relief; this is ‘the safe majority’. 
He calculates percentages by classifying 775 characters in the 
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thirty-eight plays ‘of whom we can form a moral estimate’. 
By this rough science, he works out 49 per cent (378) are 
‘indubitably good’, 20 per cent (158) are ‘good in the main’, 
14 per cent (106) are ‘bad in the main’ and 17 per cent (133) 
are ‘indubitably bad’. I have tabulated some of his examples 
of classifi cations in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1
Indubitably good – 
49 per cent (378)
Horatio, Cordelia, Orlando, Portia 
(wife of Brutus), Hamlet, Helena, 
Bottom, Anne Bullen
Good in the main – 
20 per cent (158)
Lear, Friar Laurence, Emilia, 
Posthumus
Bad in the main – 
14 per cent (106)
The Apothecary, King Lewis XI, 
Cleopatra, Mistress Quickly, Falstaff, 
Shylock
Indubitably bad – 
17 per cent (133)
Richard III, Iago, Goneril, Joan la 
Pucelle, Andrew Aguecheek, 
Claudius, Macbeth
It will not have escaped keen observers that overall this puts 
the ‘good’ characters at 69 per cent (536) versus only 31 per 
cent (239) for the ‘bad’ characters. ‘Considering that drama 
is focused on trouble spots, these fi gures are cheering,’ quips 
Harbage breezily. ‘Shakespeare’s humanity works with the 
angels in the proportion of seven to three. This is his safe 
majority.’ And he fi nds this rough 70–30 split broadly consis-
tent across characters of upper, middle and low classes.29 
While we might take genuine issue with the specifi cs of 
several of Harbage’s classifi cations, I think his general point 
is broadly true: most people in the plays defi ned this loosely 
are ‘good’. However, I think a more compelling statistic, 
given these broad norms, would be to see where Shakespeare 
focuses most of his attention. If one were to order all the char-
acters in Shakespeare by their total number of lines, we could 
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place relatively few of those in the top fi fty in the ‘indubitably 
good’ category. Even if one follows Harbage in placing the 
likes of Hamlet and Helena there (which I would question), 
by my rough estimate at least half would fi nd themselves in 
‘bad’ categories, and this is even while giving the benefi t of 
the doubt to characters such as Othello, Hal / Henry V, Duke 
Vincentio and Rosalind. There seems a strong and obvious 
correlation between the number of lines a character has and 
how ‘indubitably good’ they appear to us: the more lines, the 
less likely they seem like angels. Is it really the case, therefore, 
that the ‘safe majority’ are indubitably good, or rather that 
most of them are so out of focus that their moral fl aws do not 
become apparent to us? 
Perhaps infl uenced by Harbage (although he does not 
cite him), in The Shakespearean Ethic (1959), John Vyvyan 
makes a bold claim: ‘Shakespeare is never ethically neutral. 
He is never in doubt as to whether the souls of his characters 
are rising or falling.’ For Vyvyan, Shakespeare’s moral stan-
dard is captured by Polonius’s advice to Laertes: ‘to thine 
own self be true’ (I, iii, 80). He spots a recurring pattern 
in which characters give in to a temptation to choose cer-
tain principles over love or life and betray their ‘true self’. 
Thus, Brutus in Julius Caesar ‘puts politics before humanity’, 
Hamlet’s ‘death-wish has triumphed over his love-wish’, 
Isabella in Measure for Measure exalts ‘chastity above life 
and humanity’, and so on. Vyvyan’s key insight is that the 
temptation is almost always followed by a period of inner 
confl ict in which he see characters struggle with their ‘true 
selves’; there will usually be a second temptation before 
the character makes their ultimate choice, for good or for 
ill. Eventually, this reveals itself as a rearticulating of the 
Catholic tradition à la Bowden and Simpson, foreground-
ing conscience: ‘the tragic hero, who betrays his own Self’ is 
akin to ‘Judas, who betrays Christ’.30 Thus, for Vyvyan, as 
for Bowden and Simpson, in Shakespeare there is always a 
choice, and moral agency leaves the door open for salvation. 
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Interestingly, in Shakespeare and Christian Doctrine 
(1963), Roland Mushat Frye draws quite a different con-
clusion: ‘I fi nd that an explicitly New Testament ethic is 
less relevant to Shakespeare’s plays than an ethic of purely 
natural law, based equally in the Scriptures and the Greek 
and Latin classics.’ As with George H. Morrison before him, 
Frye looks for an explicitly Christian message in Shake-
speare and instead fi nds a humanist moral vision: ‘the mir-
ror of Shakespearean drama was held up to nature, and 
not to saving grace’. However, like Vyvyan, he foregrounds 
choice and agency as being integral to the Shakespearean 
ethic: ‘Nowhere is the necessity for moral responsibility 
clearer than in the cases of Iago and Edmund. If these two 
great villains were not responsible for their actions, an audi-
ence could scarcely regard them as being, in any meaning-
ful sense, villainous.’ But if the mirror is held up to nature 
rather than to divine grace, by what moral authority can 
we tell what is villainous and what is virtuous? According 
to Frye, it comes down to basic humanity. For example, ‘in 
general the family tie is basic to what is human in life’, and 
so violence to that family tie – as we see in King Lear – 
offends nature and therefore Goneril and Regan are obvious 
villains.31 Writing a year after Frye, in 1964, V. G. Kiernan 
similarly found Shakespeare’s outlook ‘profoundly human-
istic’ and ‘profoundly unreligious’: ‘he was not interested, as 
some of the other dramatists were, in ropes to link human 
beings together that had to be slung over the pulley of a 
remote heaven’.32
In this survey, we have seen three broad traditions of 
thinking about Shakespeare and morality: fi rst, the Protes-
tant tradition, which emphasises an overarching cosmic sys-
tem and concepts of divine or poetic justice. These include 
the studies by Elizabeth Griffi th, Charles Knight, Bishop 
Wordsworth, Richard G. Moulton and Harold Ford, and 
they are implicitly endorsed by historicists, new or old, 
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who broadly accept that Shakespeare and his audience were 
wedded to the Great Chain of Being. Second, there is the 
Catholic tradition, which emphasises the centrality of moral 
agency and conscience in a moral universe in which redemp-
tion is possible, if one chooses correctly. This strand of criti-
cism includes Richard Simpson, Henry Sebastian Bowden, 
Arthur Temple Cadoux, Alfred Harbage and John Vyvyan; 
their inheritors, directly or indirectly, are David N. Beaure-
gard, who (as we saw in Chapter 3) stresses the infl uences of 
Aristotle and St Thomas, and Michael D. Bristol, who (as we 
saw in Chapter 1) stresses the importance of moral agency. 
The third tradition is that of secular humanism, which views 
Shakespeare’s moral sense as coming out of what is natural 
in humanity. Here there is no higher order, no cosmic jus-
tice, no fi nal redemption, only an intuitive sense of what is 
right and wrong in lived experience. Advocates of this view 
include William Hazlitt, W. J. Birch, Frank Chapman Sharp, 
George H. Morrison, Roland Mushat Frye and V. G. Kiernan; 
their inheritors would include Jan Kott, Robin Headlam 
Wells and A. D. Nuttall.
Although these are three distinct strains in the criticism, 
there are naturally many points of similarity and crossover. 
Across virtually all these studies, we fi nd a playwright sym-
pathetic to individuals and unwilling to write off humanity. 
He is seldom despairing, even if his moral vision tends to 
look down at the groundlings rather than up at the sky for 
answers. He does not condemn or moralise, and he is sus-
picious of those who make exaggerated claims about their 
own virtuousness as a pretext to condemn others. Although 
it is not possible to locate adherence to any specifi c Christian 
doctrine in his works, Shakespeare’s moral vision seems to 
echo Jesus on the Mount of Olives: ‘He that is without sin 
among you, let him fi rst cast a stone at her’ (John 8: 7). We 
need to look inwards and judge ourselves, before we look 
outwards and judge others.
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In summary
• A survey of Shakespeare criticism from 1775 to 1964 dem-
onstrates that there are three main traditions of thinking 
about Shakespeare and morality: the Protestant tradition 
foregrounding divine providence (Elizabeth Griffi th, Charles 
Knight, Bishop Charles Wordsworth, Richard G. Moulton 
and Harold Ford), the Catholic tradition foregrounding moral 
conscience (Richard Simpson, Henry Sebastian Bowden, 
Arthur Temple Cadoux, Alfred Harbage and John Vyvyan) 
and the secular–humanist tradition foregrounding human 
nature (William Hazlitt, Frank Chapman Sharp, George H. 
Morrison and Roland Mushat Frye).
• Shakespeare stresses the importance of viable alternatives 
in ethical choices; as Richard Simpson and Henry Sebastian 
Bowden put it, ‘the agent in each case might have done the 
opposite’, and this is what makes the moral decisions in the 
plays meaningful.
• Shakespeare’s plays emphasise the psychological interiority of 
morality, what Arthur Temple Cadoux calls the ‘inward fac-
tors of destiny’. We come to understand rights and wrongs 
‘from the inside out’, rather than by external judgement.
• Shakespeare has a positive view of humanity; in As They 
Liked It: A Study of Shakespeare’s Moral Artistry (1947), 
Alfred Harbage argues there is a ‘safe majority’ of good char-
acters in the plays.
• It is not possible to pin Shakespeare down to any Christian 
doctrine, and it is not clear whether or not the worlds of his 
plays allow for redemption; his sinners seldom seek it.
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CHAPTER 6
AUTHORITY
In this chapter, I argue that Shakespeare’s response to the 
moral foundation of authority is not located in the speeches 
of his political leaders because authority is not synonymous 
with power. Authority must be earned, whereas power 
is usually bestowed. Therefore, we must look to the rela-
tionships between characters of different social rank, espe-
cially between servants and their masters. In Shakespeare’s 
plays these relationships often take the form of freely cho-
sen employment as opposed to feudal oaths of fealty. This 
is because paid employment became the new norm as early 
capitalism fl ourished in the 1500s, and the last remnants 
of the old feudal order were swept away. Focusing on the 
relationship between Adam and Orlando in As You Like It, 
the contrast between Kent and Oswald in King Lear, and 
the relationship between Flavius the steward and Timon in 
Timon of Athens, I contend that in Shakespeare’s plays virtu-
ous authority entails reciprocal good service. Good service 
is found not in mere obedience but in a sense of duty, which 
might on occasion directly contradict the wishes of the mas-
ter. In the ideal scenario, which is glimpsed in the relationship 
between Adam and Orlando in As You Like It, good leader-
ship is rewarded with good service. However, sometimes – as 
in the cases of Kent and Lear, and Flavius and Timon – poor 
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leaders are rewarded with good service, which (as bad lead-
ers) they fail to recognise. Even so, good servants seem to 
derive a sense of meaningful purpose from their duty, while 
characters who fail to transcend self-interest fi nd only exis-
tential despair. In virtually all cases, if authority is mistaken 
for oppressive power, and if liberty is mistaken for subver-
sion, tyranny follows.
Few topics have been as thoroughly mined out as that 
of Shakespeare’s depiction of power, which was an obses-
sion of new historicist and cultural materialist critics from 
the 1980s to the mid-2000s. I have analysed the strengths 
and shortcomings of these two schools elsewhere at length.1 
New historicists tended to see Shakespeare’s plays as being 
complicit with power, while cultural materialists tended to 
see them as working to expose the ideological contradic-
tions in power structures. However, despite their sustained 
focus on power, neither of these approaches can tell us very 
much about the nature of authority in Shakespeare’s plays. 
Their view of power is almost always corrosive and oppres-
sive: something that is, by its very nature, harmful and even 
immoral. They can understand power structures only as 
shibboleths to be brought down. The baby boomer genera-
tion did not like anyone telling them what to do: the kids 
are alright. This overwhelmingly negative view of power is 
because, although they differed on many issues, new his-
toricists and cultural materialists were united politically 
on the left, and in some cases, even on the far left. As per 
Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind, those on the left tend 
to be morally blind to the foundation of authority because 
they process the world almost exclusively through the lens 
of care, fairness and liberty.2 To such a mindset, power and 
oppression often appear to be synonyms, which is especially 
ironic, given that the same people often show a remarkable 
faith in the ability of government to solve social problems – 
if only it were the right sort of government, invariably the 
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sort with their anointed philosopher kings du jour in key 
positions of power.
By contrast, in the 1960s, various voices from the right, 
including the Conservative Member of Parliament, Enoch 
Powell, arguably ‘the most popular politician of his time’,3 
viewed Shakespeare as being straightforwardly patriotic and, 
with perhaps a touch of jingoism, celebrated his apparent 
love of order. For Powell, Shakespeare sounded ‘the chord 
of patriotism: the romantic self-consciousness of national 
identity as against the rest of mankind’.4 This was the main-
stream British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) version of 
the thesis put forward by E. M. W. Tillyard about twenty 
years earlier.5 At that time it was to drum up a sense of 
social cohesion and national spirit during World War II; in 
the 1960s it was bound up with questions of what it meant 
to be British in a rapidly changing society. Generally, those 
insisting on a Patriotic Bard make the keynote speeches in 
the history plays do much work. And it was this version of 
Shakespeare that the cultural materialists had initially set 
out to correct before encountering its modern update in the 
form of new historicism.6 
From my vantage point, these old debates reveal more 
about the readers and watchers of Shakespeare’s plays than 
they do about the playwright. Each of them seems to create 
Shakespeare in their own image or to serve their own ends. 
It should not surprise us that a staunch Conservative such 
as Enoch Powell should see his own patriotism refl ected in 
Shakespeare, while radical leftists such as Alan Sinfi eld and 
Jonathan Dollimore see the same plays exposing the limits 
and ideological fractures of such patriotism. In both cases, 
we can see the real effects of confi rmation bias. The Shake-
speare play is a Rorschach test: where I am prone to see a 
butterfl y, you are prone to see a bat. It is Richard II’s mir-
ror smashed into tiny pieces, refl ecting our own faces. One 
reason for this, as T. J. B. Spencer argued, is because of the 
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playwright’s deliberate sophistry: his ability to argue for the 
wrong side brilliantly. In many cases, we do not and cannot 
know which side Shakespeare thought ‘wrong’.7
It is therefore easy to become swayed by the virtuosity of 
his characters’ speeches or else recognise views with which we 
agree in them, assuming in the excitement that Shakespeare 
is on ‘our side’. Because of this, I do not think we can locate 
Shakespeare’s attitude towards authority in these moments 
of rhetorical fl ourish. For example, it has been commonplace 
to take Ulysses’ speech on the nature of degree in Troilus and 
Cressida as emblematic of the playwright’s idealised vision 
of social order: 
How could communities,
Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities,
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
The primogenity and due of birth,
Prerogative of age, crowns, scepters, laurels,
But by degree stand in authentic place?
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And hark what discord follows. (I, iii, 97–104)
Taken in isolation and out of the context of the rest of the 
play, this might seem a straightforward endorsement of Plato’s 
Republic and a proto-Hobbesian warning against the possibil-
ity of lapsing into the state of nature. But Troilus and Cressida 
is a play in which seemingly every point is debated endlessly, 
and on which many different speakers hold forth on a vari-
ety of topics. Rather than a straightforward endorsement, 
the play facilitates ‘a conversation between Shakespeare and 
Platonism’.8 Because of this quality of Shakespeare’s politicians, 
I do not think that we can fi nd a specifi cally moral response to 
authority through politics, and especially not through rhetori-
cal fl ourishes. Instead, it seems to me that we might detect an 
underlying attitude to authority in the relationships between 
characters of different social ranks. Authority in Shakespeare 
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is not located in power and governance, but in service and 
dependency. 
For all the talk of the Great Chain of Being, feudalism 
had been in permanent decline in England from the end of 
Richard II’s reign in 1399. To understand the nature of service 
in the 1590s and early 1600s, it is necessary to grasp drastic 
changes in economic relationships from feudalism to nascent 
pre-industrial capitalism. 
[I]n the thirteenth century, demesnes were managed by 
lords’ offi cials for the lords’ own table and profi t, most 
of which was allocated for nonprofi table expenditure on 
display and warfare. The profi ts from the produce from 
demesnes can only be seen to have been invested profi tably 
in feudal terms – that is, in the ability to further extra-
economic ends. In the fi fteenth century the demesnes were 
farmed by wealthy peasants producing in competition, an 
unprecedented step. So when the demesnes were leased to 
wealthier peasants in the fi fteenth century, a novel dynamic 
of competitive production was set in train.9 
Initially, these peasant farmers, who either held a copyhold 
or (increasingly) leased their demesnes wholesale from absen-
tee rentier landlords, were mostly at subsistence level: ‘In 
the early sixteenth century, around 80 per cent of farmers 
were only growing enough food for the needs of their family 
household.’ But as the 1500s wore on the trend was towards 
increased productivity and profi t, a long trend that would 
continue until 1850.10 As an example, Richard Shakespeare, 
William’s grandfather on his father’s side, was making a good 
living as a yeoman tenant famer in Stratford in the 1520s. His 
landlord was not an aristocrat but landed gentry: specifi cally, 
Robert Arden, William’s grandfather on his mother’s side. 
England’s post-feudal, pre-industrial economy saw ‘between 
70 and 80 per cent of the occupied population . . . primarily 
engaged in agriculture, though of course many of them must 
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have pursued secondary occupations in industry and trade’. 
It was a ‘predominantly rural, family-based economy’.11 It 
is crucial to recognise that, by the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, the manor – the bedrock of the old feudal system – ‘had 
become an anachronism’.12 Manorial lords, who for over a 
century had largely collected rents in absentia, for fi nancial 
reasons started selling their lands on the open market. James 
I himself sold Crown lands in the 1610s to raise extra funds: 
for example, in 1614, he sold copyholds in the West Country 
for a total of £11,928. Between 1560 and 1620, land transac-
tions in England doubled. Who was buying this land? In some 
cases, it was nobles or the gentry. In others, tenants would 
buy the land to convert their existing copyhold or leaseholds 
into freeholds. In Yorkshire, for example, ‘roughly 40 per 
cent of all transactions in the later sixteenth century were 
“downwards transmissions”’, from either nobility or gentry 
to yeomen.13 
These economic changes effectively created new socio-
economic classes comprising enterprising landowners and 
paid employees. Of those who received a working wage for a 
living – a ‘shepherd to another man’, as Corin in As You Like 
It puts it (II, iv, 70) – it is useful to make a distinction between 
those who ‘lived out’ and those who ‘lived in’. Those employ-
ees who did not live in the households of their employers 
would usually makes ends meet working at a variety of differ-
ent casual jobs as supply and demand dictated (although, as 
the statistics quoted above suggest, the vast majority of these 
jobs were in agricultural labour). Those who lived in con-
sisted of apprentices, who would usually take training in lieu 
of payment, and domestic servants, who, as well as earning 
cash, might also take payment in the form of ‘board’, political 
privileges or even land. Around 29 per cent of households in 
England had live-in servants of various ranks and duties, typi-
cally aged between ten and thirty, with older servants such as 
stewards often having their own dwellings.14 
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This relatively new set of economic arrangements in the 
sixteenth century produced at least two interesting features 
for us to consider as regards authority. First, there is a yawn-
ing chasm between the political theory – of the Great Chain 
of Being variety that E. M. W. Tillyard made do so much 
work in The Elizabethan World Picture (1942),15 which 
maintained something approximating the old feudal order – 
and the economic reality on the ground. To focus entirely 
on the offi cial doctrine as Tillyard did, and, it must be said, 
as new historicists often did, is to ignore these ‘new emerg-
ing forces which seemed to threaten cherished ideals’.16 As I 
argued in Chapter 1, Shakespeare’s moral vision plays out in 
the realm of lived experience rather than philosophical sys-
tems, and hence his concern here is with the economic real-
ity rather than the political theory. Second, and perhaps easy 
to miss, is the fact that while forms of hierarchy and obedi-
ence are theoretically still in effect, in practice a servant, as 
a paid employee, is not bound to work for only one master 
for life, and likewise the master has no obligation to keep 
the employee in service beyond the terms of their contract. 
This means that service itself was something approaching a 
free market.
This topic, once neglected in Shakespeare studies, has 
been treated in three book-length studies, all of which were 
published in 2005: Linda Anderson’s A Place in the Story: 
Servants and Service in Shakespeare’s Plays, Judith Weil’s 
Service and Dependency in Shakespeare’s Plays and David 
Evett’s Discourses of Service in Shakespeare’s England. These 
monographs all make it clear that service was not only an 
ideal of early modern life in England, but also a practical and 
social necessity, for many of the same reasons that Shake-
speare’s Ulysses outlines. Anderson points out that recent 
critics have paid disproportionate attention to rebellious or 
subversive servants at the expense of the larger numbers of 
obedient ones because they seem more interesting. As I have 
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noted, this should come as no surprise because cultural mate-
rialism, which valued subversion highly, was all the rage in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Servants who fail to rebel, who do as they are commanded, 
who fl atter their employers, who remain loyal even at the 
expense of their own self-interest, are harder to incorporate 
into our narrative of subversion. We may acknowledge that 
they are too oppressed, but their failure openly to resist 
their oppression makes them less interesting, though poten-
tially more disturbing, to us than the rioters and outlaws.17 
Anderson’s use of ‘us’ is interesting here. Who is ‘we’? I 
would warrant it is certainly not Enoch Powell. The ‘us’ in 
this passage refers to Shakespeare critics on the liberal left, 
to whom the very notion of ‘service’ automatically translates 
into ‘oppression’. To use Haidt’s phrase, this is a ‘WEIRD’ 
response.18 Evett addresses it head on, seeking to liberate us 
from the ‘bleak vision of the materialists’. ‘We postmoderns’, 
he says with a touch of sarcasm, cannot process ‘servants 
and other subordinates, expressing love and respect for their 
social and economic superiors’ and so must explain this away 
as ‘false consciousness’ by relying on ‘the materialist empha-
sis on ressentiment’.19 Anderson goes on to argue that critics 
have been too quick to dismiss the more obedient servants 
as ‘nose-picking halfwits’ in Shakespeare’s plays because of 
a ‘desire for neatness of pattern rather than genuine engage-
ment’,20 but then she seems to look for the subversive potential 
in these ‘good’ servants as possible comments on or judge-
ments of their masters. This is to see these servants through 
WEIRD eyes. It is less an attempt at subversion and more a 
lived understanding of how authority works in the real world. 
As Weil argues, we should avoid ‘narrow, utopian prejudices 
against subordination in general and work in particular’.21 It 
is a basic fact of life, not only in Shakespeare’s time but also in 
our own. Any mature response to the nature of service in the 
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plays, and the moral foundation that underlies it, must move 
beyond the gaze of the wide-eyed revolutionary.
One obvious example is Adam in As You Like It, who, in 
an act of incredible selfl essness, gives Orlando his life savings 
with a pledge: ‘let me be your servant’ (III, ii, 46). As Mark 
Thornton Burnett notes, although we think of Adam primar-
ily as a loyal servant, ‘in order to follow Orlando, Adam must 
be unfaithful to Orlando, which suggests that loyalty, a qual-
ity to be earned, can never be taken for granted’.22 It seems to 
me that the relationship between Adam and Orlando primar-
ily leans on the moral foundation of authority, rather than 
loyalty. Anderson picks up on this without naming it as such: 
Adam ‘chooses to serve his old master’s virtuous son, rather 
than his villainous son, a choice Shakespeare surely must 
have meant us to applaud.’23 The fact that Adam makes a free 
choice to follow Orlando is signifi cant. Since it is Adam who 
gives his money to Orlando in aid, it cannot be for fi nancial 
reasons – and the fact that he has such money in the fi rst 
place tells us he was paid a wage. Adam is effectively a free 
agent after Oliver’s dismissal of him at I, i, 78, and nothing 
obliges him to follow Orlando into the forest. The fact that 
he does so reveals a moment of authentic service in the name 
of authority. Evett goes further by suggesting that Orlando 
learns a sense of duty and how to serve from Adam:
[T]he old servant’s thematic role has been taken over by 
his new master, for the new Adam, Orlando, with the 
old Adam as his model, serves Adam as Adam has served 
him . . . ministering to him like a nurse to a child. More fully 
yet, we see that in Orlando, the concept of service has come 
to extend all elements of his life. . . . By the play’s end he 
arrives at the center of a network of servitudes. . . . Despite 
the wrongs done him by his brother Oliver, Orlando freely 
chooses to serve the latter at the risk of his own life, saving 
him from the lion and the snake. . . . And even more than 
Adam, he freely chooses to do these things.24 
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This sense of duty, freely chosen when less risky choices are 
available, is the beating heart of the moral foundation of 
authority. Adam’s dutiful service is repaid in kind by the fact 
that Orlando himself dutifully serves. 
However, this curiously sentimental and romantic picture 
of reciprocal service in As You Like It is not refl ected in every 
play. Let us substitute Orlando for Lear, and old Adam for 
Kent. What happens to the picture? Where there is a reciproc-
ity in Orlando’s relationship with Adam, those who follow 
Lear ‘are touched by servility through their one-sided relations 
with him’.25 Jonas A. Barish and Marshall Waingrow articu-
lated this view in 1958:
Service, for our purposes, may be thought of as the for-
malization of relationships between individuals of different 
social or political rank. So much is implicit in the doctrine 
of hierarchy. An individual obeys or ministers to his supe-
rior in the social scale, and that superior ministers to his 
superior. But an essential thing about this relationship in 
Lear is its feudal character: ideal service works two ways; 
it implies rights as well as duties, on each side. The reci-
procity suggested by the term ‘bond’, where privileges are 
granted at the same time that duties are imposed, is the 
condition that justifi es service in principle; in practice, it is 
precisely the denial of reciprocity that is the fi rst of Lear’s 
tragic violations. By refusing to honour the reciprocal force 
of the bond tying him to his inferiors, Lear cuts the bond, 
‘cracks’ it, and so lets loose the forces of disorder, division, 
and disservice that are to overwhelm the kingdom.26 
One key difference between Adam’s bond to Orlando and 
Kent’s to Lear is that the former, as we have seen, is freely 
chosen, whereas the latter has a feudal basis. Kent is no 
less devoted a servant than is Adam, but crucially Orlando 
has earned his authority, which is subsequently reciprocal, 
whereas Lear’s rests on his status as king. It is fair to say that 
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Lear wields power but, at least as we see him in the play, he 
does not seem to have authority. It is valid to ask, therefore, 
what motivates Kent to keep following him? I will return to 
this question shortly.
At the start of the play Kent has a different understanding 
of service from his King, who seems to expect complete obe-
dience from his subjects. This is revealed in one of his tirades 
against Goneril’s steward, Oswald: 
Such smiling rogues as these,
Like rats, oft bite the holy cords atwain
Which are too intrinse t’unloose; smooth every passion
That in the natures of their lords rebel,
Bring oil to fi re, snow to their colder moods;
Renege, affi rm, and turn their halcyon beaks
With every gale and vary of their masters,
Knowing naught (like dogs) but following. (II, ii, 79–86) 
Kent berates Oswald for being servile in service. For Kent, a 
bad servant, such as Oswald, panders to their master’s every 
whim like ‘dogs’. To adapt Haidt’s metaphor of the intuitive 
elephant and the rational rider (see Chapter 1), if the master’s 
elephant – ‘passions’, as Kent puts it – seems to lurch wildly 
left or right, the bad servant, much like the rider, swiftly takes 
whatever actions are necessary to extenuate them. The bad 
servant sees their master in a hot temper (‘fi re’) and, being a 
snivelling and submissive sycophant, thinks only to fuel it, 
and likewise bring ‘snow to their colder moods’. The impli-
cation of Kent’s attack is that good service in each of these 
cases would be to try to steer the elephant to a more rational 
course. The good servant, then, should not tell his master 
what he wants to hear, but in some cases must challenge him. 
Barish and Waingrow argue that Shakespeare depicts 
Oswald as the epitome of the bad servant: he is little more 
than Goneril’s ‘puppet’. They go so far as to speak of ‘the 
total immolation of his will in hers’; he is remarkable for ‘his 
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failure to exist at all except as her creature’.27 In fact, so total 
is Oswald’s subservience that in his fi rst eight spoken lines 
of dialogue, more than half make explicit reference to his 
‘madam’ (I, iii, 3; I, iii, 11; I, iii, 17; I, iv, 307) or ‘lady’ (I, iv, 71), 
and this continues throughout the play. In fact, he says 
‘madam’ a total of ten times in Act IV alone (IV, ii, 3; IV, ii, 
29; IV, iv, 1; IV, iv, 2; IV, iv, 5; IV, iv, 15; IV, iv, 17; IV, iv, 22; 
IV, iv, 27; IV, iv, 39). The repetition is too marked for this to 
be sketchy characterisation; Shakespeare deliberately makes 
Oswald as obsequious as possible – and a skilled actor could 
wring comic potential from the sliminess of his ‘madam’. 
It is perhaps no coincidence either that his fi nal utterance 
should start with the word ‘slave’ (IV, v, 238). Shakespeare 
makes it abundantly clear that there is nothing morally good 
in servility. Even in a feudal hierarchy, an excessive willing-
ness to please one’s superiors offends the moral foundation 
of authority.
Of course, Oswald fi nds his opposite in Kent himself, 
who has already demonstrated his philosophy of good ser-
vice by speaking truth to power in the opening scene of the 
play:
Think’st thou that duty shall have dread to speak
When power to fl attery bows?
To plainness honour’s bound
When majesty falls to folly. Reserve thy state,
And in thy best consideration check
This hideous rashness. Answer my life my judgment:
Thy youngest daughter does not love thee least,
Nor are those empty-hearted whose low sounds
Reverb no hollowness. (I, i, 144–52)
Even in the feudal bond, good service is not mere obedience or 
submission to power; the line of duty sometimes calls for dis-
obedience. This is the rationale, for example, of Edward IV’s 
lament regarding his subjects in Richard III after he discovers 
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Clarence has been killed: ‘Who sued to me for him? Who, 
in my rage, / Kneeled at my feet and bade me be advised?’ 
(II, i, 104–5). In King Lear, it is obvious that Cordelia has done 
nothing wrong and that Lear has acted in ‘hideous rashness’ 
in banishing her. As Weil observes, it results from his ‘failure 
to recognize the difference between daughters and follow-
ers’.28 Lear also fails to recognise that in openly speaking out 
against his foolish decision, Kent is the model of good service. 
As Richard Strier puts it, in his ‘behaviour . . . the theme of 
virtuous, morally mandated disobedience, even interference, 
is fully articulated’.29 After Lear banishes Kent, he once again 
disobeys him by donning his disguise as Caius and living out 
the very opposite of banishment. What is interesting here is 
that, with banishment, Kent is effectively released from ser-
vice as a feudal retainer, and yet he freely chooses to follow 
the King regardless. Since Lear has shown virtually no signs 
of being a good leader thus far in the play, why should this 
be? It is possible that he was once a good leader that has only 
momentarily lapsed into madness, but his two elder daugh-
ters are hardly good adverts of that possibility. In fact, we can 
infer from the one-sided nature of Goneril’s relationship with 
Oswald – dominant mistress and toadying steward – not to 
mention her own skill in fl attering Lear himself, that he was 
always a poor role model. It seems more likely that Kent’s 
unswerving devotion to his King is a facet of his moral char-
acter rather than any direct response to Lear’s leadership. It 
is unambiguous, I think, that Shakespeare views good service 
– of the kind that Kent embodies – as a moral virtue. Lear 
plainly does not deserve a servant like Kent, but England is 
better for it in the end that he is blessed with one. 
We see a parallel example of this in Timon of Athens, 
a play that has often been paired with King Lear. Flavius, 
Timon’s steward, is a servant who brings snow rather than 
oil to fi re, much like Kent. In that play there is little doubt 
that Flavius stands at moral centre as the sole bastion of 
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good service in a seemingly bankrupt world. The similarities 
between Flavius and Kent are too numerous to be acciden-
tal. Surely, then, the vision of good service they represent is 
morally ingrained in Shakespeare’s imagination. Like Kent 
in Lear’s court, we are supposed to laud Flavius’s plainness 
in speaking the truth while Timon is surrounded by vapid 
or cynical fl atterers. A. D. Nuttall describes the obvious 
similarities between Lear and Timon:
Lear expects reciprocal gratitude after his gift of the king-
dom to his three daughters at the beginning of the play. 
Goneril and Regan are like Timon’s false friends. They pro-
fess love but are insensible of any ethical obligation. They 
simply hang on to whatever they can get. Lear’s folly, we 
could say (as we said of Timon’s), ‘asked for it’.30 
Authority must be earned and cannot be bought; Kent and 
Flavius alike are keenly aware of this fact. 
There are further similarities: like both Adam in As You 
Like It, and Kent, Flavius follows his master after the point 
at which he can gain from the relationship personally: in this 
case, when Timon has lost all his money and leaves Athens in 
IV, i. In the following scene, Flavius demonstrates extraordi-
nary altruism in dividing his own money between his fellow 
servants. This is an especially virtuous act because we know 
from the play that he is frugal, someone who knows the price 
of money. Yet, like Adam, he is willing to give of his own 
resources in good service until they are extinguished. After 
this, he resolves to fi nd his old master, even though at this 
point Timon has nothing:
He’s fl ung in rage from this ingrateful seat
Of monstrous friends.
Nor has he with him to supply his life,
Or that which can command it.
I’ll follow and inquire him out.
I’ll ever serve his mind with my best will;
Whilst I have gold, I’ll be his steward still. (IV, ii, 45–51)
5829_Parvini.indd   214 03/08/18   11:51 AM
 Authority [ 215
Note that Flavius persistently emphasises that he follows 
Timon for his ‘mind’, not because of his social status. He fi nds 
Timon near his cave and articulates a pure vision of good ser-
vice: ‘That which I show, heaven knows, is merely love, / Duty, 
and zeal to your unmatched mind’ (IV, iii, 507–8). As with 
Lear, Timon has been profl igate and plainly does not deserve 
this level of good service, but as we have seen, the moral 
foundation of authority is about not only the leaders but also 
the followers. Perhaps, in the indefatigability of servants like 
Adam, Kent and Flavius, Shakespeare acknowledges the sorts 
of people who hold the fabric of society together in the real 
world. The people who keep things from falling apart are not 
those like Lear or Timon, but those like Kent or Flavius.
For any benefi t that points to me,
Either in hope, or present, I’d exchange
For this one wish: that you had power and wealth
To requite me by making rich yourself. (Timon of Athens, 
IV, ii, 511–14)
Such sentiments bring to mind John Calvin’s notion of the 
‘calling’ (see Chapter 4). Flavius wants to be useful. He seems 
to see his calling in the world as being a steward, and spe-
cifi cally Timon’s steward. If there is any aspect of the good 
service we see in Adam, Kent and Flavius that is not wholly 
selfl ess, it is the fact that all three of them draw their sense 
of purpose and meaning from their duty. One has the sense 
that, denied of their mission, they would be faced with an 
existential crisis. Their sense of meaning derives from serv-
ing something or someone beyond themselves. Timon, by 
contrast, loses any sense of meaning beyond himself. Alone, 
bitter and misanthropic in his cave, he loses any sense of pur-
pose. As Arthur Temple Cadoux eloquently puts it, 
his scheme of life is shattered. He has no ground to which 
to retreat from the blow, for he has no value for other vir-
tue than his own or that which he respects as a response to 
his own. . . . self-regard by its dominance wrecks the self.31 
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Like Macbeth, with nothing to serve beyond his own inter-
ests, life becomes ‘a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound 
and fury, / Signifying nothing’ (Macbeth, V, v, 26–8). Why 
should Adam, Kent and Flavius derive meaning from serving 
others, but Timon and Macbeth fi nd only existential despair 
in serving themselves? 
In Man’s Search for Meaning, Viktor E. Frankl, a survivor 
of the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, argues that 
humans possess a deep-seated psychological need to serve:
A public-opinion poll was conducted a few years ago in 
France. The results showed that 89 percent of the people 
polled admitted that man needs ‘something’ for the sake 
of which to live. Moreover, 61 percent conceded that there 
was something, or someone, in their own lives for whose 
sake they were even ready to die.32 
In The Righteous Mind, Jonathan Haidt has some insights 
from recent studies in human biology and evolution as to 
why this might be. The answer lies in the ‘10 percent bee’ 
component of his formulation that humans are ‘90 percent 
chimp and 10 percent bee’ (see Chapter 2). While mostly 
selfi sh, we are also inextricably social and groupish. Haidt 
describes a ‘hive switch’, which needs to be activated to bring 
about a sense of fulfi lment and happiness: ‘We have the abil-
ity (under special conditions) to transcend self-interest and 
lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in something 
larger than ourselves. That ability is what I’m calling the hive 
switch.’33 It is a moment at which ‘individualism’ is replaced 
with more ‘communal feelings’: in other words, when we 
‘turn . . . into team players’.34 When describing his experi-
ences of seeing his students’ engage in such group activities 
in his years of researching this, Haidt says: 
They put on plays, compete in sports, rally for political 
causes, and volunteer for dozens of projects to help the poor 
and the sick in Charlottesville and in faraway countries. 
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I see them searching for a calling, which they can only fi nd 
as part of a larger group. I see them striving and searching 
on two levels simultaneously, for we are all Homo duplex.35 
It is interesting to note the Calvinist turn of phrase here. The 
‘calling’ is to serve something beyond the individual self. 
Viewed in this way, Adam, Kent and Flavius are the ultimate 
team players, whose concern for their social bonds outstrips 
their individual needs and wants. Timon and Macbeth, mean-
while, have effectively lost their teams, the individual self 
without a calling necessarily struggles to generate meaningful 
purpose. The moral foundation of authority rests on an intui-
tive recognition of this fact. When religions and ideologies 
build social structures of authority into their doctrines, they 
are engaged in the post hoc justifi cation and description of a 
more natural process to which most people respond as if by 
instinct.
Let us return to King Lear and its contrast between the 
bad and good servants, Oswald and Kent. There is no better 
measure of a moral response to a situation or person than 
visceral outrage. In order to have such a reaction to the dif-
ference between Oswald and Kent, one’s moral taste buds 
must be responsive to the foundation of authority. Samuel 
Johnson, for example, had no such reaction. Indeed, he won-
dered, ‘I know not well why Shakespeare gives the Steward, 
who is a mere factor of wickedness, so much fi delity.’36 Dr 
Johnson apparently could not distinguish between good and 
bad service, and so his response to Oswald is not moral, 
but one of intellectual confusion. This response contrasts 
sharply with another great Shakespearean, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, who registers his full moral outrage in his notes 
on King Lear. For Coleridge, especially vehement on this 
point, Kent is, ‘perhaps, the nearest to perfect goodness in 
all Shakespeare’s characters’. In juxtaposition, he describes 
Oswald as ‘the only character of utter irredeemable base-
ness in Shakespeare’.37 It is worth pausing on the strength of 
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Coleridge’s sentiments here: even within the confi nes of the 
play, he ranks Oswald below Goneril or Regan or Edmund. 
In terms of the whole canon, he is arguing that Oswald is 
more irredeemably base than the likes of Iago, the Macbeths, 
Richard III or, say, Tamora, Demetrius, and Chiron in Titus 
Andronicus. After all, from a certain point of view, Oswald’s 
only crime is in following the orders of his superiors in an 
obsequious manner. He does not kill anybody, even though 
he might have killed Gloucester, and yet in Coleridge’s esti-
mation his complete obedience to Goneril makes him more 
irredeemably base than schemers, murderers, torturers and 
rapists. This is quite revealing of Coleridge’s moral compass; 
for him, it appears that abject servility is a worse sin than 
mere cruelty, but is it possible that Shakespeare shares this? 
In traditional virtue ethics, servility is viewed as evil. 
Thomas Aquinas addresses the question in the Summa Theo-
logiae under the article ‘Is Servile Fear Good?’:
There is an element of evil in servile fear, namely its very 
servility. Servitude, after all, is the denial of liberty, and if a 
free man is a cause unto himself, as Aristotle observes at the 
beginning of the Metaphysics, it follows that a slave is one 
who is not himself the source of his own activity, but is rather 
subject to coercion. Now if we take the case of someone act-
ing out of love, he acts as it were, on his own, because the 
only impetus to activity comes from within himself. Conse-
quently to act out of love is incompatible with the meaning of 
servility; this is only to say that servile fear, under the aspect 
precisely of servility, stands opposed to charity.38 
He invokes Augustine to contrast ‘love for justice’ with ‘fear 
of punishment’. For Aquinas, servility is evil chiefl y because 
it offends the principles of liberty and free will. He is not 
wrong. However, as I have shown in this chapter, it also 
offends the principles of good leadership and service nec-
essary for authority because they ultimately rest on what 
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individuals in a hierarchy freely choose to do. For those with 
a liberal WEIRD mindset, liberty and authority appear to 
be in tension because liberty’s opposite is oppression and 
authority’s is subversion, and these four concepts seem inter-




But we should not equate subversion with liberty or author-
ity with oppression. As in the cases of Adam and Orlando, 
or Kent’s service to Lear, authority – which is not power, but 
the upholding of principles of good leadership and justice 
– is commensurate with liberty, whether it is the servant or 
the master who is working to maintain it. Social hierarchy, 
even in feudal conditions, does not mean total obedience. 
It is a mistake common not only to Lear and to Oswald, 
but also to plenty of modern scholars. Perhaps they do not 
understand this principle because, as in the case of Samuel 
Johnson, it is in their moral blind spot. By the same token, 
subversion is not freedom; it is the wilful undermining of 
an existing social order. Thus, even in his total obedience to 
Goneril (oppression), by carrying out her orders Oswald is 
still guilty of undermining existing hierarchies (subversion). 
This fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of 
authority is common to revolutionaries and tyrants alike. 
Perhaps Coleridge understood this better than most because 
in his own lifetime he saw the French Revolution – which 
mistook liberty for subversion and authority for power – 
turn into the Reign of Terror and very quickly saw a fl edg-
ing republic succumb to tyranny. He had read John Milton, 
of course, who saw the same fate befall his own utopian 
dreams under Oliver Cromwell in the 1640s. Idealists of 
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various stripes during the twentieth century must have 
experienced similar disappointment as socialist regimes on 
every continent – from the Soviet Union to China to Cuba 
to Zimbabwe – fell quickly into the hands of despots. The 
outcome of such drastic misunderstandings of the nature 
of liberty and authority is virtually always authoritarian-
ism: a state where true authority is subverted and liberty 
is oppressed. While we cannot say if Shakespeare shared 
Coleridge’s view of Oswald as the basest of his characters 
and Kent as the most virtuous, he undoubtedly grasped 
these crucial distinctions between authority and oppres-
sion, and liberty and subversion. When they are misaligned, 
as is very often the case in his plays, tyranny follows.
In summary
• The moral foundation of authority cannot be found in the 
political rhetoric of Shakespeare’s characters, but rather in 
relationships between characters of different social rank.
• The most common bonds of service in Shakespeare’s England 
were not feudal in nature but freely chosen contracts of employ-
ment, which means that, in practice, real social relations bore 
little resemblance to the political theory outlined by the Great 
Chain of Being.
• The ideal model of good service and authority is found in As 
You Like It, where Adam freely chooses to serve Orlando, who 
repays his duty reciprocally by performing his own dutiful 
service later in the play.
• In King Lear, Shakespeare diametrically opposes Kent, as a 
model of good service, which is rooted in a sense of duty 
rather than mindless obedience, and Oswald as a model of 
bad service, which is rooted in servility.
• We fi nd a strong parallel to Kent in Flavius, the steward in 
Timon of Athens, another model of good service, whose sense 
of duty leads him to speak truth to power, and freely to give 
up his own time, money and efforts to serve Timon, even as 
he can see his master has gone astray.
5829_Parvini.indd   220 03/08/18   11:51 AM
 Authority [ 221
• Through Jonathan Haidt’s concept of the ‘hive switch’ – the 
ability to transcend our own self-interest to lose ourselves 
in something larger than ourselves – we can see why Adam, 
Kent and Flavius all derive a profound sense of purpose from 
their duty, while characters such as Timon and Macbeth, 
stuck only with self-interest, give way to misanthropy and 
existential despair.
• To understand the difference between Kent and Oswald in 
King Lear morally – as Samuel Johnson seemingly cannot but 
as Samuel Taylor Coleridge can – we must respond to the 
moral foundation of authority.
• Those who are blind to the moral foundation of authority 
frequently confuse it for oppression, the opposite of liberty, 
and likewise mistake authority’s opposite, subversion, for lib-
erty itself. In Shakespeare, and indeed in the real world as 
observed throughout history, the result of this fatal misunder-
standing is virtually always tyranny.
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CHAPTER 7
LOYALTY
Evolutionary theory expects to fi nd that kin loyalty is stron-
ger than group loyalty, which, in turn, is stronger than 
loyalty to all of mankind (see Chapter 2). Shakespeare seems 
to have had a special interest in the tension between loyalty 
to one’s family and loyalty to the group or the nation. We can 
see this most violently in a play such as Titus Andronicus. 
It is striking, then, that Shakespeare’s most loyal characters 
pledge their allegiance to neither kin nor country, but instead 
to their friends. ‘Friendship always meant much to him.’1 
Studies in both psychology and sociology have found that 
while men tend to value group-level social relations within 
a hierarchy, women tend to value their individual relation-
ships more highly. It is therefore interesting to fi nd that when 
Shakespeare deals with loyalty, he focuses on individual rela-
tionships, as opposed to groups. This renders his friendships, 
and by extension his concept of loyalty, ‘feminine’, even 
though the friendships he depicts are between both men and 
women. In this chapter, I will approach the topic primarily 
through the lens of Antonio’s devotion to Bassanio in The 
Merchant of Venice and Celia’s to Rosalind in As You Like 
It. I argue that although these pairs of friends are differently 
gendered, they are structurally very similar, and marked by 
their total imbalance. Both Antonio and Celia demonstrate 
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exceptional selfl essness in their loyalty, despite the fact that 
neither Bassanio nor Rosalind comes close to ever repaying 
their kindness. I suggest our diffi culty in processing these dis-
proportionate relationships is because they upset the moral 
foundation of fairness, but loyalty is not transactional. It 
seems, rather, that Shakespeare’s notion of friendship rested 
partly on the Christian (Thomist) virtue of charity.
We can divide Shakespeare’s most loyal characters into 
two types: fi rst, faithful servants such as Adam in As You 
Like It, Kent in King Lear, or Flavius in Timon of Athens. 
As I argued in Chapter 6, I believe that these bastions of 
good service respond primarily to the moral foundation of 
authority rather than that of loyalty. In the second category 
of Shakespeare’s most loyal characters we fi nd the devoted 
friends. As Kate Emery Pogue has shown convincingly in 
Shakespeare’s Friends (2006), Shakespeare’s obvious and 
deep interest in friendship as a structuring principle in his 
plays is rooted in his real-life relationships. While there is 
a still a great deal we will never know about Shakespeare’s 
life, it does seem likely that he was a social man who main-
tained life-long friendships, both personal and professional.2 
Arthur Temple Cadoux lists some of the many friendships in 
Shakespeare’s plays:
Friendship is a chief feature of the plays written in the years 
from 1595 to 1601. We have here Valentine and Proteus [in 
Two Gentlemen of Verona], Antonio and Bassanio [in The 
Merchant of Venice], Beatrice and Hero [in Much Ado About 
Nothing], Brutus and Cassius [in Julius Caesar], Mistress 
Ford and Page [in Merry Wives of Windsor], Rosalind and 
Celia [in As You Like It], Hamlet and Horatio [in Hamlet].3 
We might also add Antonio and Sebastian from Twelfth 
Night. A central feature of these relationships is how one-
sided many of them seem to be. Mistresses Page and Ford 
are perhaps the most equal of the pairings, but beyond them 
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each friendship appears to be lop-sided. Valentine forgives 
Proteus despite his treachery in thwarting his attempts with 
Silvia and then attempting to rape her. Antonio is willing to 
risk a pound of his own fl esh for Bassanio to secure him a 
loan of 3,000 ducats, despite the fact that Bassanio already 
owes him money. Beatrice and Hero perhaps have a more 
equal relationship, but Hero risks her reputation and even 
her life for the friendship, while Beatrice risks only her blos-
soming courtship with Benedick. The hard pragmatism of 
Cassius allows him to outmanoeuvre his idealist friend, 
Brutus. In leaving the safety of her family home, Celia gives 
up much more for Rosalind than vice versa. Horatio is a 
constant friend to Hamlet, who offers him virtually nothing 
in return. And, fi nally, Antonio risks his life for Sebastian’s 
with seemingly little recompense. 
I will return to the question of one-sidedness in these 
friendships presently, but before so doing, it seems signifi cant 
that Shakespeare locates his concept of loyalty here. Indeed, 
‘there are forty-one friendships in Shakespeare, and thirty-
nine ties of loyalty; the two things tend more and more to 
merge, as he searches for a new moral cement to take the place 
of crumbling feudal associations’.4 By focusing on individual 
friendships, he departs from the notion that loyalty is a bond 
between an individual and his or her group. Instead, he seems 
to foreground a view of loyalty as a bond between two people. 
In The Righteous Mind, Jonathan Haidt emphasises the pre-
dominantly tribal nature of the moral foundation of loyalty.
The Loyalty / betrayal foundation is just part of our innate 
preparation for meeting the adaptive challenge of forming 
cohesive coalitions. The original trigger for the Loyalty 
foundation is anything that tells you who is a team player 
and who is a traitor, particularly when your team is fi ghting 
with other teams.5 
This is the principally male view of loyalty, as seen, for 
example, in team sports. However, following recent research 
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on gender differences by Roy F. Baumeister and Kirsten L. 
Sommer, Haidt adds that ‘the objects of loyalty tend to be 
teams and coalitions for boys, in contrast to two-person 
relationships for girls’.6 Psychological and sociological stud-
ies have long found that women seem to value their social 
relationships more than men:
There is evidence that relationships are more central to 
women’s lives than to men’s, as refl ected in women’s greater 
tendency to have an interdependent self-concept, to report 
greater commitment in relationships, and to engage in more 
relationship maintenance behaviours.7 
However, Baumeister and Sommer set out to counter the con-
ventional wisdom that men are less social than are women by 
showing how apparent male independence is, in fact, a form 
of status-seeking within a hierarchy.
Independence, by defi nition, means to be free of connec-
tion with other people, and this is readily elaborated into 
a desire for autonomy and social separation. We have pro-
posed, in contrast to this view, that men are conditioned by 
both culture and nature to seek social attachments within 
a broader sphere than are women and that such a quest 
requires men to compete for an advantageous place within 
a hierarchy of power and status.8 
Some have argued that this is because of the higher average 
propensity of males towards the Machiavellian personality 
type, as opposed to empathy.9 Hence we can speak loosely 
of masculine loyalty (to the group) and feminine loyalty 
(between two individuals). 
Shakespeare provides us with numerous examples of mas-
culine loyalty. To take an extreme one, we might think of the 
shocking moment in Titus Andronicus in which Titus kills 
his own son, Mutius (I, i, 294), to demonstrate his loyalty 
to the newly crowned Saturnus. This cold Roman stoicism – 
which puts country before family, and group allegiance before 
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individual bond – feels alien in Shakespeare’s canon. Another 
example, less shocking but just as extreme, is Hotspur in 
1 Henry IV: perhaps the living embodiment of masculine 
loyalty. His passion for fi ghting the traitorous enemy is such 
that he gives it greater priority than having sex with wife. 
He has no time for individual relationships and thus, as per 
Baumeister and Sommer, seems independent. Hotspur’s is a 
hyper-masculine world defi ned by tribal confl ict:
This is no world
To play with mammets and to tilt with lips.
We must have bloody noses and cracked crowns (II, iii, 84–6)
But here, as seemingly everywhere in his works, Shakespeare’s 
overwhelming interest is not in this hyper-masculine world, 
but in the feminine loyalty between individuals. As much as 
the political battles rage in the background of the Henriad, 
surely the key dramatic – and, indeed, moral – concern in 
these plays is the friendship between Hal and Falstaff. Is there 
a more crushing moment of personal betrayal in Shakespeare 
than ‘I know thee not, old man’ (2 Henry IV, V, v, 45)? The 
fat knight fails virtually every test of the honour system that 
binds homosocial group hierarchies in the play – a man who 
thinks honour is a ‘mere scutcheon’ (1 Henry IV, V, i, 139) 
has no place in Hotspur’s world – yet Shakespeare gives 
Falstaff’s relationship with Hal vital importance in his retell-
ing of this passage of history. Furthermore, and perhaps 
tellingly, Falstaff’s catechism on honour is vindicated: he sur-
vives the battle, while Hotspur is killed. Through his friend-
ship with Hal, Falstaff claims the glory of the kill: ‘For my 
part, if a lie may do thee grace / I’ll gild it with the happiest 
terms I have’ (V, iv, 151–2). Individual loyalty seems to trump 
group loyalty in 1 Henry IV, which is perhaps why it is so 
devastating when it breaks down in 2 Henry IV.
However, the fact that he emphasised feminine, two-person 
loyalty over masculine group loyalty in this way does not 
mean that Shakespeare’s concept of loyalty is individualistic. 
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V. G. Kiernan’s essay of 1964, ‘Human Relations in Shake-
speare’, remains one of the most compelling treatments of this 
topic. It outlines how the plays are full of what Kiernan calls, 
echoing William Hazlitt, ‘a golden readiness of fellow-feeling 
for the world’.10 Here characters are never wholly disconnected 
from other people but inextricably constituted by their indi-
vidual relations:
Shakespeare-criticism, growing up in days of fully-fl edged 
individualism, was apt to fi x its attention on characters as 
separate units, ‘portraits’, each a work of art in itself. Some 
of Shakespeare’s own words show him thinking rather of 
the individual as the sum of his relationships, actual or 
possible, with his fellows. Brutus has to see himself in the 
mirror of Cassius’s mind before his duty becomes clear to 
him. . . . Shakespeare was concerned with men in combina-
tion, interacting, entering into one another’s lives, becom-
ing part of one another.11 
For Kiernan, Shakespeare fears not so much the breakdown 
of social hierarchies, as is so commonly suggested, but rather 
the disintegration of the bonds of friendship:
It has been often enough or too often said that Shakespeare 
had a horror of anarchy, of social disorder; what really hor-
rifi ed him was not any breakdown of ‘order’ in the police-
man’s understanding of the word, but something more 
fundamental, the destruction of men’s faith in one another 
that is always liable to accompany the break-up of an old 
social pattern whether authority remains intact or not. . . . 
Disloyalty and ingratitude are two of the sins he condemns 
most eloquently, and if he so habitually censures men by 
comparing them with brute beasts, what he has against the 
animals is, surely, their incapability of fellow-feeling.12 
Indeed, as I argued in Chapter 6, it seems that Shakespeare’s 
concept of authority is tied closely with this notion of 
‘fellow-feeling’, as manifest in mutual good service between 
servant and master. 
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However, the ethics of friendship differ from the ethics of 
good service because there is no hierarchy as is implied by the 
terms ‘master’ and ‘servant’. Aristotle dedicates two books 
of the Nicomachean Ethics to friendship.13 In his characteris-
tic manner, Cicero duly Romanised Aristotle’s ideas, focusing 
on practice rather than theory in his treatise on the topic, De 
Amicitia (‘On Friendship’).14 Shakespeare would undoubtedly 
have encountered this standard Latin text in his schooldays at 
Stratford. Aristotle ranks three levels of friendship:
1. Utility: the useful friend is someone we can rely on 
when we need something.
2. Pleasure: the pleasurable friend is someone who can 
make us laugh or otherwise entertain us.
3. Complete friendship: someone for whom you wish good 
things for their own sake, and for no other reason. 
Clearly, we should aim for the third: in everyday parlance, 
we would say that the fi rst two are merely on the level of 
acquaintance, and only the third is ‘true friendship’. The 
Aristotelean–Ciceronian view of friendship is predicated on 
an equal partnership between ‘good men’; without virtue it 
cannot exist. However, such an arrangement in its purest 
form is rarely achieved, to the extent that Cicero can name 
only four examples in history. In its most ideal incarnation, 
amicitia perfecta (‘perfect friendship’), it becomes a neces-
sary condition for the summum bonum or highest good. 
Literary historians have long pointed out that Cicero’s con-
cept of ideal friendship became something of a craze in 
sixteenth-century England; it was a cultural phenomenon 
that peaked during the late Elizabethan era. The classic study 
is Laurens J. Mills’s One Soul in Bodies Twain: Friendship in 
Tudor Literature and Stuart Drama (1937), but the topic has 
received greater attention in the past two decades in major 
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scholarly studies.15 Of these, the most useful for our purposes 
is Tom MacFaul’s Male Friendship in Shakespeare and His 
Contemporaries (2007), not only because it deals directly 
with Shakespeare’s plays, but also because of its clear-eyed 
distinction between the fantasy of the classical ideal – espe-
cially the notion that friendships should be equal – and the 
imperfect reality of actual friendships. 
And so we return to a persistent feature of many of 
Shakespeare’s friendships: their one-sidedness. They fail the 
‘preliberal utopian’ ideal of equality in every respect at the 
fi rst hurdle.16 Why does Antonio give so much of himself 
to Bassanio in The Merchant of Venice while receiving so 
little in return? It is a question that has puzzled critics for 
many years. In Tom MacFaul’s reading, the mismatch occurs 
because Antonio tries to transcend the mercantile norms of 
Venetian society:
Venice is a mercantile society, in which too much idealism 
about love or other matters cannot thrive. Antonio nev-
ertheless tries to rise above his station within this society. 
Bassanio, in contrast to this, is fully adjusted to the mer-
cantile world. His ideas regarding love and friendship are 
all bound up with money. . . . It is beyond his imagination 
to see friendship as more than a matter of give-and-take.17 
As Tzachi Zamir puts it, Antonio’s dream of idealised friend-
ship is ‘contaminated by fi nancial dependency’.18 Bassanio 
not only sees the relationship in transactional terms, but 
also runs up a defi cit – monetarily and emotionally – with 
seemingly no intention of settling the balance. And, as if to 
underline the stark imbalance of the relationship, Antonio 
does not even expect him to settle. 
Such is the level of this imbalance that it has driven some 
critics to incredulity. Arthur Temple Cadoux, for example, 
cannot take Antonio at face value. He views him as little more 
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than a poser, of a ‘histrionic bent’, full of ‘self-deception’.19 
Cadoux seemingly cannot process the idea that Antonio’s 
generosity could be for real. The opposite extreme is found 
in J. A. Bryant’s view, which elevates him to a Christ-like fi g-
ure.20 In the year of 1960–1, Essays in Criticism staged some 
interesting exchanges on this topic, taking a more sympa-
thetic view of the character. Graham Midgley advanced the 
idea that ‘Antonio is an outsider because he is an uncon-
scious homosexual in a predominantly, and indeed blatantly, 
heterosexual society.’21 In this reading, Antonio is Shylock’s 
mirror – he is to the world of love and marriage as the Jew 
is to Venetian society – both men are studies in loneliness. 
Naturally, this gained purchase in subsequent years: for exam-
ple, A. D. Nuttall concludes that such is the inequality of their 
relationship that it must reveal Antonio’s ‘profound homo-
sexual love’ for Bassanio.22 Midgley found swift rebuke from 
M. G. Deshpande, who, in the historicist–corrective mode, 
argued that the private and quiet loneliness he attributes to 
Antonio is ‘typically modern; the concept of any individual as 
an outsider was not within the general consciousness of the 
Renaissance’.23 This was enough to stir E. M. W. Tillyard, at 
this point in his seventies and one year from his death, who 
weighed in on Midgley’s side with common sense: ‘To say 
that Shakespeare was incapable of picturing such a contrast 
because the average Elizabethan was incapable of doing so is 
as great an error as to fashion him in the form of a twentieth-
century intellectual.’24 It turns out Elizabethan people could 
get lonely too. As Alan Bray has shown since, there is much 
evidence of same-sex love in the period.25 Harold Bloom, 
meanwhile, postulated that Antonio’s selfl essness has less to 
do with his homosexuality than it has with his ‘sadomasoch-
ism’.26 Kenneth Muir insisted that these psychological read-
ings are a ‘distortion’ of the play: ‘we need to remember that 
Elizabethan friendships were frequently passionate, though 
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usually platonic’. And, in any case, Antonio’s melancholy 
is purely a function of the drama, ‘to prepare the audience 
for disaster’.27 These explanations, though not implausible, 
still somehow seem strangely unsatisfactory. It seems as if the 
critics personally struggle to make sense of Antonio’s selfl ess 
behaviour and so generate post hoc rationalisations for it. 
I think that one reason for this is that Bassanio seems 
such a shallow and vapid young man and critics feel that 
he is unworthy of Antonio’s affections and efforts. As J. A. 
Bryant put it, ‘Criticism has struggled with Bassanio for 
a long time, the problem being to justify the interest that 
Antonio and Portia take in him.’28 His fecklessness is diffi cult 
to ignore, and few are taken in by his blustery promise dur-
ing Shylock’s trial:
Antonio, I am married to a wife
Which is as dear to me as life itself;
But life itself, my wife, and all the world
Are not with me esteemed above thy life.
I would lose all – ay, sacrifi ce them all
Here to this devil – to deliver you. (IV, i, 280–5)
Does anyone believe this? There seems a marked gap between 
what Bassanio says and what he actually does. Nuttall certainly 
does not believe him. He is especially disdainful of Bassanio’s 
‘moral thinness’ and wonders, as if out loud, ‘How can Portia, 
who could have had anyone (including that very nice Prince of 
Morocco), love Bassanio?’29 Similarly, Bloom seems at a loss 
to explain what anyone sees in Bassanio, who, though ‘not a 
bad fellow’, has little else to recommend him. ‘If you compare 
Portia’s Bassanio to Rosalind’s Orlando, obviously you will 
prefer the amiable young wrestler of As You Like It.’30 
Bloom compares Bassanio and Orlando because they 
are both male, but structurally, the more natural compari-
son point is between Bassanio and Rosalind. In both plays, 
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a friend helps the romantic lead pursue the object of their 
affection, and does so through love. It just so happens that 
the romantic lead of As You Like It is a woman with a female 
friend pursuing a man, while in The Merchant of Venice it 
is a man with a male friend pursuing a woman. To make the 
structural similarity as plain as possible, I have constructed 
Table 7.2.
Table 7.2
Friend Romantic lead Object of affection
Antonio Bassanio Portia
Celia Rosalind Orlando
It does not occur to critics as regularly to ask what Celia or 
Orlando sees in Rosalind as they ask what Antonio or Portia 
sees in Bassanio. It is not diffi cult to see why: she dazzles the 
stage and dominates the action. But if we are studying what 
friendship means to Shakespeare, the worth of the friend sub-
jectively evaluated by a critic should not matter. Is Rosalind 
somehow more worthy of devotion than Bassanio because 
the likes of Nuttall and Bloom do not like him? It seems to 
me that the moral concepts of friendship and loyalty cannot 
work like this. We must try to get beyond our own judge-
ments of individual characters. Even so, if Bassanio were 
more like Rosalind, would we better understand Antonio’s 
devotion to him? 
We scarcely need to imagine this because Shakespeare 
runs exactly this variable with Celia in the place of Antonio.
You know my father hath no child but I, nor none is like 
to have; and truly when he dies, thou shalt be his heir; for 
what he hath taken away from thy father perforce, I will 
render thee again in affection. (As You Like It, 1.2.16–19) 
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I do not think Antonio is any more devoted or any more selfl ess 
than is Celia. She not only abandons her father for Rosalind, 
but also pledges her future inheritance to her. If anything, this is 
a bigger price than that Antonio was prepared to pay because 
we should remember that he expected his ships to return: 
Why, fear not man: I will not forfeit it.
Within these two months – that’s a month before
This bond expires – I do expect return
Of thrice times the value of this bond. (The Merchant of 
Venice, I, iii, 149–53)
When Antonio agrees to the conditions of the loan, he does 
not expect that he is really wagering a pound of his own fl esh, 
whereas when Celia pledges herself to Rosalind, she is really 
sacrifi cing her own fortune for her. If there is a question of 
whether Celia is really Antonio’s moral equal, in the material 
terms of self-sacrifi ce the advantage is in Celia’s favour. But 
it seems to me that in both cases, Shakespeare intended for 
us to take these as morally good characters because of their 
loyalty and devotion in friendship. 
By insisting on reading Shakespeare’s friendships 
through the lenses of gender and sexuality, it appears that 
some scholars may have missed the fact that very little sepa-
rates Antonio and Celia. They are both ready to lose every-
thing for a friend who may never repay them in kind. As I 
have suggested, this is because loyalty between friends in 
Shakespeare invariably takes a ‘feminine’ form – that is, 
centred on a bond between two people, as opposed to the 
bond between individual and group – regardless of whether 
the friends are male or female. Back in 1903, Richard G. 
Moulton argued that Antonio must be understood as ‘the 
most ideal of characters . . . not simply a Christian . . ., but 
a supremely noble Christian . . . a combination of dignifi ed 
strength with almost womanly tenderness towards his young 
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friend’.31 Within the world of the play, Antonio stands apart 
from the groupish male bonding we see in the laddish ban-
ter of his and Bassanio’s mutual friends: Lorenzo, Graziano, 
Salerio and Solanio. These characters, the ‘masquing mates’ 
(II, vi, 60), form a pack in the play, between them repre-
senting something like the whole of Venetian society. As 
Marianne Novy puts it, they are ‘suffi ciently uncharacterized 
that they may represent the dominant biases of the play’s 
Venice’.32 They fi rmly establish a sense of an in-group and 
an out-group. We see them bullying Shylock (III, i, 17–43), 
which triggers his famous ‘Hath not a Jew eyes?’ speech (III, 
i, 44–60). Although Shylock is a proud man, the logic of his 
speech is to focus on the common humanity and similarities 
between the Christian in-group and the Jewish out-group. 
This has been commented on many times but how quickly 
it falls on deaf ears. No sooner has he fi nished than Solanio 
reinforces his status as a member of the out-group: ‘Here 
comes another of the tribe; a third cannot be matched unless 
the devil himself turn Jew’ (III, i, 64–5).
Hence there is an uneasy tension in The Merchant of 
Venice between these masculine social bonds of group loy-
alty and the feminine bonds of two-person loyalty. Antonio 
is fi rmly a member of the in-group, but in choosing to focus 
on loyalty in its more feminine form, he stands apart and, 
as per those who see him as a fi gure of loneliness, outside 
that group – ‘a tainted wether of the fl ock’ (IV, i, 113). We 
can also glimpse this effect when Jessica disguises herself 
as a boy and escapes her father’s claustrophobic control by 
running away with Lorenzo. Graziano foregrounds the soci-
etal contexts of their impending union: ‘Now by my hood, 
a gentle and no Jew’ (II, vi, 52). But Lorenzo immediately 
refocuses attention to the two-person bond:
Beshrew me, but I love her heartily;
For she is wise, if I can judge of her;
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And fair she is, if that mine eyes be true;
And true she is, as she hath proved herself. (II, vi, 53–6)
It is as if feminine two-person bonds pose a kind of exis-
tential threat to the bonds of masculine group loyalty. 
Although Jessica travels with the group disguised as a boy, 
and Graziano symbolically embraces her as a new member 
of the in-group (‘a gentle, and no Jew’), Lorenzo, by insist-
ing on her individual qualities and their special two-person 
bond, just as quickly places her (and indeed himself) apart 
from the group.
This tension between masculine in-group social bonds and 
feminine two-person bonds is perhaps even more marked in 
As You Like It. Paul A. Kottman spots it in his analysis:
By offering ‘in affection’ what Duke Frederick would render 
by paternal authority, Celia aims to bind herself to Rosalind 
independently of preexistent kinship or political ties – and, 
thus, her affection is perceived as a threat to the durability 
and viability of those other ties.33 
Celia explicitly rejects kin loyalty in favour of friendship: the 
bond between her and Rosalind is stronger than that between 
father and daughter. And, in the end, this bond is enough to 
bring down Duke Frederick, restore Duke Senior and reconcile 
Orlando and Oliver. In As You Like It, feminine two-person 
loyalty trumps masculine group loyalty. 
However, we have not yet got to the bottom of the inequal-
ity problem, which makes characters like Antonio and Celia 
apparently so diffi cult for us to grasp. Even a perceptive 
observer of morality in Shakespeare such as Alfred Harbage 
complains of Shakespeare’s frequent ‘failure to reward the 
good’ characters and puts it down to ‘sheer forgetfulness’ or 
‘irresponsibility’ on the playwright’s part.34 Harbage seems 
to be operating under the expectations of literary conven-
tion and genre. But as we saw in Chapter 5, generations 
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of critics who have turned to the playwright looking for 
divine or cosmic justice have been disappointed. As Stephen 
Greenblatt points out, ‘Shakespeare did not think that one’s 
good actions are necessarily or even usually rewarded.’35 In 
Shakespeare’s moral universe, there is no reason to expect 
characters, whether good or evil, to get their just deserts. In 
the constrained or tragic vision, life is frequently unfair, and 
to criticise Shakespeare’s plays for refl ecting this is to judge 
them against a utopian ideal (see Chapter 2). However, at 
the same time, it seems to me that many of our struggles 
with the inequities between Antonio and Bassanio, and Celia 
and Rosalind, come from an emotional and moral place. 
Intuitively, we feel something is not quite right. This is because 
the disproportionate nature of these friendships offends the 
moral foundation of fairness. Is Bassanio taking advantage 
of Antonio? Is Rosalind taking advantage of Celia? This nag-
ging feeling will not leave us. 
I think the key tension here is between the Christian con-
cept of charity manifested as friendship, and what evolution-
ary theorists call reciprocal altruism (see Chapter 1). While 
the recent studies I discussed earlier in this chapter have 
concentrated on the early modern vogue for classical ide-
als of friendship, they neglect the most important Christian 
interpreter of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas.36 In Virtue’s Own 
Feature (1995), David N. Beauregard argues that Shake-
speare often depicts Aristotelian–Thomistic triads of vir-
tues and vices in his plays. For example, in The Merchant of 
Venice, he thinks Antonio represents the virtue of liberality 
while Bassanio and Shylock represent the vices of prodigal-
ity and avarice, respectively.37 I disagree: this surely makes 
Shakespeare more didactic and moralising than he is. There 
is scant evidence in the play that Bassanio is some sort of 
warning against prodigality, and Shakespeare’s depiction 
of liberality elsewhere – Timon of Athens most obviously – 
suggests that his view of the supposed virtue is much more 
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pessimistic than that of Aquinas. Instead, I posit that the 
chief virtue embodied in Antonio (and also Celia) is charity.38 
In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas answers the question 
‘is charity a friendship?’
According to Aristotle, not all love has the character of 
friendship, but that only which goes with well wishing, 
namely when we so love another as to will what is good for 
him. For if what we will is our own good, as when we love 
wine or a horse or the like, it is not a love of friendship but 
of desire. It makes no sense of somebody being friends with 
wine or a horse.39
As I outlined above, Aristotle made a distinction between rela-
tionships based on utility or pleasure, and ‘complete friend-
ship’ based only on goodwill for the other. Plainly, Aquinas 
does not consider the former types of relationship to be friend-
ship at all. He continues:
Yet goodwill alone is not enough for friendship for this 
requires a mutual loving; it is only with a friend that a 
friend is friendly. But such reciprocal good is based on 
something in common. . . . Now the love which is based on 
this sort of fellowship is charity.40 
This is very similar to V. G. Kiernan’s concept of ‘fellow-
feeling’. Although ‘mutual loving’ implies a certain reciproc-
ity, note that Aquinas insists neither upon equality between 
friends, nor that the recipient of charity should repay any 
favours in kind. In fact, he widens the scope of charity and 
friendship to an extraordinary degree:
Friendship goes out to another in two ways. When he is 
loved in himself, and such friendship is only for a friend; 
and when he is loved of another person, as when for the 
sake of a friend you love those belonging to him, be they 
children, servants or anyone connected with him at all, 
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even if they hurt or hate us, so much do we love him. In this 
way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, 
for we love them for the sake of God who is principal in 
our loving. . . . In a friendship of true worth we love princi-
pally a man of virtue, though out of regard for him we love 
all who belong to him, even if they are not virtuous. In this 
way, charity, which above all is friendship, reaches out to 
sinners whom we love for God’s sake.41
Here the ‘fellow-feeling’ between two friends extends to 
include practically all of mankind. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
although evolutionary theorists are currently divided on the 
human capacity for true altruism, virtually all of them would 
reject the idea that we could operate on this universal level. 
Advocates of reciprocal altruism would object to the idea 
that charity without some sort of quid pro quo payback could 
get us very far in non-kin relations. Advocates of group- or 
multi-level selection would maintain that, while altruism is 
possible, it is naïve, bordering on reckless, to think that it can 
transcend the in-group.
Shakespeare is perhaps too much the realist to expect any 
characters to live up to Aquinas’s ideals of universality. For 
example, although Antonio shows Bassanio outstanding love 
and charity, he stops short of extending these to Shylock, 
who quite obviously stands outside his in-group. In As You 
Like It, Celia clearly makes herself and Rosalind an exclusive 
in-group, with her own father placed outside of it. Indeed, 
she inculcates a kind of siege mentality – those two against 
the world – pledging that they will ‘love no man in good 
earnest’ (I, ii, 22–3). Just as in the evolutionary theory of 
group selection, friendship and charity do not transcend the 
in-group in Shakespeare. However, within those boundaries, 
he appears to inherit Aquinas’s ideal of friendship as char-
ity wholesale. This is somewhat in keeping with what Haidt 
would expect: 
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Whatever Christ said about the good Samaritan who helped 
an injured Jew, if religion is a group-level adaptation, then 
it should produce parochial altruism. It should make people 
exceedingly generous and helpful toward members of their 
own moral communities, particularly when their reputations 
will be enhanced. And indeed, religion does exactly this.42
Whatever Shakespeare’s attitude toward Shylock, in the 
world of The Merchant of Venice good Samaritans do not 
tend to help injured Jews, even though examples of parochial 
altruism abound in the play. However, as we have seen, what 
is remarkable about Shakespeare’s treatment of parochial 
altruism is that it does not seem to play out on a group level. 
He fractures ‘moral communities’ into two-person relation-
ships. We fi nd characters such as Antonio and Celia acting 
in exceedingly generous ways towards their friends, but this 
is not based on (masculine) group loyalty but on (feminine) 
individual relationships.
In this chapter, we have seen that Shakespeare’s notion 
of loyalty is unusually nuanced. He persistently empha-
sises two-person relationships based on ‘fellow-feeling’, as 
opposed to the relationship between individual and group 
based on power or status. In his plays, individual friendships 
frequently retain the capacity to trump family bonds. From 
Aristotle and Cicero, he takes the notion of ‘complete friend-
ship’, but loses the ideals of equality and reciprocity. From 
Aquinas, he takes the notion of friendship as charity, but 
loses the ideal of extending this to all people, including the 
enemies of loved ones or members of out-groups. The price 
of loyalty may be that it results in unfair relationships with 
disproportionate levels of give and take. But despite this, it 
is obvious that Shakespeare sees loyalty – understood in this 
way, and as embodied in characters such as Antonio in The 
Merchant of Venice and Celia in As You Like It – as being 
unconditionally good.
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In summary
• Psychological and sociological studies have found that men tend 
to prioritise group-level relations for power and status while 
women put place greater emphasis on two-person relationships.
• Shakespeare roots his concept of loyalty in feminine two-person 
relationships as opposed to the masculine group level.
• His two-person friendships are often imbalanced, with one per-
son (the loyal friend) appearing to give more to the relationship 
than the other, and in so being fail the classical ideals of equality 
and reciprocity in friendship outlined by Aristotle and Cicero.
• Critics have struggled to account for why Antonio gives so 
much of himself to Bassanio in The Merchant of Venice. In 
trying to justify this, they have cast Antonio variously as an 
attention-seeking poser, a Christ-like saviour, a lonely homo-
sexual, a sadomasochist and a mere function of dramatic plot.
• The relationship between Celia and Rosalind in As You Like 
It mirrors that between Antonio and Bassanio. Like Antonio’s, 
Celia’s selfl essness in her loyalty to Rosalind is remarkable.
• In both plays, feminine two-person loyalty presents an exis-
tential threat to, and perhaps even trumps, masculine group 
loyalty.
• The unbalanced nature of Shakespeare’s friendships offends 
the moral foundation of fairness, but the selfl ess loyalty of 
Antonio and Celia seems to appeal to the Christian concept 
of charity, as outlined by Thomas Aquinas, even if they do 
not fully live up to its ideals of universal inclusivity.
• Loyalty, defi ned as a selfl ess and charitable yet exclusive 
commitment to a friend, is undoubtedly a key point on 
Shakespeare’s moral compass.
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CHAPTER 8
FAIRNESS
Fairness concerns itself with proportionality, not equality. It is 
a question of reciprocity – ‘just desserts’, what one deserves – 
rather than egalitarian distribution. Imagine you are working 
on a project with two colleagues, P and Q. P puts in a lot of 
effort, appearing to work beyond what would be expected in 
order to get the job done; Q appears to contribute very little to 
the project, is frequently missing from meetings, misses inter-
nal deadlines, and takes days off in the middle of the week to 
concentrate on their leisure activities. P, it seems to you, puts 
in just as much work as you do, if not more, whereas Q is not 
at all pulling their weight. Eventually, perhaps because of the 
efforts of P, and despite the efforts of Q, the project achieves 
its goals and attention turns to the question of remuneration. 
Is it fair that Q should be paid the same amount as you and P? 
To most people, it is not fair, and feelings of injustice or being 
wronged in some way are both natural and universal.1 This 
chapter will focus on how Shakespeare tends to depict such 
feelings as a key motivation for revenge and, if unchecked, a 
possible route to villainy, evil and even societal collapse. This 
is because the desire for revenge fuels selfi sh or self-seeking 
behaviour – the antithesis of fairness – and thus unfairness 
begets unfairness. Human groups that lack any sense of fair-
ness and in which individuals have become wholly selfi sh 
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cannot fl ourish. I will focus chiefl y on Richard III’s primary 
motivation for revenge, Hamlet’s refusal to kill Claudius when 
he is praying, the Duke’s pardon of Angelo in Measure for 
Measure, and Edmund’s motivations in King Lear.
In a robust study, which cites over a hundred books and 
papers on fairness and equality from across psychology, soci-
ology and evolutionary studies, Christina Starmans, Mark 
Sheskin and Paul Bloom have shown that, when all other fac-
tors are equal, human beings show a preference for equality of 
outcome, but this is almost always trumped by the principle of 
proportional fairness. Indeed, this strong propensity towards 
and sensitivity to fairness, as opposed to equality, is an evolu-
tionary trait in humans, developed to reward and punish good 
and bad actors for the benefi t of the group: 
For cooperation and prosociality to evolve, there has to be 
some solution to the problem of free-riders, cheaters, and 
bad actors. The usual explanation for this is that we have 
evolved a propensity to make bad behaviour costly and good 
behaviour benefi cial, through punishment and reward. That 
is, we respond differently to individuals based on what one 
can see as their ‘deservingness’ – responses that are present 
even in infants. It’s possible that fairness intuitions more 
generally develop from this moral foundation.2 
The rewards and punishment are not only material but also 
social. Selfi sh individuals are shunned, whereas cooperative 
individuals are included. However, because we are human 
beings and not, say, ants or termites, there must be a trade-
off between altruism and self-interest. 
[C]ooperative individuals gain benefi ts from being included 
and selfi sh individuals lose out on those benefi ts by being 
shunned. But individuals who are too cooperative – too 
generous – run the risk of being taken advantage of by oth-
ers. So a balance must be struck. To treat everyone equally 
would entail penalization of more productive individuals 
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when they collaborate with less productive individuals 
relative to highly productive individuals. In contrast with 
equality, fairness allows individuals with different levels 
of productivity to share the benefi ts of their collabora-
tion proportionately. This focus on fairness is particularly 
important for humans (compared with even our closest 
evolutionary relatives), due to the critical importance of 
collaboration in human hunting and foraging.3 
Either extreme, pure selfi shness or pure altruism, is more 
likely to lead to net negative material and social outcomes 
than net benefi ts, and in the worst cases will result in the 
individual being killed. Such fi ndings would not have been 
surprising for Niccolò Machiavelli, who advised a pragmatic 
balance between the two.4
One interesting fi nding is that just as proportionality is 
a central feature of fairness, disproportionality is a central 
feature of selfi shness: 
[P]eople have selfi sh motivations, but . . . these desires are 
not always for increasing one’s absolute amount, but are 
often for increasing one’s standing relative to others. For 
example, studies of income and happiness have revealed that, 
once a basic level of wealth is achieved, relative wealth is 
more important for overall happiness. Similarly, a vast body 
of research in social psychology fi nds that people engage 
in constant comparison of themselves with others. . . . 
Five-year-olds often reject equal payouts of two prize tokens 
for themselves and two prize tokens for another child, and 
choose instead only one token for themselves, if that means 
that the other child will get none.5 
We typically think of such behaviour as spiteful and ‘unfair’, 
which is an intuitive moral response to a behaviour that 
seems rooted in our constrained natures. In this way, unfair-
ness is defi ned, above all else, by selfi shness.
Where Shakespeare evokes unfairness, villainy usually 
follows. Experience has not been ‘fair’ to Richard III, Aaron 
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in Titus Andronicus, Shylock in The Merchant of Venice, 
Malvolio in Twelfth Night or Edmund in King Lear, and all 
of them are determined to prove themselves villains. Shake-
speare depicts fairness almost always from the individual, 
psychological perspective, as opposed to the cosmic or dis-
interested third-party view. Thus, in As You Like It, despite 
Louis Montrose’s famous arguments to the contrary,6 we are 
not led to dwell too deeply on the disproportionate treat-
ment of Oliver and Orlando by their father because Orlando 
himself does not articulate much in the way of grievance. 
Contrast this with King Lear’s reaction to his treatment at 
the hands of Goneril and Regan when they refuse to host a 
hundred of his retinue, and quite a different story emerges. 
I gave you all . . . Made you my guardians, my depositaries,
But kept a reservation to be followed
With such a number. (King Lear, II, iii, 244, 246–8)
Lear feels that it is unfair that his daughters are not main-
taining the conditions he had outlined when he gave them his 
lands, and very quickly seeks justice in the form of revenge:
I will have such revenges on you both
That all the world shall – I will do such things – 
What they are, yet I know not, but they shall be
The terrors of the earth. (King Lear, II, iii, 274–7)
Lear’s revenge is motivated by a sense of injustice. Similarly, 
Malvolio, who ‘hath been most notoriously abused’ (Twelfth 
Night, V, i, 365) by Sir Toby, Feste and Maria – far in excess 
of his actual wrong-doings – is last seen swearing ‘I’ll be 
revenged on the whole pack of you’ (V, i, 364). And Shylock 
seeks to ‘feed’ his ‘revenge (The Merchant of Venice, I, iii, 
45) because he feels that Antonio has treated him terribly 
unfairly: ‘He hath disgraced me and hindered me half a mil-
lion, laughed at my losses, mocked at my gains, scorned my 
nation, thwarted my bargains, cooled my friends, heated mine 
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enemies, and what’s his reason? I am a Jew’ (I, iii, 45–9). In 
each case, unfairness drives spite and revenge. 
To my knowledge, the two most thoroughgoing recent 
studies on Shakespeare and fairness are Tzachi Zamir’s Double 
Vision: Moral Philosophy and Shakespearean Drama (2007), 
which has a long chapter focusing on ‘A Case of Unfair Pro-
portions’ in Richard III,7 and Linda Woodbridge’s English 
Revenge Drama: Money, Resistance, Equality (2010), which 
provides a detailed historical overview of attitudes to fairness 
in the early modern period.8 Although they do not reference 
any of the psychological material from which I have been 
drawing – or, indeed, each other – both authors are acutely 
aware of the link between unfairness and revenge. However, in 
my view, neither of them captures Shakespeare’s tragic sense of 
the continuity between unfairness and selfi shness: if our sense 
of fairness is offended, the desire for revenge and the welling 
up of emotions invariably give sway to our worst instincts of 
self-interest and self-preservation.
In a nuanced and penetrating argument, Zamir concludes 
that Richard III confronts its central character’s ‘radical eth-
ical skepticism’, which turns out to be little more than ‘a 
defi ciency in knowing’.9 Richard misperceives the motives 
of others and fails to see the real complexity of the world. 
Zamir correctly points out that Richard does not even enter-
tain the possibility that Anne could really love him, although 
I would reject his claim that Anne’s ‘positive response to 
Richard’s wooing is [so] outrageously unmotivated’ that it 
might be explained by a ‘sexual pull’ towards him.10 As I 
argued in a previous study, Anne’s reaction is best under-
stood as her reaching out for a brief respite from suffering, 
a momentary relief.11 Let us look again at Richard’s primary 
motivation:
I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
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. . . And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover
I am determinèd to prove a villain. (Richard III, I, i, 
18–19, 28, 30)
Zamir notes that, like Edmund in King Lear and Iago in 
Othello, Richard’s ‘villainy is vindictive’, but unlike theirs, 
his ‘vengeance seems to be general’ rather than directed at a 
particular person. The charge that ‘nature’ is ‘dissembling’ 
reveals that Richard thinks beauty is a false mask that cov-
ers up the true (evil) nature of human beings. However, ulti-
mately, this philosophising is just a ‘superfi cial excuse’, what 
in the terms of the present study we might call a post hoc 
rationalisation, because ‘his [real] preoccupation is with his 
ugliness’.12 Zamir’s suggestion is that so much of what drives 
Richard is his own paranoia, what he imagines others think 
of him, as opposed to the reality of the situation, which is 
one in which Anne might really have felt some attraction 
to him. While it is no doubt true that Richard is, or at least 
has become, paranoid, I see no reason for such an optimistic 
view of ‘reality’. Richard – at least the man that Shakespeare 
imagines, as opposed to the historical King – probably was 
treated differently for most of his life, and, as I suggested, 
very likely did not possess a sexual allure for Anne. 
If there is a moral point being made at all by Richard’s vil-
lainy, it is that life is not fair and we must, if we are to live the 
good life, make peace with that fact. How might the world 
be corrected to make it fairer for Richard? Should all the ugly 
people be subjected to corrective surgery to make them better-
looking, while all the most beautiful people are somehow dis-
fi gured to take away their unfair advantage? I am reminded 
of L. P. Hartley’s dystopian novel, Facial Justice, which takes 
such a premise as its plot.13 This is a nightmarish egalitarian-
ism for which no sane person would wish. Individuals are not 
created with entirely equal traits, and this is something every-
one must live with for the greater good. In this realisation 
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lies the heart of the tragic, or constrained, vision I outlined in 
Chapter 2. In Measure for Measure, Claudio recognises this, 
echoing Paul in Romans 9: 15:
Thus can the demigod Authority
Make us pay down for our offense by weight.
The words of heaven; on whom it will, it will,
On whom it will not, so; yet still ’tis just. (I, i, 109–12)
As I discussed when outlining John Calvin’s theology in 
Chapter 4, God’s grace touches some people but not others, 
just as some people are good-looking and others ‘cheated of 
feature’. This is obviously ‘not fair’ but it is still ‘just’, because 
to rail against this is to go the way of Richard III: a direction-
less revenge that can resolve only in empty self-interest and 
preservation. Justice is not a levelling egalitarianism; it is the 
proportionate relationship of one thing to another, as sug-
gested by the title Measure for Measure. 
Once again, we can turn to Thomas Aquinas and natural 
law for a defi nition of justice that would have been embedded 
in early modern society:
The proper characteristic of justice, as compared with the 
other moral virtues, is to govern a man in his dealings 
towards others. It implies a certain balance of equality, as 
its very name shows, for in common speech things are said 
to be adjusted when they match evenly. Equality is relative 
to another. The other moral virtues, however, compose a 
man for activities which befi t him considered in himself. 
So then that which is correct in their working and which 
is the proper object of their bent is not thought of save in 
relation to the doer. Whereas with justice, in addition to 
this, that which is correct is constituted by a relation to 
another, for a work of ours is said to be just when it meets 
another on the level, as with the payment of a fair wage for 
a service rendered.14 
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This idea of justice is based fi rmly on the fairness of propor-
tionality, not on egalitarianism. Richard might feel that he 
is the victim of an unjust and cruel world, but based on this 
defi nition, he has no justifi cation for seeking revenge on it. 
But what if someone had a just reason to seek revenge? We 
might think of Hamlet. Surely, here, where Claudius has taken 
the life of Old Hamlet, based on this idea of proportional fair-
ness, his son has just cause for vengeance? Here is Aquinas:
Vengeance is accomplished by some punishment being 
infl icted upon one who has given offence. In vengeance, 
therefore, the attitude of the avenger must be considered. 
Should his intention be centred chiefl y upon the evil done 
to the recipient and is satisfi ed with that, then the act is 
entirely unlawful. Taking delight in evil done to another is 
in fact a type of hatred, the opposite of that charity with 
which we are bound to love all. Nor is there any excuse just 
because the evil is intended towards one who has himself 
unjustly infl icted injury, even as there is no excuse for hat-
ing someone who already hates us. A person has no right 
to sin against another because the other fi rst sinned against 
him; this is to be overcome by evil, which St. Paul forbids, 
Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.15 
Based on these criteria, Hamlet is on dubious moral grounds 
because, while he plainly does not take ‘delight’ in his revenge 
mission to kill Claudius, he purposely wishes to do it in the 
most hateful and spiteful manner possible. He does not wish 
to murder Claudius while he is at prayer, not out of any 
respect for the sanctity of the Church, but because the idea 
of Claudius being forgiven for his sin and gaining admittance 
to Heaven sickens him. He prefers to wait instead for a time:
When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage,
Or in th’incestuous pleasure of his bed,
At game, a-swearing, or about some act
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That has no relish of salvation in’t.
Then trip him that his heels may kick at heaven
And that his soul may be as damned and black
As hell whereto it goes. (Hamlet, III, iii, 89–95)
Hamlet’s ‘intention’ is focused ‘chiefl y upon the evil done to 
the recipient’ and hence, at least according to Aquinas, his 
revenge is ‘unlawful’ in the eyes of God.
But as the theologian goes on to say, 
Vengeance, however, can be lawful – so long as all proper 
conditions are safeguarded – if the intention of the avenger is 
aimed chiefl y at a good to be achieved by punishing a wrong-
doer; thus, for example, at the correction of the wrongdoer, 
or at least at restraining him and relieving others; at safe-
guarding the right and doing honour to God.16 
To fi nd an example of this in Shakespeare, we must turn to 
one of his least emotionally satisfying instances of justice: when 
the Duke seems to punish Angelo at the end of Measure for 
Measure only by ensuring he stays married to Mariana. For 
the theatre audience, this certainly feels unsatisfactory because 
Angelo has been such a despicable hypocrite throughout the 
play, and so ready to execute other characters for lesser crimes; 
this is scarcely a punishment at all, especially given that 
Mariana loves him. It seems to us that he gets off very lightly:
By this Lord Angelo perceives he’s safe:
Methinks I see a quick’ning in his eye.
Well, Angelo, your evil quits you well.
Look that you love your wife, her worth worth yours.
I fi nd an apt remission in myself. (Measure for Measure, V, i, 
496–502)
But Angelo has been exposed and shamed in public and sub-
ject to what Aquinas calls, drawing on Cicero’s eight types 
of penalty in law, ‘disgrace (the ruin of his reputation)’.17 
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Incidentally, the other seven types are: death, fl ogging, retali-
ation, bondage, chains, exile and damages. If one assesses the 
net damages infl icted by Angelo on Claudio – he made him 
suffer the indignity of the experience of being arrested, being 
jailed, and desperately begging his sister, Isabella, to compro-
mise her sacred vows to save his life – then the punishment 
seems more proportionate. Claudio suffered disgrace and 
loss of reputation, perhaps permanently with his sister, and 
this is what Angelo also receives: the scales of justice are in 
balance. In Aquinas’s terms, we witness ‘the correction of the 
wrongdoer’: not only justice but also rehabilitation. And this 
would not have been possible with the harsher sentence that 
hot-headed vengeance would dictate. This is a judicial model 
of mercy, forgiveness and personal growth, and a restoration 
of true Christian justice after the tyrannical corruption of 
Angelo’s abuses of power.
In rejecting any impulses in Shakespeare towards egalitari-
anism, I fi nd myself at odds with Linda Woodbridge’s English 
Revenge Drama. While this is a valuable work of scholarship 
on fairness in the early modern period, at times – perhaps in 
the pursuit of a politically radical thesis – Woodbridge seems 
to mistake the fairness of proportionality for a levelling egali-
tarianism. She recognises that fairness concerns itself with pro-
portions. For example, she suggests that ‘revengers are often 
embittered over unrewarded merit’, and refl ected feelings that 
were widespread in Shakespeare’s audience:18
Unfairness was like the weather: everyone talked about it. 
But revenge plays did something about it. Many revengers 
are disempowered people, unjustly treated, who step up and 
take control. . . . But rather than viewing revenge through a 
lens of individual psychology, I suggest that the fairness fi xa-
tion and relish of vigilantism reveal widespread resentment of 
systemic unfairness – economic, political, and social – as the 
Renaissance witnessed severe disproportion between crime 
and punishment, between labor and its rewards.19 
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But, here, in creeps a utopian element to Woodbridge’s 
analysis that is at odds with the sensibilities of the 1590s 
and early 1600s. She seems to think that Shakespeare and 
his contemporaries anticipate the égalité of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and the French Revolutionaries, who were later 
infl uenced by his philosophy:
In three electrifying speeches by Shylock, Emilia, and 
Edmund, Shakespeare extends the radical thinking of his 
age into the realms of religious affi liation, ethnicity, gender 
equity, and legitimacy. Our blinkered dismissal of venge-
fulness castrates their radicalism. If we truly listen to these 
speeches, we’ll fi nd that the urge to get even harbored the 
germ of the idea that all men are created equal. . . . With its 
book-balancing devotion to equality, revenge fed into the 
broad stream of Renaissance egalitarianism. Revenge was 
never pleasant or morally uplifting. But audiences under-
stood it and emotionally validated it. And I propose that the 
ubiquitous Renaissance writings about revenge, the audi-
ence zest for revenge, are inextricable from the political, 
economic, and social radicalism of the age.20 
I am not persuaded of any such ‘social radicalism’ in these 
speeches.21 They powerfully register characters who feel that 
they have been unfairly treated, but the plays neither endorse 
revenge nor call for revolution. Shakespeare’s moral mode does 
not lend itself to the literature of political protest, and here, 
it seems, Woodbridge is projecting her own modern, progres-
sive, perhaps even socialistic sensibilities on to the past. The 
inherited wisdom in Shakespeare is closer to that cautioned 
by Ulysses in Troilus and Cressida: ‘Oh, let not virtue seek / 
Remuneration for the thing it was’ (III, iii, 167–8).
Let us look briefl y at just one of these speeches, Edmund’s 
in King Lear:
Thou, Nature, art my goddess; to thy law
My services are bound. Wherefore should I
Stand in the plague of custom and permit
The curiosity of nations to deprive me,
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For that I am some twelve or fourteen moonshines
Lag of a brother? Why ‘bastard’? Wherefore ‘base’,
When my dimensions are as well compact,
My mind as generous and my shape as true
As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us
With ‘base’? With ‘baseness’, ‘bastardy’? Base? Base?
Who, in the lusty stealth of nature, take
More composition and fi erce quality
Than doth within a dull, stale, tired bed
Go to th’ creating a whole tribe of fops
Got ’tween a sleep, and wake? Well, then,
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land.
Our father’s love is to the bastard Edmund
As to th’ legitimate. Fine word: ‘legitimate’!
Well, my legitimate, if this letter speed
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base
Shall to th’ legitimate. I grow. I prosper.
Now, gods, stand up for bastards! (King Lear, I, i, 1–22)
If Edmund anticipates a political philosopher here, it is assur-
edly not Rousseau, for whom all men are created equal, 
because he hints that in some ways he might be Edgar’s supe-
rior, not only because of the way he was conceived (in a ‘lusty’ 
as opposed to ‘dull, stale, tired bed’), but also because of the 
merits of his ‘invention’. And to an extent this is borne out as 
Edmund continually tricks his naïvely trusting brother in the 
next couple of scenes. In outlining this case, based on the ‘law’ 
of ‘Nature’, Edmund echoes Machiavelli22 and anticipates 
Thomas Hobbes. Indeed, in 1949, John F. Danby ‘maintained 
that Hobbes is Edmund’s philosopher’.23 Andrew Moore 
makes the most recent and fully articulated case for this:
Edmund is the prime example of a character who subscribes 
to the idea we are no different from animals, that we pri-
oritize self-preservation and bodily satisfaction over all else, 
and are essentially governed by instinctual processes beyond 
our control. Edmund has made a ‘goddess’ of this emergent 
nature (1.2.1). Consequently, he is completely self-interested. 
Morality and religion have no hold over him.24 
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Yet, he remains a villain because ‘Shakespeare recognises in 
our innate desire for security and felicity the simultaneous 
presence of communal and antisocial drives, and so antici-
pates the tension in Hobbes’s Leviathan between our natu-
ral passions and natural law.’25 Finding a ‘plague of custom’ 
that would hold him down because of a quirk of his birth, 
Edmund feels that the world is grossly unfair and so, fi lled 
with vengeance, he becomes the pure agent of self-seeking 
behaviour. In Edmund’s new order – which temporarily over-
throws Lear’s old order – we are in the world of the ruth-
less Chicago gangsters that Richard Dawkins imagines in The 
Selfi sh Gene:26 in other words, the Hobbesian state of nature. As 
evolutionary psychology maintains, however, pure selfi shness, 
just like pure altruism, cannot subsist for long and, accord-
ingly, Edmund’s successes are short-lived. In Why Nations Fail 
(2012), Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argue that 
nations cannot prosper without fair rules of cooperation and 
mutual trust under the rule of law,27 and in The Moral Foun-
dations of Economic Behaviour (2011), David C. Rose makes 
a similar case.28 A society with a complete absence of fair play, 
fi lled with ruthlessly selfi sh cheaters such as Edmund, Goneril, 
Cornwall and Regan, is doomed.
In this chapter, I have argued that fairness is concerned 
with proportionality, not a levelling egalitarianism, and that 
this is mirrored in Shakespeare’s treatment of the theme 
across several plays. In Shakespeare’s moral vision, when 
codes of fairness break down, revenge and rampant selfi sh-
ness, as manifest in villainy, are not far behind. A society in 
which a sense of fairness has given way to complete selfi sh-
ness risks complete collapse. However, to some extent, to 
ward against this risk for the greater good, we must also 
accept that life is ‘not fair’: we are not born equal in looks, 
talents, wealth and so on. The worst villains cannot accept 
this. Shakespeare’s depiction of fairness, as contrasted with 
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selfi shness, seems at once compatible with the view we fi nd in 
a wide range of other sources, including Aquinas, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, evolutionary psychology, and the constrained vision 
I outlined in Chapter 2.
In summary
• The moral foundation of fairness responds to proportional-
ity, not equality. It is a question of deserving, of reward or 
punishment at an appropriate level.
• Studies from across psychology, sociology and evolutionary 
studies have found that fairness developed chiefl y to coun-
ter free-riders, cheaters and bad actors prone to ruthless and 
self-seeking behaviour. Despite this, human beings still show 
a selfi sh preference for increasing their own standing relative 
to others.
• In Shakespeare, unfairness usually results in a desire for 
revenge, which leads to ruthless selfi shness; we can see this in 
King Lear (Edmund, Lear himself), Twelfth Night (Malvolio), 
Richard III and Hamlet.
• Following the tragic or constrained vision, Shakespeare cau-
tions that we must accept that life is seldom fair, lest we 
become a Richard III.
• His conception of justice seems to follow Thomas Aquinas in 
looking for moderately proportional punishments emphasis-
ing mercy and rehabilitation (the Duke’s pardon of Angelo 
in Measure for Measure) rather than vengeance (Hamlet not 
killing Claudius at prayer out of spite).
• There is no socially levelling or egalitarian strain in Shake-
speare’s conception of fairness, and it would be a mistake 
to take Edmund in King Lear as a political revolutionary, 
since the plays wholly condemns his self-seeking behaviour, 
which would result in complete societal collapse if taken to 
its logical endpoint (the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’). In the 
absence of fairness, selfi shness reigns, and it is a model that 
cannot subsist.
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CHAPTER 9
SANCTITY
In her classic study, Shakespeare’s Imagery and What It Tells 
Us (1935), Caroline Spurgeon points out that, in Shake-
speare’s plays, evil and images of dirtiness and disease are 
strongly correlated: 
Evil in Shakespeare’s imagination is dirty, black and foul, 
a blot, a spot, a stain; and some sixty examples could be 
quoted of this, as well as many of the reverse and rather 
more obvious uses of spotless, stainless, and so on. . . . 
Shakespeare also thinks of evil as a sickness, an infection, 
a sore and an ulcer.1 
She also adds that evil, thus manifested, appears to be conta-
gious, infecting all that are touched by it: ‘the idea also that 
one evil leads to another is ever present with Shakespeare’.2 
This concept of evil rests on the moral foundation of sanc-
tity. In this chapter, I will examine the link between sin and 
dirtiness, disease or contagion in Shakespeare by looking at 
some key examples in King Lear, Timon of Athens, Othello, 
Richard III, Hamlet, Othello and Macbeth. I will also com-
pare Shakespeare’s sometimes gruesome descriptions of degra-
dation with those found in the Protestant theology of Richard 
Hooker and John Calvin, who each provide dark visions of 
5829_Parvini.indd   262 03/08/18   11:51 AM
 Sanctity [ 263
human impurity. I will also cross-reference Catholic teachings 
on sin as embodied in Thomas Aquinas. In the process, I will 
attempt to discover what was sacred to Shakespeare.
It has been the fashion in recent years to think about 
Shakespeare’s many images of disease in the context of ‘a 
precise historical and medical moment’. For example, while 
Eric Langley is alert to ‘connotations of contagion: interac-
tion becoming infection; communication becoming com-
municative; sympathy facilitating contagion’, in focusing so 
squarely on the early modern understanding of medicine, 
he appears to miss the moral dimension, even though this 
accounts for much of the process he describes.3 Likewise, 
Jonathan Gil Harris does a superb job of tracing contagion 
and disease in the discursive concepts of the emerging nation-
state and mercantilism (especially as regards xenophobia), 
but he too never seems to think of his subject as a moral 
matter.4 Of course, one reason for this is that neither Langley 
nor Harris was writing books about Shakespeare and moral-
ity as I am. Another reason is that it simply would not occur 
to either of them that in writing about disease and conta-
gion in Shakespeare, they were in fact dealing with a mor-
ally charged subject. Of the six moral foundations, sanctity / 
degradation is perhaps the one to which modern Westerners 
are least attuned to thinking of in a moral sense, even though 
it still has great purchase in our culture. 
Jonathan Haidt adapts the concept from his mentor, 
Richard A. Shweder, who calls it the ‘ethics of divinity’.5 It 
is primarily concerned with notions of the sacred or ‘puri-
fi cation’, which, if violated, result in feelings ‘of stain’ and 
‘pollution’,6 activating moral revulsion and disgust. Psycho-
logical studies have found that disgust is not only unique 
to humans (animals do not reject food because of what else 
might have touched it), but also universal across cultures, 
with a readily recognisable facial expression (picture a child 
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tasting a bitter lemon or grapefruit).7 We have particularly 
visceral responses to objects associated with disease that 
might contaminate food. Humans experience:
Revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an 
offensive object. The offensive objects are contaminants; 
that is, if they even briefl y contact an acceptable food, they 
tend to render that food unacceptable. . . . Disgusting items 
have the capacity to contaminate and are usually animals 
or animal products, with feces being a universal disgust 
object among adults.8 
It is obvious that this deeply primeval response evolved to 
help us avoid pathogens. However, it extends beyond food 
into the moral realm whenever a community holds a sacred 
creed. 
In The Righteous Mind, Haidt gives an example:
The current triggers of the Sanctity foundation . . . are 
extraordinarily variable and expandable across cultures and 
eras. A common and direct expansion is to out-group mem-
bers. Cultures differ in their attitudes toward immigrants, 
and there is some evidence that liberal and welcoming atti-
tudes are more common in times and places where disease 
risks are lower. Plagues, epidemics, and new diseases are 
usually brought in by foreigners – as are many new ideas, 
goods, and technologies – so societies face . . . [a] dilemma, 
balancing xenophobia and xenophilia.9 
It is a dilemma that became a reality in the summer of 2017 
in the United States. Haidt wrote a piece in The Atlantic after 
President Donald Trump was criticised by many commentators 
for failing to condemn neo-Nazis suffi ciently at a white nation-
alist rally in Charlottesville: 
Taboo and sacredness are among the most important words 
needed to understand Charlottesville and its aftermath. 
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Taboo refers to things that are forbidden for religious or 
supernatural reasons. All traditional societies have such 
prohibitions – things you must not do, touch, or eat, not 
because they are bad for you directly, but because doing 
so is an abomination, which may bring divine retribution. 
But every society also makes some things sacred, rally-
ing around a few deeply revered values, people, or places, 
which bind all members together and make them willing 
to sacrifi ce for the common good. The past week brought 
violent confl ict over symbols and values held sacred – and 
saw President Trump commit an act of sacrilege by violat-
ing one of our society’s strongest taboos.10 
He continues by describing Trump’s press conference of 
Tuesday, 15 August 2017, and especially his claim that there 
were ‘very fi ne people’ on both sides.
Taboo violations are contagious. They render the trans-
gressor ‘polluted’, in the language of anthropology, and 
the moral stain rubs off on those who physically touch 
the transgressor, as well as on those who fail to distance 
themselves from the transgressor. When people march with 
Nazis and Klansmen, even if they keep their mouths closed 
when others are chanting, and even if they don’t personally 
carry swastika or Klan fl ags, they acquire the full moral 
stain of Nazis and Klansmen. By saying that some of these 
men were ‘very fi ne people’, the President has taken that 
stain upon himself.11 
In this way, the moral transgression of a sacred creed becomes 
like a contagious disease. This is readily captured in the phrase 
‘guilt by association’. Of course, in logical argumentation, this 
is a variant of the ad hominem informal fallacy; it is funda-
mentally irrational, an appeal to emotion. Moral responses 
are seldom, if ever, rational.
Shakespeare gives us many examples of characters being 
totally irrational while leaning on the sanctity foundation. 
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For instance, let us take Lear’s revolting verbal assault on 
Goneril:
 But yet thou art my fl esh, my blood, my daughter,
Or rather a disease that’s in my fl esh
Which I must needs call mind. Thou art a boil,
A plague sore, or embossèd carbuncle
In my corrupted blood. (King Lear, II, iv, 215–19)
Lear is plainly disgusted at his daughter. She has transgressed 
that which is sacred to him, which in this case was her com-
plicity in putting Kent (disguised as Caius) into the stocks 
(see Chapter 6) and her complicity with Regan in refusing 
to house his full retinue of a hundred knights (see Chapter 
10). From Lear’s point of view, moral culpability spreads 
rapidly in this scene. At fi rst, he is angry only with Goneril, 
the source of the ‘disease’, but by the end of the scene Regan, 
Cornwall and Oswald all become tainted and untouchable to 
him as well. He begins by symbolically injecting the ‘serpent-
like’ (II, iv, 154) Goneril with poison: 
You nimble lightnings, dart your blinding fl ames
Into her scornful eyes. Infect her beauty,
You fen-sucked fogs, drawn by the pow’rful sun
To fall and blister. (II, iv, 158–61)
The sun was said to suck poisonous vapours from the 
marshy ground. Even though she has not yet entered the 
scene, Goneril is already polluted in mind. Thus, when 
Oswald enters, Lear immediately lashes out at him: he has 
guilt by association, and is therefore also untouchable:
This is a slave whose easy borrowed pride
Dwells in the sickly grace of her he follows.
Out, varlet, from my sight. (II, iv, 177–9)
Later, after his daughters talk him down from a hundred men 
to just one, Regan catches Goneril’s disease and seemingly, by 
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extension, so do all women. Hence Lear will not let ‘women’s 
weapons, water drops, / Stain his man’s cheeks’ (II, iv, 72–3, 
emphasis mine). Having transgressed his sacred values, his 
daughters are now ‘unnatural hags’ (II, iv, 73). The castle itself 
has become contagious and so Lear forces himself out into 
the storm to contend with the ‘fretful elements’ (III, i, 4). His 
daughters have become so poisonous to him that he would 
rather spend the night raging at the weather than acquiesce 
to their requests to entertain fewer of his men. One critic has 
argued that Lear does not achieve ‘purifi cation’ from the taint 
of this perceived evil until his fi nal interview with Cordelia, in 
a mirror of Virgil’s reunifi cation with Beatrice in The Divine 
Comedy.12 Even though the play depicts an essentially pagan 
world, this purifi cation is possible because so much is ani-
mated – at least within Lear’s own mind – by the moral foun-
dation of sanctity.
In Shakespeare’s plays, perceived spiritual and moral deg-
radation nearly always manifests itself in the physical. Sin 
infects every aspect of a person’s being, rendering ‘diseased 
conditions of mind and body’.13 For example, in Timon of 
Athens, as Timon – like Lear – comes to see himself as ‘more 
sinned against than sinning’ (King Lear, III, ii, 59), he paints 
those around him as physically degrading:
Consumptions sow
In hollow bones of man, strike their sharp shins,
And mar men’s spurring! Crack the lawyer’s voice
That he may never more false title plead,
Nor sound his quillets shrilly. Hoar the fl amen
That scold’st against the quality of fl esh
And not believes himself. Down with the nose,
Down with it fl at, take the bridge quite away
Of him that his particular to foresee
Smells from the general weal. Make curled-pate ruffi ans bald,
And let the unscarred braggarts of the war 
Derive some pain from you. Plague all,
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That your activity may defeat and quell
The source of your erection. There’s more gold,
Do you damn others, and let this damn you,
And ditches grave you all. (Timon of Athens, IV, iii, 151–66)
The imagery in this passage is horrifi c: here ‘consumption’ 
probably represents either syphilis or leprosy, and the effects 
of these diseases are chilling. It causes bone degeneration until 
the marrow is hollowed out. An ulcer grows in the larynx to 
‘crack’ the voice. The bridge of the nose collapses (‘Down with 
nose, / Down with it fl at’). The contaminated man also expe-
riences hair loss (‘bald’) and ‘pain’, and eventually loses his 
sexual functions (‘erection’). Timon, at this point the complete 
misanthrope, embodies moral decay in this imagined disease-
riddled and rotting character, a terrifying fi gure who would 
not be out of place in a modern zombie fi lm. However, as in 
Lear, so much of this is projection from Timon: he perceives a 
morally bankrupt world gone to rack and ruin, and describes 
it in terms of disease, as if evil is a contagion or pathogen 
slowly destroying everyone around him. The fact that so many 
of these images of sickness and decay are psychologically gen-
erated is signifi cant because we cannot straightforwardly align 
Shakespeare’s morals with those of his characters. We can 
plainly see that a link between moral and physical degradation 
is hard-coded in his imagination, but that does not necessar-
ily mean that he agrees with, for example, Lear or Timon on 
what counts as evil.
In fact, it seems that, no matter who is speaking, the 
logic of sin consistently works in the same contagious way 
in Shakespeare’s universe. Thus, when Richard II predicts 
‘ere foul sin, gathering head, / Shall break into corruption’ 
(Richard II, V, i, 58–9), the disease spreads not only into 
the next play but into the one after that: King Henry quotes 
him almost verbatim in 2 Henry IV (III, i, 76–7). The same 
logic is at play in Othello. We see Iago plotting to taint 
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Desdemona’s purity: ‘So will I turn her virtue into pitch’ 
(Othello, II, iii, 331), and from there he can keep spread-
ing his evil. Othello himself thinks of sin in this way – ‘the 
slime / That sticks on fi lthy deeds’ (Othello, V, ii, 143–4) 
– as something disgusting and sticky, something that con-
taminates once touched. Alexander G. Gonzalez has dem-
onstrated how sin works in a close reading of the play, in 
which he fi nds a ‘pattern of transfer’ from one character to 
another: ‘There exists in the play what amounts to a spread 
of evil from Iago to other characters and . . . Shakespeare 
has given us cues in the play’s language that aid us in fol-
lowing the contamination’s progress.’14 It is a broadly con-
vincing view of how evil functions in the play, and entirely 
consistent with what we have seen in other plays.
We also fi nd similar language of corruption in cases where 
characters belie their guilt for sinful deeds they have freely 
chosen to commit, but here the images turn from diseases 
to staining: for example, when Richard III tells Buckingham
But if black scandal or foul-faced reproach 
Attend the sequel of your imposition,
Your mere enforcement shall acquittance me
From all the impure blots and stains thereof. (Richard III, 
III, vii, 209–12)
Richard is playing his coquettish façade here; he must be seen 
to be reluctant to take the throne, but even in the process we 
know, as well as Buckingham, that his moral copybook is 
already covered in ‘blots and stains’. Take Claudius too, in 
his pivotal confession scene in Hamlet:
Oh, my offense is rank, it smells to heaven;
It hath the primal eldest curse upon’t – 
A brother’s murder. Pray can I not:
Though inclination be as sharp as will,
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent
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And like a man to double business bound
I stand in pause where I shall fi rst begin,
And both neglect. What if this cursèd hand
Were thicker than itself with brother’s blood—
Is there not rain enough in the sweet heavens
To wash it white as snow? Whereto serves mercy
But to confront the visage of offense? (Hamlet, III, iii, 35–47)
Images of defi lement pile up. His offence is ‘rank’ and ‘smells’. 
He cannot wash the stain of blood from his hands. Sanctity 
has been desecrated. The image is, of course, biblical:
And when you shall stretch out your hands, I will hide 
mine eyes from you: and though ye make many prayers, 
I will not hear: for your hands are full of blood. Wash you, 
make you clean: take away the evil of your works from 
before mine eyes: cease to do evil. . . . though your sins were 
as crimson, they shall be made white as snow: though they 
were red like scarlet, they shall be as wool. (Isaiah 1: 15–18)15 
It seems this passage was deeply ingrained in Shakespeare’s 
imagination because he returns to it again in Macbeth: 
Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand? No, this my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red. (Macbeth, II, ii, 63–6)
Macbeth speaks these lines but the sin of the deed also infa-
mously stains his wife and accomplice: ‘Out, damned spot!’ 
(V, i, 31). The stain seems permanent: her ‘hands [will] ne’er 
be clean’ and ‘all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten’ 
the odious smell of the blood (V, i, 37, 44–5). The doctor 
admits ‘This disease is beyond my practice’ because ‘More 
needs she the divine than the physician’ (V, i, 52, 67).
Of all the aspects of Shakespeare’s moral compass we have 
explored so far, his mode of depicting sanctity and degradation 
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in terms of disease, contamination and staining has the most 
overtly Christian overtones. However, as Francis Fergusson 
points out:
[T]o recognize Shakespeare’s dependence on medieval Chris-
tianity, as one must, does not require us to suppose that he 
was an orthodox believer. . . . he sometimes even wished to 
de-emphasize the Christianity of his scheme. There is very 
little reference to the Church in Hamlet or Macbeth, and 
Lear is ostensibly set in pre-Christian Britain.16 
In closing this chapter, I would like to take some space to 
discern how Shakespeare’s depiction of sanctity and deg-
radation differs from what we fi nd in theology. As we saw 
in Chapter 4, during the Reformation, Protestant teachings 
leaned heavily on the moral foundation of sanctity. Roland 
Mushat Frye describes ‘how the theologians treated man’s 
universal depravity’: ‘Sin exists as a disease in man; the dis-
ease may be controlled by the medicine of grace, but if it is 
not, it will destroy men in one way or another.’17 In this view, 
mankind is already in a state of sickness or moral decay; the 
only cure comes from divine grace. We can see this plainly in 
Richard Hooker’s theology: 
So, that which is nature once made a disease, the continu-
ance of that disease hath made it nature; for even that light, 
which man whilst he wanteth liveth in perpetual darkness, 
is a light by our weakness not possible to be attained unto; 
and those paths, which in our blindness we grope after 
with so much desire, they are ‘ways’ not possible, by man’s 
weakness, to be found out. For there is ‘a cloud and dark-
ness which are round about him’, and thick mists to cover 
him[.]18
Here human nature is ‘made a disease’, which has the conse-
quence of shrouding us in perpetual darkness; thus weakened 
and blinded, we are unable to see the divine light of God.
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John Calvin gives us an even bleaker vision for humanity, 
and describes it in more visceral terms, in fact, closer to the 
language of Shakespeare:
To man we assign only this: that he pollutes and contami-
nates by his impurity those very things which were good. 
For nothing proceeds from a man, however perfect he be, 
that is not defi led by some spot.19 
In Calvin’s view, humans are so inherently sinful that they 
contaminate all they touch, including that which is good – we 
are all Lady Macbeth, the spot will never come out. Indeed, 
without the grace of God, ‘it is futile to seek anything good 
in our nature’: ‘Only damnable things come forth from man’s 
corrupt nature.’20 Referring to Psalms 5: 9, 140: 3 and 107: 7, 
Isaiah 59: 7 and Romans 3: 10–16, Calvin argues:
With these thunderbolts [God] inveighs not against par-
ticular men but against the whole race of Adam’s chil-
dren. Nor is he decrying the depraved morals of one age 
or another, but indicating the unvarying corruption of our 
nature. . . . This defect, therefore, is necessarily found in 
all who have forsaken God. He adds that all have fallen 
away and have, as it were, become corrupt, that there is no 
one who does good.21 
As in Hooker, we are in a permanent state of degradation, 
the hosts of a disease with no cure that we can administer 
ourselves. 
For the body, so long as it nourishes in itself the cause and 
matter of disease (even though pain does not yet rage), will 
not be called healthy, so also will the soul not be considered 
healthy while it abounds with so many fevers of vice.22 
Here we see, similar to Shakespeare, that sin has a physi-
cal manifestation: if the soul is diseased, so is the body. 
But it is interesting that where Calvin emphasises the soul, 
Shakespeare seems to emphasise the mind or the will, as 
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L. C. Knights noted: ‘Disease [in Shakespeare’s plays] . . . is 
associated with disorder originating in will.’23 Perhaps this is 
why critics have struggled to fi nd the redemptive impetus in 
Shakespeare’s moral universe because sin is a psychological 
phenomenon rather than an affl iction of the soul. It is either 
perceived (as in Lear and Timon), contracted through conta-
gion (as in Othello and the histories) or chosen by will (as in 
the case of Iago himself, Richard III, Hamlet and Macbeth).
However, the most glaring difference between Shake-
speare and these Reformation theologians is that, whereas 
in Hooker and Calvin individuals are already corrupted 
by sin, it seems that in Shakespeare – as we have seen in 
this chapter – characters start plays as nominally pure and, 
whether through their own actions or by contagion, become 
contaminated by sin. In other words, in Hooker and Calvin, 
human beings are fundamentally bad until they are touched 
by goodness (divine saviour), but in Shakespeare human 
beings are fundamentally good until they are touched by evil. 
This is made most obvious in Macbeth, where we can trace 
a descent into sin from the ‘milk of human kindness’ (I, v, 
15) to being ‘in blood / Stepp’d in so far’ (III, iv, 135–6) that 
it can never be washed away. We watch Lady Macbeth wish 
the taint of poison into her breasts:
Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fi ll me from the crown to the toe top-full
Of direst cruelty! . . . .
Come to my woman’s breasts
And take my milk for gall, you murd’ring ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature’s mischief. (I, v, 39–48)
And yet we know she cannot be wholly evil, the stain of sin 
has not yet fully stuck, because she retains some ‘milk of 
human kindness’ in the form of compassion for her father. 
Lady Macbeth gives this as the reason that she cannot kill 
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Duncan herself: ‘Had he not resembled / My father as he 
slept, I had done’t’ (II, ii, 12–13). Perhaps this is what William 
Hazlitt meant when he said – as I quoted him in Chapter 1 – 
that Shakespeare maintains ‘some soul of goodness in things 
evil’.24 It seems that characters are nominally good until con-
taminated by evil. Therefore, it follows that ‘in things evil’ 
there must be some vestige of goodness as a kind of residue. 
This would also account for Alfred Harbage’s fi ndings, which 
I summarised in Chapter 5, that a ‘safe majority’ of his char-
acters are good.25
Shakespeare’s view of humanity thus seems diametrically 
opposed to the Protestant idea of total depravity. In the Protes-
tant view, all mankind is ‘already diseased’, whereas in Shake-
speare’s it appears that characters start with a clean bill of 
health. Therefore, it stands to reason that they must also differ 
in the source of purity (or sanctity). In Hooker and Calvin, this 
is most obviously God, who is all sanctity as mankind is all 
degradation. But in Shakespeare, it seems individuals provide 
their own sanctity, and spread their own degradation. Natu-
rally, this locates him fi rmly in the secular–humanist tradition. 
This is so striking that some, such as W. J. Birch in 1848 or, 
more recently, Eric S. Marlin, have suggested that Shakespeare 
was not a Christian.26 This seems very unlikely to me because, 
in using the very language of sin as something that can ‘stain’ 
individuals, he is working within a recognisably Christian 
framework. It is certainly true, though, that God is somewhat 
out of focus, while human beings are in focus. If we were to 
presume to fi nd God anywhere on Shakespeare’s moral com-
pass, it would be here, on the sanctity foundation (otherwise 
known as the ‘ethic of divinity’) – but where we expect God to 
be, we fi nd only humans. 
There are, however, some similarities to be found between 
Shakespeare’s view of sanctity / degradation and Catholic 
teachings, especially those of Thomas Aquinas, who devotes 
a question in the Summa Theologiae to ‘The Stain of Sin’:
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In its literal sense the word ‘stain’ refers to physical objects, 
as is the case where one bright object – e.g. a garment 
or some gold or silver item – loses its lustre by rubbing 
against another object. It is by simile with this use that the 
term should be applied to spiritual realities. The human 
soul has a twofold radiance: one from the refulgence of 
the natural light of reason, by which its acts are guided; 
the other from the refulgence of the divine light of wisdom 
and grace, which also empower man to act well and nobly. 
When through love the soul cleaves to certain things it is 
as though it were touching them; where sin is involved, the 
soul as it were rubs against certain things that go against 
the light of reason and of divine law. The impairment of the 
soul’s radiance resulting from such a contact is described 
metaphorically as a stain of soul.27 
This view of ‘the stain of sin’ seems to me perfectly compat-
ible with what we have seen in Shakespeare. In the same way 
that characters can be contaminated or stained by sin in the 
plays, here the human soul, which is in a condition of ‘radi-
ance’, can be tainted when it ‘rubs’ against evil. This does 
raise the question of original sin. How can individuals take 
on the additional stain of sin when they are, in effect, already 
stained? Where, in Hooker and Calvin, the stain of original 
sin seems to be totalising, covering everyone and everything in 
darkness, Aquinas views it as being more like the capacity to 
do evil at all than something inherent: the privation of original 
justice rather than explicit wrongdoing on every sinner’s part. 
In other words, original sin is that which makes sin in general 
possible. Babies are born with original sin, transmitted from 
their parents and down the generations from their ultimate 
origin in Adam and Eve, but to all intents and purposes they 
are still ‘innocent’ in the Fallen sense that they have yet to 
commit any wrongdoing of their own will.28 Aquinas gives 
much greater scope for moral agency to humans than do the 
Reformers. Even if divine grace ‘empowers’ us to do good, 
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the ‘light of reason’ grants us a certain independence from 
God in our ability to act at all. Here the Thomistic insistence 
on free will is sharply at odds with Hooker and Calvin, but 
entirely in keeping with Shakespeare. Even though England 
in the 1590s and early 1600s was nominally Protestant, in 
practice, the actual belief on the ground is closer to Catholi-
cism. They may not have thought of themselves as Catholics 
in the sense of being ruled from Rome or respecting the Pope, 
but on such a fundamental issue as how original sin and mor-
tal sins function, a writer like Shakespeare – probably repre-
sentative of his audience – is far closer to the Catholic view 
than he is to the Protestant one. As I argued in Chapter 4, it 
seems likely to me that this was very common. Shakespeare 
and others might have belonged to the Anglican Church, but 
that does not mean that they swallowed the latest teachings 
of Hooker or Calvin wholesale; in fact, it seems as if they 
persisted in the older mainstream Christian beliefs as inher-
ited from Aquinas. It takes a long time for new ideas to fi lter 
through to the populace at large.29
In this chapter, I have argued that the moral foundation 
of sanctity is fundamental to Shakespeare’s depiction of 
good and evil. The idea that sin is a stain, contamination or 
disease that can be spread through contagion is deep-rooted 
in his imagination and recurs across the plays. His concep-
tion of evil undoubtedly has a Christian basis, but he consis-
tently emphasises human action and free will rather than the 
divine, and the psychological rather than the spiritual. His 
view of sin is thus closer to Catholic theology, derived from 
Thomas Aquinas, than it is to Protestant notions of original 
sin outlined by Richard Hooker and John Calvin. This can 
be seen in the fact that he often shows characters becom-
ing infected by or stained by sin – a journey from sanctity 
to degradation – which is in stark contrast to the doctrine 
of total depravity in Reformed theology. If God is sacred to 
Hooker and Calvin, then humanity is sacred to Shakespeare.
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In summary
• Psychological studies have found that the disgust response 
to contaminated food is unique to humans and universal 
across all known cultures. This is the evolutionary root of 
the sanctity moral foundation. Degradation functions like a 
contagion, which infects or stains all it touches.
• Shakespeare consistently depicts evil and sin as a disease, con-
tamination or stain, and it functions like a pathogen: it can be 
transferred from one person to another. There are examples 
across the plays, including in King Lear, Timon of Athens, the 
history plays, Othello and Macbeth. Shakespeare emphasises 
the psychological effects of sin through metaphors of physical 
degradation or staining.
• This way of thinking about evil is rooted in biblical imagery, 
but Shakespeare imagines the stain of sin in a radically differ-
ent way from Protestant theologians of the Reformation, such 
as Richard Hooker and John Calvin. 
• Where Hooker and Calvin see humans as being stained by 
sin from birth, Shakespeare’s characters start from a clean 
bill of health and become contaminated during a given play, 
whether by their own actions or through contagion. Sanctity 
in Protestant theology is God himself, whereas in Shakespeare 
it appears to be in mankind.
• Shakespeare’s view of moral degradation is similar to and per-
fectly compatible with that outlined by Thomas Aquinas, who 
also emphasises free will and an essential human ‘radiance’ in 
the Summa Theologiae.
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25. See Harbage, As They Liked It, pp. 166–70.
26. See Birch, An Inquiry into the Philosophy and Religion of 
Shakspere; Eric S. Marlin, Godless Shakespeare (New York 
and London: Continuum, 2007).
27. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Vol. 27: Effects of Sin, 
Stain and Guilt) [1a2ae.86–9], ed. T. C. O’Brien (London: 
Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1969), question 86, article 1, p. 5.
28. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Vol. 26: Original 
Sin) [1a2ae.81–5], ed. T. C. O’Brien (London: Eyre & Spot-
tiswoode, 1969). See also Jeremy Cohen, ‘Original Sin as 
the Evil Inclination: A Polemicist’s Appreciation of Human 
Nature’, Harvard Theological Review 73:3 (July to October 
1980), pp. 505–6.
29. I should note that in claiming both that the populace at large 
was not especially Calvinist and that the imagery of original 
sin in Shakespeare aligns him with Aquinas as opposed to 
the Reformers, I am at odds with John Gillies, ‘The Ques-
tion of Original Sin in Hamlet’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 
64:4 (Winter 2013), pp. 396–424. Gillies points to Calvinist 
turns of phrase, such as ‘special providence’ (Hamlet, V, ii, 
191), as evidence that, at the very least, the play is a ‘com-
patibilist check upon, or rather correction and modifi cation 
to, the Calvinist consensus preeminent in Shakespeare’s day’ 
(p. 164). My own thought is that we have seen in our own 
time how wide the gap between the intellectual elites of the 
universities and the general populace can grow, and I see 
little reason to believe that the people were any more recep-
tive to radical new ideas in Shakespeare’s day than they are 
now. Of course, in making this claim I am implicitly putting 
Shakespeare on the side of ‘the people’ as opposed to the 
‘intellectual elites’: it was his job to know his audience.
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CHAPTER 10
CARE
In the previous four chapters, aspects of Shakespeare’s moral 
vision have become clearer. He values the duty and reciprocal 
good service necessary for authority; this helps to give people 
a sense of meaning and purpose in their lives. He values two-
person friendships held together by loyalty, which depends 
on love and charity. He values fairness as a measure of pro-
portionality. However, he cautions against the selfi shness and 
vindictiveness that can result from the feeling that the world 
is ‘unfair’ because people are not equally good-looking, tal-
ented or wealthy – a fact with which individuals must make 
their peace, lest they become a Richard III. When these values 
are violated (sanctity), there is mental and physical degrada-
tion, as sin moves like a contagion infecting all it touches. In 
each case, care and harm are symptoms or by-products, and 
invariably this comes either from selfl ess and altruistic ges-
tures towards fellow human beings, or from selfi sh and hateful 
behaviour driven by spite. A subject providing good service, 
or a leader who is true to the principles of authority, performs 
a duty of care. Those that do not invariably bring harm to 
others and eventually themselves. The abandonment of friend-
ship, love and charity leads inevitably either to their oppo-
sites – enmity, hatred and selfi shness – or else to a Timon-like 
loneliness in misanthropy and self-exile; the net effects bring 
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harm to those involved. When fairness gives way to selfi sh-
ness, society descends into a dog-eat-dog death spiral. And 
when moral decay in the form of degradation, disease and 
contamination taints all it touches, the obvious consequences 
are physically and psychologically harmful. In this chapter, 
I will assess the extent to which this is true by focusing on 
plays in which moral order seems to break down completely, 
and the dramatis personae revert to the Hobbesian state of 
nature and unspeakable cruelty: Titus Andronicus, 3 Henry 
VI, Richard III and King Lear. In the constrained or tragic 
vision, when there are no institutions with which to reinforce 
the morals that bind people together (authority, loyalty, fair-
ness, sanctity), the worst aspects of humanity – as embodied 
in the tiger – are granted their fullest expression. However, in 
Shakespeare’s version of this vision, human nature provides 
the seeds of its own rebirth. 
The word ‘tiger’ occurs sparingly in Shakespeare’s works: 
only fi fteen times, and one of them is the name of an inn 
(Comedy of Errors, III, i, 95). In almost all other cases, includ-
ing eight times in plural form, the tiger seems to represent 
solitary self-seeking and inhuman aggression in its rawest 
manifestation. Despite this sparse use, it still seems a pecu-
liarly Shakespearean image, not only because his name will be 
forever connected with ‘his Tiger’s heart wrapped in a Player’s 
hide’, in Robert Greene’s famous attack,1 but also because, 
elsewhere in Renaissance and early modern writings, tigers are 
an endangered species. Niccolò Machiavelli, usually so fond 
of animal metaphors, mentions tigers neither in The Prince 
nor in Discourses on Livy. In this, Thomas Hobbes, his chief 
inheritor in political theory, follows him, fi nding no place for 
tigers in Leviathan. In the major theology of the period, tigers 
are seldom, if ever, mentioned. For example, Thomas Aqui-
nas makes no reference to tigers in the entirety of the Summa 
Theologiae and, likewise, John Calvin’s Institutes is tigerless.2 
Geoffrey Chaucer makes several references to ‘tigres’, which 
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are said to be ‘crueel’ (Knight’s Tale, 1657), ‘ful of double-
nesse’ (Squire’s Tale, 543) and ‘swyfte’ (Boece, 3.8.29).3 The 
chief source for Chaucer’s usage is Statius’s Thebaid, in which 
the two tigers that pull Bacchus’s chariot break free and kill 
three men; the Argives kill the tigers in retaliation, thereby 
restarting the war between Argos and Thebes.4 
However, tigers remain relatively scarce in English litera-
ture for the next 200 years. Ben Jonson makes no reference 
to them.5 In Christopher Marlowe’s Edward II, shortly before 
his death the King laments ‘Inhuman creatures, nursed with 
tiger’s milk’ (V, i, 71) and warns against leaving his son with 
Mortimer because ‘More safety is there in a tiger’s jaws 
(V, i, 116).6 Marlowe also mentions the ‘tigers of Hyrcania’ 
in Dido (V, i, 159). Both are references to Virgil’s Aeneid, in 
which Dido says to Aeneas, ‘The sharp-rocked Caucasus / 
Gave birth to you, Hyrcanian tigers nursed you’ (4.466–7).7 
This is the chief literary source for tigers in the period, and 
they are often connected with Hyrcania, an area to the south-
west of the Caspian Sea in modern-day Iran. Tigers were abun-
dant around Iran and the Caspian Sea in antiquity, although 
they are now extinct in the area.8 It is seemingly these tigers, 
rather than those that drew Bacchus’s chariot, to which Shake-
speare refers most often. Consider, for example, in Macbeth, 
when he sees Banquo’s ghost and likens it to ‘th’ Hycran tiger!’ 
(III, iv, 103) or ‘th’ Hycranian beast’ in Hamlet (II, ii, 372). In 
3 Henry VI, York lambasts the cruel Margaret for being ‘more 
inhuman, / more inexorable / Oh, ten times more than tigers of 
Hycrania’ (I, iv, 154–5).
I am lingering on the image of tigers because they seem to 
have taken on almost mythical quality in the extent of their 
savagery, and Shakespeare appears to reserve it for only the 
most extreme cases – as if it is the most cruel and fi erce thing 
he can evoke. One possible reason for this is that tigers have a 
long history of hunting and killing human beings, and, unlike 
lions, hunt alone rather than in packs and so bring the element 
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of surprise. Since they were so exotic to England, rumours 
travelling down the trade routes and across the seas, and the 
imagination, must have buttressed this fearsome reputation. 
It is doubtful that anyone in London would have seen a real 
tiger, although the Issues of the Exchequer does record that, 
on 5 July 1613, Giovanni Perundini was ‘sent from the Duke 
of Savoy to his majesty [James I] with the present of a tiger, 
the sum of 76l. 13s. 4d’.9 However, Caroline Grigson, an 
expert in the history of exotic animals in England, thinks that 
this was likely to have been a leopard, not a tiger. Incidentally, 
in the early eighteenth century, when the vogue of bringing 
menageries of exotic animals to England started in earnest, 
the tiger lived up to its notoriety by claiming its fi rst victim in 
1703: Hannah Twynnoy, a barmaid from Malmesbury.10 In 
Shakespeare’s imagination, then, the tiger was an emblem of 
inhuman cruelty, a creature almost from another world.
As Titus Andronicus starts, Rome is already ‘a wilderness 
of tigers’ (III, i, 54). The play has long been met by critics with 
‘howls of disapproval’ as ‘an aberrant, “barbarous” work’.11 
Indeed, one theatre critic fainted when reviewing a production 
for The Independent. It was during a run at the Globe in Lon-
don in 2014. She was not alone: ‘more than 100 people either 
fainted or left the theatre after being overcome by on-stage 
gore – making it a strong candidate for the most potent show 
in British history’.12 Why does this play, a box-offi ce block-
buster during Shakespeare’s own life, elicit such responses 
from us ‘modern milksops’?13 There is no reason to believe 
that early modern theatregoers did not have strong emotional 
responses to what they saw (‘What’s Hecuba to him?’, Hamlet, 
II, ii, 478), but also there are no reports of them fainting at 
performances of Titus Andronicus. The answer lies in attach-
ment theory, which explains how humans evolved to meet the 
adaptive needs of protecting and caring for children, and is 
now fundamental to developmental psychology.14 When most 
people see a baby or, let us say, a puppy with big doe eyes, it 
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induces a ‘cuteness response’, which is a ‘releaser of parental 
instincts’.15 Now imagine someone wielding a sledgehammer 
and threatening to bring it down on the head our doe-eyed 
puppy. Even the thought of such a brazen act of cruelty sends 
off signals in our brains and triggers an emotional response. 
The scope of what counts as ‘cute’ varies across cultures and 
history, and can widen or narrow. The trend in Western culture 
has been for this to widen: one need only think of the noun 
‘Disneyfi cation’ to recognise this. Accordingly, the extent to 
which we recoil at violence has increased – although it may 
be hard for some to believe, given the daily news cycles – and 
the extent to which we are violent has decreased.16 This may 
explain why Shakespeare’s own audience could cope better 
with the gratuitous violence in Titus Andronicus, when today 
it sends some viewers into shock and even overwhelms them 
into fainting. However, the play is so extreme that it always 
threatens to teeter over from horror into absurdity; as the 
actor David Bradley, who once played Titus, put it, we might 
also respond with ‘Tarantino-esque laughter’.17 This is another 
coping strategy that puts us at an emotional post-ironic dis-
tance from the subject matter.
The question remains: why is Shakespeare’s early trag-
edy so full of nihilistic cruelty? Even from the beginning, its 
characters have already morphed into ‘tigers’. Revenge has 
become endemic and endlessly cyclical. As the play starts, 
Titus has defeated the Goths, yet ignores Tamora’s pleas 
for mercy because he lost sons in the brutal ten-year war 
that precedes the play. Instead, Titus orders that Tamora’s 
son, Alarbus, be executed to atone for his dead sons. As per 
my analysis in Chapter 8, this form of vengeance is not real 
justice according to natural law and Aristotelian–Thomist 
virtue ethics. Thus Titus, rather than defusing the bonfi re 
of revenge, pours fresh fuel on to it, and gives Tamora and 
her remaining sons every reason to wish to get their own 
back. The new Emperor, Saturninus, declares his intention to 
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marry Titus’s daughter, Lavinia, who is already betrothed to 
Bassianus, Saturninus’s younger brother. Shortly after this, 
moral order breaks down almost totally in Rome. Out of a 
sense of Roman stoicism (group loyalty, see Chapter 7), Titus 
sides with Saturninus, and in the ensuing scuffl e kills his own 
son, Mutius. This unnatural act shows at a stroke that, in 
this imagined late Roman period, degradation has reached 
saturation point. It offends Shakespeare’s sense of authority: 
Titus does not demonstrate good service in unquestioningly 
pledging himself to an arbitrary and tyrannical ruler such 
as Saturninus, who, in turn, shows no signs of good lead-
ership. It also offends Shakespeare’s sense of loyalty: Titus 
chooses masculine group-level allegiance to the kingdom 
over the feminine two-person bond with his own son. This is 
a kin-level relationship, the strongest bond in nature and, of 
course, the one on which the moral foundation of care and 
harm, which evokes the ‘parental instinct response’ is based. 
For a father to kill his own son for so slight a reason offends 
evolution itself, nature itself. To top it all off, Saturninus 
immediately reduces the gesture to nothing, by reneging on 
his pledge to marry Lavinia and proposing to Tamora instead 
– not only Titus’s mortal enemy, but also an enemy of the 
Roman state. This grossly violates the moral foundation of 
fairness: Saturninus has cheated Titus, and negated any sense 
of justice and the rule of law. By the completion of the fi rst 
act, we are already approaching Hobbes’s vision of perpetual 
war: ‘it is manifest that during the time men live without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that con-
dition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, 
against every man’.18
In such a ‘wilderness of tigers’, Tamora promptly repays 
her new husband by cuckolding him with her lover, Aaron. 
He hatches a plan to murder Bassianus and pin the blame 
on another two of Titus’s sons, Quintus and Martius. Acting 
on Aaron’s orders, Tamora’s sons, Demetrius and Chiron, 
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murder Bassianus, trap Quintus and Martius in a pit, and 
then rape and mutilate Lavinia. They cut out her tongue and 
chop off her hands. In a bid to save his sons from execution, 
Titus has his own hand cut off by Aaron in exchange, but, of 
course, this agreement means nothing and the sons are killed 
anyway. Titus exacts his revenge by killing Demetrius and 
Chiron, baking them into a pie and feeding it to Tamora and 
Saturninus. For his sins, Aaron is buried alive up to his chest 
and left to starve. Titus performs a mercy killing on Lavinia 
before taking his own life. It is a lurid scene. Throughout all 
of this, Shakespeare constantly evokes tigers. When Lavinia 
is pleading for her life she says to Demetrius, ‘When did the 
tiger’s young ones teach the dam? / Oh, do not learn her 
wrath! She taught it thee. / The milk thou suck’st from her 
did turn to marble (II, iii, 142–4). In order to make sense of 
what is happening, she can only imagine that this is learned 
behaviour: the idea that Demetrius and Chiron are naturally 
this cruel is unconscionable. Yet, they seem to be. In the fi nal 
scene, Lucius calls Aaron a ‘ravenous tiger’ (V, iii, 5), and 
repeats the epithet – ‘ravenous tiger’ (V, iii, 194) – when 
declaring that Tamora should not be granted funeral rites. 
This is the constrained or tragic vision pushed to its break-
ing point. In the absence of any meaningful institutions to 
uphold a rule of law, to incentivise good behaviour and to 
punish bad and undesirable behaviour, Rome is turned to a 
living hellscape. It might appear that Shakespeare’s view of 
humanity is bleak here: there are only a few checks and bal-
ances keeping us from turning into ‘tigers’. But this is not 
entirely the case, and this is perhaps where Shakespeare 
departs from Machiavelli or Hobbes – it is also, to come back 
to the question I trailed in Chapter 1, as to whether William 
Hazlitt’s optimism is well placed. Shakespeare includes a sin-
gle beam of hope in the play: Aaron, in all other ways a despi-
cable villain without a shred of moral decency, still shows he 
cares for his newly born son. He will not let Demetrius or 
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Chiron kill the baby (IV, ii, 80), and swiftly kills the nurse 
rather than risk its discovery (IV, ii, 144). One is reminded 
here of Emmanuel Levinas’s ‘face-to-face encounter’ and 
what he sees as the infi nite ethical responsibility for the other, 
which in various ways seems to parallel Shakespeare’s view of 
good service in authority (Chapter 6), and charity and loyalty 
in friendship (Chapter 7).19 As we saw in Chapters 5 and 9, 
in Shakespeare’s moral universe, human beings are good or 
innocent until proven otherwise: and here, this child – born to 
abominable parents, and in a society so morally depraved it 
has reached the point of self-immolation – is still an innocent, 
and still, somehow, protected by a father who cares for him. 
In a poetic way, too, Aaron rights the wrong of Titus killing 
his own son, Mutius. It is not a divine or cosmic justice, or 
even a redemptive one, but it does offer some hope for rebirth 
and growth: a consolation for the future of our sorry species.
This basic template is repeated in 3 Henry VI and Richard 
III. After the tumultuous events of the fi rst two plays in the tril-
ogy, moral order has broken down in England almost totally. 
Promises and oaths mean nothing, and wanton cruelty with-
out mercy has become the rule rather than the exception. 
It is not enough for Margaret simply to kill York; she must 
humiliate him, forcing him to wear a paper crown (3 Henry 
VI, I, iv, 94). In one of the most senseless acts of cruelty 
in Shakespeare, Clifford slaughters the adolescent Rutland 
at the site of his birth. The boy begs for his life, appealing 
to common decency, and evoking Clifford’s own son in the 
hope it might spark some human recognition: ‘Thou hast one 
son, for his sake pity me’ (I, iii, 40). Clifford responds roboti-
cally with an abstract and inhumane logic: ‘Thy father slew 
my father; therefore die’ (I, iii, 46).20 The escalating cycle of 
revenge is not only endless but also now impersonal, routine 
and self-fulfi lling, practically without real motivation. After 
Margaret and Clifford kill York in I, iv, his sons Edward and 
Richard immediately vow to avenge his death. 
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This crisis of intensifying immorality reaches its symbolic 
peak when Henry VI, the ailing and by this point truly pathetic 
King, watches a son who has killed his father carry away the 
body, and likewise, a father who has killed his son dispose 
of the corpse. It is as if the horror for the watching Henry 
is too much to bear, and the scene may signal his nervous 
breakdown. The crime is the same as that of Titus: murder 
of a kin-relation, the starkest transgression against natural 
law. But unlike in Titus Andronicus, where it is just another 
moment of madness in the spiralling chaos, here it takes on 
a more melancholy tone. The father recognises his crime: 
‘I have murdered where I should not kill’ (II, v, 122). Henry 
is racked by ‘more than common grief’ (II, v, 94). Henry him-
self is later cruelly stabbed multiple times by Richard, even 
after he has already died (V, vi, 67). Margaret has to suffer, 
witnessing the murder of the only thing in the world she still 
cares about: her son Edward. She begs to follow him: ‘Oh, kill 
me too’ (V, v, 41). The scorpion whiplash of revenge comes 
back to sting her, as Richard and George leave her to live – in 
a cruel irony, where she showed York no mercy, his sons do 
show her mercy and it is a form of torture. But by not killing 
her, they also fail to halt the revenge cycle, which lingers on as 
Margaret drifts almost ghost-like into Richard III. 
And yet, when we reach that play, after years of this circle 
of violence repeating itself, and as moral degradation inten-
sifi es further, we still get a moment of human recognition. 
Richard has sent a pair of assassins to murder his brother, 
Clarence (George). Again, this the murder of a kin-level rela-
tion, and a crime against nature itself. As one of the assassins 
sees Clarence sleeping, he hesitates: ‘What, shall I stab him 
as he sleeps?’ (Richard III, I, iv, 91). What follows is a kind 
of moral panic attack: ‘The urging of the word “Judgement” 
hath bred a kind of remorse in me’ (I, iv, 98–9). The second 
executioner fears that he will be damned for killing another 
human being as he sleeps. We must remember the backdrop 
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to this moment. England has been torn by political violence 
and civil war for years at this point, as depicted in three plays 
by Shakespeare (Henry VI Parts 1–3); or, if we imagine he 
always intended to write the second tetralogy (Richard II, 
Henry IV Parts 1 and 2, and Henry V) next, this is the culmi-
nation of seven plays’ worth of bloody history. We have seen 
fathers and sons murder each other, great warriors and politi-
cians humiliated and killed, innocent children slain without 
mercy: as close to the Hobbesian state of nature as we see in 
Shakespeare, at least on a par with Titus Andronicus. And 
yet, this individual, whose chosen profession is in the dark art 
of murder, still experiences a pang of human feeling: ‘some 
certain dregs of conscience are yet within me’ (I, iv, 110–11).
The pattern in King Lear is similar. Albany calls Goneril 
and Regan ‘Tigers, not daughters . . . most barbarous and 
degenerate’ (4.2.32.10, 13) shortly after we witness Cornwall 
and Regan plucking out Gloucester’s eyes. This is a society 
on a downward spiral: soon Goneril and Regan are at each 
other’s throats in their attempts to seduce Edmund, whose 
rapid advancement in wealth and military strength suddenly 
makes him a prize asset in their self-interested calculation. But 
while the effects of such degradation are physically and men-
tally corrosive, they cannot completely quash human decency 
from welling up in the kingdom. For example, as Cornwall is 
plucking out Gloucester’s eyes, one of the servants, a bastion 
of good service, objects:
Hold your hand, my lord.
I have served you ever since I was a child,
But better service have I never done you
Than now bid you hold. (III, vii, 73–6)
This servant feels strongly enough to draw his sword and 
attack Cornwall, fatally wounding him. Of course, Regan and 
Cornwall – understanding authority only as oppression (see 
Chapter 6) – cannot understand this, and Regan promptly 
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grabs her husband’s sword and kills this ‘peasant’ (III, vii, 80). 
Yet, despite the cruelty to which society has succumbed in this 
play, a kind of compassion still wins out. Edmund is ‘moved’ 
(V, iii, 191) when he sees Edgar again. He seeks reconcilia-
tion if not redemption. His dying wish is to do ‘Some good 
. . . Despite of mine own nature’ (V, iii, 218–19). Lear also 
comes ‘To be tender-minded’ (V, iii, 32) in his brief reconcilia-
tion with Cordelia before her death. In Coppélia Kahn’s iconic 
reading, Lear makes ‘some progress toward acceptance of the 
woman in himself’.21 What this means in practice is exercising 
mercy, empathy and the ethics of care. 
These moments of human decency in the otherwise 
brutal worlds of Titus Andronicus, the fi rst tetralogy (Henry 
VI Parts 1–3 and Richard III) and King Lear, reveal two 
crucial aspects of Shakespeare’s moral vision. First, as John 
Vyvyan put it, ‘there is always a choice’:22 no matter how 
endemic revenge or violence seems, individuals always retain 
the capacity to do otherwise. This is the theme of the next 
and fi nal chapter. Second, even though human beings are 
corruptible to the extent that whole societies can degener-
ate and collapse, such moral degradation is never total and 
is seldom, if ever, lasting. Even those we would imagine to 
be ostensibly ‘lost’ to ruthless self-interest – in these cases, a 
self-described villain and a professional hitman – do not lose 
the capacity for ‘fellow-feeling’.23 This ‘fellow-feeling’ is not 
socially conditioned – how could such hellish societies, dic-
tated by survivalist self-interest, produce such feelings? – but 
rather something that comes from within, that instinctually 
‘wells up in his characters’.24 Even if Albany is often proven 
correct when he says ‘Humanity must perforce prey on 
itself / Like monsters of the deep’ (King Lear, 4.2.32.19–20), 
so too is Polixenes in The Winter’s Tale when he says:
Yet nature is made better by no mean
But nature makes that mean. So over that art
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Which you say adds to nature is an art
That nature makes. . . . We marry
A gentler scion to the wildest stock
And make conceive a bark of baser kind
By bud of nobler race. This is an art
Which does mend nature – change it, rather – but 
The art itself is nature. (IV, iv, 89–97)
Although ‘humanity must . . . prey on itself’, nature also gives 
us the tools with which to mend and grow. And this image of 
rebirth is not a utopian vision putting ‘art’ – that is, human 
invention or reason – above reality; ‘the art itself is nature’. 
Interestingly, this aligns Shakespeare with advocates of group 
selection in modern evolutionary theory, who posit that cul-
tural institutions themselves are evolutionary adaptations at a 
group level (see Chapter 2), and puts him at odds with Thomas 
Hobbes, who saw such institutions as ‘utterly artifi cial’.25
In summary
• Care and harm manifest as consequences of the four moral 
foundations that ‘bind’ – authority, loyalty, fairness and 
sanctity; care results if they are respected, and harm (in the 
form of abject cruelty) results if they are offended.
• Tigers represent the ultimate symbol of cruelty in Shake-
speare, the moment in which all human decency is lost, and 
we are returned to the ‘state of nature’ later described by 
Thomas Hobbes.
• In Titus Andronicus, 3 Henry VI, Richard III and King Lear 
we witness the same pattern: society is reduced to a ‘wilderness 
of tigers’ as every moral foundation is offended.
• However, in each play, Shakespeare shows that even where 
moral degradation seems endemic, human nature still provides 
the tools for mending itself: individuals seem capable of empa-
thy and care, even in the most extreme of circumstances, and 
even after the point where it appears that hope is lost. 
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veers on the side of unconstrained or utopian vision, which is 
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drawing on evolutionary theory. That said, it does not follow 
that Levinas has nothing to say of value, only that the future he 
wishes for is unlikely ever to materialise, and what he describes 
is not the full picture of humanity. In Haidt’s terms, we are only 
‘10 percent bee’; Levinas seems to think we have the capacity 
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CHAPTER 11
LIBERTY
‘There is always a choice’:1 John Vyvyan’s maxim has been 
a consistent refrain in my consideration of Shakespeare’s 
moral compass in Part II of this book. In Chapters 5–10, 
I have found that the plays emphasise individual free will 
as a prerequisite for both good and evil. I have argued that 
in Shakespeare there is no divine, cosmic or poetic justice; 
wrongdoers seldom look for a fi nal redemption, and fi nd 
it even less frequently. Characters are not born evil – we 
watch them choosing to sin, or else giving in to an emotional 
sense that they have been hard done by. A sense of contin-
gency persists: it might have turned out differently if only 
people had made different choices. Edmund and Richard III 
did not have to prove themselves villains; Lear did not have 
to banish Cordelia; Titus did not need to kill his own son, 
Martius; Demetrius and Chiron did not need to rape and 
mutilate Lavinia, and so on. Likewise, the converse is true 
of good deeds: Adam did not have to sacrifi ce his savings 
and ultimately his life for Orlando; Kent did not have to fol-
low Lear; Antonio need not have lent Bassanio the money; 
Celia need not have given up her inheritance and followed 
Rosalind into the woods, and so on. Thus, in Shakespeare, 
liberty – as defi ned by the ability of the individual to decide 
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on their own course of action – is the engine room of moral-
ity. Without it, the entire vehicle grinds to a halt: without the 
ability to choose, we can travel in no moral direction at all. 
As I argued in Chapter 9 (see also Chapter 5), this empha-
sis on individual free will puts Shakespeare fi rmly in the 
secular–humanist and Catholic traditions, and at odds with 
Protestant Reformation thinking, which emphasises divine 
providence and predestination. Indeed, we have found, as 
Stephen Greenblatt has observed, that ‘his work . . . is aller-
gic to the absolutist strain so prevalent in his world’.2
In this study, which comes to its natural conclusion in 
this chapter, I have found all six of the moral foundations 
outlined in Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind – author-
ity, loyalty, fairness, sanctity, care and liberty3 – registered 
in Shakespeare’s plays, but they do not function indepen-
dently of each other. Rather, they form an interlocking set of 
principles, which together we can call ‘Shakespeare’s moral 
compass’. In Richard III, when the Duchess of York sees 
her only surviving son, Richard, she offers him some moral 
counsel: ‘put meekness in thy mind, / Love, charity, obedi-
ence, and true duty’ (II, ii, 94–5). This represents a key with 
which to unlock the compass. It is plain that the Duchess 
is emphasising the moral foundations of authority and loy-
alty. As we have seen, sanctity / degradation and care / harm 
almost always come as the symptom or consequence of deci-
sions and actions taken in the areas of authority and loy-
alty. Fairness, meanwhile, has functioned more as a catalyst 
or motivation. A sense of injustice tends to drive bad moral 
decisions and actions (subversion, betrayal) and therefore 
bad consequences (degradation, harm), whereas the just rule 
of law tends to give rise to good moral decisions and actions 
(authority, loyalty) and therefore good consequences (sanc-
tity, care). To make this clearer, I have depicted these fi ndings 
in Table 11.1.
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In this way, Shakespeare’s moral compass – for all its com-
plex polyvocality, complications and outliers – provides us 
with an integrated view of human morality. While each of 
the moral foundations comes with its own set of instinctive 
intuitions and emotions, and the cultural post hoc rationali-
sations that have built up around them, the plays depict two 
distinct courses of actions: 
1. Virtuous Circle: Liberty begets Fairness, which begets Authority 
and Loyalty, which result in Sanctity and Care.
2. Vicious Circle: Oppression begets Unfairness, which begets 
Subversion and Betrayal, which result in Degradation and 
Harm.
If we think through the examples of when the vicious circle 
manifests in Shakespeare’s plays, it is in situations when 
the current ruler has used his relative autonomy to violate 
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the stages of the virtuous circle. This happens in Richard 
II, in which the King’s conduct ‘can only be described as 
tyrannical’.4 Richard condemns Thomas Mowbray to life 
exile largely for carrying out orders that he gave. He repays 
the good service of his uncle, John of Gaunt, not only by 
banishing his son, Bolingbroke, for six years, but also by 
seizing his estates and wealth after his death. In so doing, he 
tramples arbitrarily on the just rule of law. This is corrup-
tion: when good authority devolves into the mere exercise 
of power, which only ever results in tyranny and oppres-
sion. These actions by Richard birth the vicious circle: 
Bolingbroke feels he has been treated unfairly, which fuels 
a desire for revenge, and so we start the descent towards a 
‘wilderness of tigers’ over the next seven history plays in 
the sequence. We see a near identical course of events in 
Measure for Measure during the period in which Angelo 
takes command (see Chapter 8), and in Titus Andronicus 
and King Lear (see Chapter 10): the arbitrary and tyran-
nical acts of the ruler set off a vicious circle. The sense of 
injustice fuels revenge and self-seeking behaviour, which 
result in abject cruelty and degradation.
But how does one break the vicious circle and restore the 
virtuous circle? As I showed in Chapter 8, one way, in a sense, 
is to let bygones be bygones. The Duke in Measure for Measure 
does not punish Angelo particularly harshly; he offers him a 
chance of self-improvement. This is not the justice of retribu-
tion, or even of forgiveness and redemption, but rather of natu-
ral rebirth and growth. However, I think a vital aspect of this 
judgement is that it is afforded by the person who has perhaps 
the greatest reason to seek vengeance: Isabella. 
Most bounteous sir,
Look, if it please you, on this man condemned
As if my brother lived. I partly think
A due sincerity governed his deeds
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Till he did look on me. Since it is so,
Let him not die. My brother had but justice,
In that he did the thing for which he died.
For Angelo, his act did not o’ertake his bad intent
And must be buried but as an intent
That perished by the way. Thoughts are no subjects,
Intents but merely thoughts. (Measure for Measure, V, i, 
446–56)
Here, even despite the fact that her brother, Claudio, is still 
alive as she says these words, Isabella shows compassion and 
mercy to a man she has every reason to hate. Rather than 
dwell in spite or bitterness towards Angelo, she instead shows 
great empathy in trying to understand things from his point of 
view: perhaps the most Shakespearean of ethics. This requires 
something of a leap of faith: to commit to a virtuous act for its 
own sake without worrying about possible consequences and 
without expecting any form of reward. In fact, each of the 
good deeds I have covered involves a character giving some-
thing freely of themselves without looking for recompense: 
Adam pledging his life savings to Orlando in As You Like It; 
Kent ensuring his King gets good service, even at the risk of 
angering him in King Lear; Flavius seeking out his old master 
while ensuring his colleagues are still paid in Timon of Athens; 
Antonio securing the loan for Bassanio in The Merchant of 
Venice; Celia giving up her inheritance and risking her life 
for Rosalind in As You Like It; and Aaron doing all he can 
to protect the life of his newborn son in Titus Andronicus. In 
order to have any chance of breaking the vicious circle and 
restoring the virtuous circle, an individual is required to put 
the needs of someone else ahead of their own needs. In other 
words, it takes an unconditional, ‘no strings’ act of altru-
ism. In his morality, Shakespeare is closer to George Lakoff’s 
concept of the ‘Nurturant Parent’, who foregrounds nurtur-
ance, empathy, self-development and growth, than he is to the 
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‘Strict Father’, who emphasises strength, authority (as defi ned 
by group hierarchy) and self-interest.5 
Of course, Shakespeare is not an idealist: his plays show 
how frequently and how disastrously human beings fall short 
of this. This is the tragic vision: if nothing else is guaranteed, 
we can count on human beings – or at least a signifi cant por-
tion of them – to give in self-interest. Even within the same 
play as Isabella’s display of compassionate mercy, her brother 
articulates the tragic vision:
Our natures do pursue,
Like rats that ravin down their proper bane,
A thirsty evil, and when we drink we die. (I, ii, 117–19)
The ‘vicious mole of nature’ (Hamlet, I, iv, 24) tends to vice 
not virtue. Yet the strength to overcome it also comes from 
within. Nature destroys, but it also mends and grows.
Neither is Shakespeare a utopian visionary: he does not 
imagine or even wish for a time or place in which there is 
no confl ict, no self-interest and no motivation for revenge. 
The best we can hope for is to keep these darker forces in 
abeyance for as long as we can by keeping the virtuous circle 
going through selfl ess moral choices. At the same time, he 
is not despairing or pessimistic: even in the direst circum-
stances – Hell-on-Earth scenarios such as those we glimpse 
in the fi rst tetralogy, Titus Andronicus or King Lear – there 
is still an opportunity for the good moral actor to choose 
otherwise. Even if the self-sacrifi ce does not end the vicious 
circle there and then, the moral choice might still be enough 
to sow the seeds of future mending and replenishment. 
Even as human beings show a remarkable capacity to self-
destruct, so we also show a perhaps even more extraordinary 
resilience and the ability to bounce back. As signalled most 
explicitly in The Winter’s Tale (see Chapter 10),6 it is likely 
that Shakespeare saw these two countervailing tendencies in 
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human nature – towards self-interest, death and destruction 
on the one hand, and towards charity, growth and renewal 
on the other – as something akin to the changing seasons. 
John F. Danby called these two different faces of humanity 
‘The Benignant Nature’ and ‘The Malignant Nature’,7 but 
every individual has the capacity for both, and has agency to 
choose one course or another. Thus Shakespeare is less pessi-
mistic than those who hold the most extreme variants of the 
tragic vision, such John Calvin or Thomas Hobbes, but at 
the same time he is less optimistic than unconstrained vision-
aries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau or twenty-fi rst-century 
Western progressives. 
One of the most striking features of Shakespeare’s moral 
compass is that his concern seems always geared towards the 
individual and their choices, actions and relationships with 
other individuals. Admittedly, this came as something of a 
surprise to me: I expected to fi nd a writer from the 1590s 
and early 1600s more fi rmly committed to the idea of the 
group and more obviously communitarian in his impulses. 
To come back to a concept I have returned to many times 
since I introduced it in Chapter 1, in foregrounding the indi-
vidual in this way, Shakespeare’s morality is already in some 
ways ‘WEIRD’.8 However, it is not fully so because, unlike 
WEIRD people, who are supposedly blind to the moral foun-
dations of authority and loyalty, as we have seen, these form 
the central pillars of Shakespeare’s moral order – if they fall, 
the rest of society often collapses. But Shakespeare trans-
mutes authority and loyalty from group-level concerns to 
individual-level concerns: the appeal of the ‘band of brothers’ 
(Henry V, IV, iii, 60) is quite different from the idea of good 
service predicated on a master–servant relationship or love 
and charity in friendship predicated on one-on-one relation-
ships, and, as per Chapters 6 and 7, he foregrounds the latter. 
In insisting on these relations between individuals, as opposed 
to between individual and group, the importance and impact 
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of moral choices are put at a premium. Individual choices 
matter to the extent that bad ones result in endemic degrada-
tion and cycles of cruelty, and, in the absence of any sense of 
divine or cosmic justice, good choices are the only path out 
of it. In one respect, Shakespeare’s moral invocation seems 
relatively modest: we should try to get along without killing 
each other. In his view, merely existing without tearing each 
other’s throats out for a while is a remarkable, tenuous, frag-
ile accomplishment. But, as Patrick Gray reminds us, we live 
in a time in which we tend to see peace as the norm, whereas 
for the vast majority of human history – including Shake-
speare’s own time and, as some contend and despite percep-
tions, our own too – confl ict and war have been the norm. 
Peace is fragile, and beyond that so are loving relationships 
between individuals.9
In closing, it is time to return to the question I asked at the 
start of the book: how can we characterise the moral vision of 
Shakespeare’s plays? If I were to characterise the Shakespearean 
ethic beyond his emphasis on love, charity and friendship in 
authority and loyalty, it would be as follows: 
1. There is always a choice; it is never too late to choose to do the 
right thing.
2. The responsibility ultimately stops with you because there is no 
divine or cosmic justice that will otherwise intervene; accordingly, 
do not expect rewards or recognition for your good deeds.
3. We should not write anyone off but rather make an effort to 
understand where they coming from, and try to see things from 
their point of view, because empathy and compassion are better 
than hatred, both morally and consequentially.
4. If we feel hard done by or slighted by unfairness, mercy is better 
than revenge, both morally and consequentially.
Despite the apparent simplicity of these moral instructions, in 
our current time of perpetual petty social media outrage, the 
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prevalence of personality over character, a near-complete lack 
of intellectual charity, increasingly meaningless virtue signal-
ling10 – mere words that are seldom backed by actual virtue in 
the form of decisions and actions – and ever-mounting political 
and cultural polarisation, perhaps a little of the Shakespearean 
ethic would go a long way.
In summary
• Liberty, as manifested in individual free choice, facilitates the 
other fi ve moral foundations.
• If liberty can be maintained through the just rule of law and 
the good choices of individuals, society can sustain a virtuous 
circle in which liberty begets fairness, which begets authority 
and loyalty, which result in sanctity and care.
• However, if oppression takes root, it breeds unfairness and indi-
vidual bad choices, and society descends into a vicious circle in 
which oppression begets unfairness, which begets subversion 
and betrayal, which result in degradation and harm.
• To break the vicious circle and to maintain the virtuous circle 
takes a leap of faith on the part of the good moral actor: they 
must give freely of themselves and expect no reward.
• Shakespeare always foregrounds the individual (and their moral 
choices) over the group, yet authority and loyalty – as defi ned 
by individual rather than group relations – are of central impor-
tance in his moral compass.
Notes
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